ARTICLES

Preventive Military Action and The Middle Power

Transforming Organizational Culture: The Lean Approach to Managing an Infantry Battalion in Garrison

Battle Drill Comes to Canada, 1942–1945

J.L. Ralston as Minister of National Defence During the Second World War: A Reassessment

Morale in Battle: The Theories of Colonel Ardant du Picq
The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official publication of the Canadian Army. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. The Canadian Army Journal is central to the intellectual health of the Canadian Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Canadian Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with the Canadian Army, defence, and security affairs.

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The employment of military force is one of many options our nation has at its disposal in order to act on the international scene, alongside friends and allies. As this latest edition of the Canadian Army Journal goes to publication, our government has chosen to employ a portion of our military power to demonstrate Canada’s willingness to stand up against a growing threat to international stability and security. Although the Canadian Army has not yet been called upon, six CF18 fighter aircraft, along with refuelling aircraft, surveillance aircraft, support personnel and Special Forces advisors on the ground, will be achieving military effects to help the government of Iraq. This situation clearly demonstrates the need for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to remain poised to respond to a call to arms.

It has been just over a month since I took over as COS Army Strategy, and in that time I have come to appreciate the scope and complexity of the challenge we face in ensuring that we continue to develop and sustain the right capabilities for the Army into the future. The Army Commander has recently issued the third edition of Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy, which provides a clear vision for the Army moving forward, including guidance on where we need to concentrate our efforts.

This issue of the Canadian Army Journal offers a reflective view of our profession and the continuum of capability development that drives its evolution, as we seek to continuously inform our development through lessons learned in the past. Talking, writing and thinking about our profession is what we need to do to remain on guard for Canada. It is one way that we remain Strong, Proud and Ready.

Brigadier-General Stephen M. Cadden, CD
THE JOURNEY’S END

The year 2014 may well be remembered as a time of transition for Canada’s Army as one journey in Southwest Asia ended and another in the Middle East and elsewhere began. As Brigadier-General Cadden points out in his own editorial, however, the Army has not yet been called upon, but it must remain ready to act should the call to arms come at a later date.

In the meantime, the Army continues to anticipate future requirements and adapt its forces accordingly. From a concept and design perspective, the recently released third edition of Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy has provided a solid anchor for the pursuit of capability development associated with land operations 2021. In addition to adaptive dispersed operations research, the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre also continues its analysis of the future Army beyond 2021, having recently completed a series of war games and a historical workshop to explore new conceptual ideas, designs and lessons learned. The results of these activities will be published next spring and summer, so watch the journal for upcoming announcements.

This issue of the Canadian Army Journal continues the discussion and debate in many areas of interest. Major Andrew Gimby’s examination of preventative military action is both timely and topical given current events, as is Captain Chaput-Lemay’s article on organizational change. Turning to strategy and tactics, regular contributor Mr. Vincent Curtis examines the writings of Du Picq, while R. Daniel Pellerin traces the origins and evolution of infantry battle drill training during the Second World War. Last but certainly not least, Dr. Daniel Byers examines the wartime leadership of the Hon. James Layton Ralston, Canada’s Minister of National Defence during the Second World War. Our Note to File in this issue raises the question of intelligence leadership, with Captain Brad Benns offering his point of view on the subject. The book review section offers a number of new and interesting reads, with some great titles on Canadian subjects appearing from both academic and commercial presses.
Lastly, as the editorial title states, this is also the journey’s end for me. After a decade serving as first the managing editor and then soon afterwards as the editor-in-chief of the Canadian Army Journal, I am finally relinquishing the chair after this issue to my colleague Major Chris Young, MA (soon to be PhD), who will assume the day-to-day duties of editor-in-chief beginning with the next issue (Vol. 16.2). As for me, I am being “promoted” to executive editor (emeritus, so to speak) and will continue to support the publication in the future with a range of creative content and also serve as a member of the editorial board. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to everyone who helped make the CAJ a success during my tenure at the helm. It is due to your efforts as authors, production staff, editors and translators that we were able to produce one of the finest professional peer-reviewed journals the Army has ever enjoyed. The bar was set high, but you delivered every time, and I am confident that Major Young will continue to publish relevant, timely, high-quality content for your consideration and debate. I hope you will give him your support as you did for me, and I wish everyone well as we go forward.

Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp
Editor-in-Chief
Warrant Officer Lauren Hatfield (front) and Master Corporal Dave Dorosz (back), Task Force Libeccio Airborne Electronic Sensor Operators man the radars aboard a CP140 Aurora aircraft during a mission on 30 September 2011.

Source: Combat Camera
“Preventive action” is a broad-ranging term. In the contemporary security environment, preventive action often involves the synchronized efforts of multiple government departments and agencies in a “comprehensive approach” to achieving their policy goals. Within this framework, the military would be one of several organizations contributing to an overall governmental strategy. Although the role of each organization and how the organizations interact are extremely important aspects of preventive action, this article focuses solely on the military component’s contribution to government strategy, or preventive military action.

For sharper focus, preventive military action will be further categorized based on the use of military force. This delineation is intended to separate relatively benign preventive military actions, such as military training assistance, from operations involving the use of military force, such as multilateral peace enforcement, precision strikes, and full-scale military intervention. With that in mind, for the remainder of this paper preventive military action will be defined only as actions where military force is used in a preventive manner. Even more important, however, is that the use of military force acts as a discriminator which marginalizes middle powers because they do not possess the same military and economic resources as major powers. This follows from traditional realist literature on preventive war, which dealt primarily with large-scale hegemonic war within the context of a balance-of-power
system. Since 9/11 and the creation of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, there has been a resurgence of literature focused on examining the legality and justification of preventive war and its effect on established international norms, as well as investigating its feasibility in the 21st-century security environment. Since the new literature focuses primarily on U.S. policies under the George W. Bush administration, and a traditional notion of preventive war, middle powers continue to be marginalized.

The key issue is that the traditional understanding of preventive military action considers military power from the perspective of major powers. This viewpoint is determined by whether or not a state has the resources and capability to act unilaterally. As a result, middle powers are immediately excluded because when they consider the preventive use of military force it will normally be within an alliance or coalition context in order to compensate for their lack of resources. For middle powers, military power is wielded as a means to gain influence within the alliance, or coalition, and is contingent not solely on the size of the contribution, but more importantly on the level of risk the middle power is willing to accept.

The goal of this paper is to determine how a middle power, such as Canada, undertakes a preventive military strategy involving the use of military force. Firstly, this paper will develop a theoretical framework followed by two case studies, Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011). More specifically, the theoretical framework will first require defining what is meant by a middle power. Secondly, since the two case studies are both examples of the coercive use of military force, in particular air power, it will be necessary to provide a theoretical foundation of coercion. Lastly, within the framework, the relevant issues involving the coercive use of air power will be discussed. Once the framework has been established, the case studies will be analyzed. It is important to note that the focus of this analysis is not whether the coercive objectives of either campaign were effective but, more specifically, how Canada used its military power within the alliance or coalition.

DEFINING A MIDDLE POWER

Paul Gecelovsky has grouped the various methods of defining a middle power into two basic approaches: positional and behavioural. Jennifer M. Welsh summarizes the behavioural approach by contending that middle powers are “characterized by their tactics: compromising, building coalitions, participating in international organizations, forging consensus and maintaining international order.” Further, this perceived commitment to internationalism has led to a belief that middle power states possess an innate altruism “because their actions were judged to be motivated less by self-interest than by service to the international community.” This perspective minimizes the influence of national interest on middle-power foreign policy decisions and emphasizes altruistic motives. In contrast, the positional conception of middle powers places them within a hierarchy between great powers and small powers, which is based on state capabilities such as “geography, population, military, economic, technological, and diplomatic capacity.” In this case, middle-power states are defined based on the constraints imposed by their relative capabilities. A third methodology would be to consider middle-power status through the notion of national interest.
Donald E. Nuechterlein developed a national interest matrix as a method to “understand the foreign policy goals of nation-states.” This matrix can be conceptualized as four national-interest goals lying along a spectrum with the realist and idealist political philosophies at the polar extremes. Moving from the realist end of the spectrum towards the idealist end, the four national interest goals are defence of homeland, economic well-being, maintaining world order, and promotion of values. This framework is useful because it makes the goals of middle-power foreign policy clearer. Instead of simply labelling a middle power altruistic, or idealistic, the framework acknowledges that it could lie anywhere along the spectrum based on its national-interest goals. Arguably, middle powers will hover around the national-interest goals of economic well-being and maintaining world order—a more middle-of-the-road foreign policy agenda.

A further consideration when examining middle-power national-interest goals is the resources available to achieve those goals. As mentioned, middle powers do not have the same depth and breadth of resources as great powers; therefore, there will be limits on the scope of their national objectives and how they can be achieved. When placed in the context of preventive military action, middle powers will still act when it is in their national interest; however, in order to compensate for their resource constraints, they will normally take action within a coalition or alliance.

As a member of an alliance or coalition, middle powers will be able to draw on the more extensive military resources of larger powers within the coalition, or will have the potential to pool resources in order to fill capability gaps. Although coalition formation may make it possible to overcome some of the obstacles to implementing a preventive military strategy, as well as create greater potential strategy options, it also creates problems. Firstly, it creates potential conflict between the objectives of individual actors and those of the coalition. In fact, this potential friction can weaken the credibility of the threat to use force because of perceived tension between coalition members. Secondly, “coalitions remain a partnership of unequals” where greater influence by some states within a coalition is due in part to the “level of political commitment as well as the size and capability of the military contribution.” In these instances, middle powers with limited resources could be easily marginalized within the larger coalition. The third issue associated with coalitions is burden sharing. Interestingly, Jakobsen concluded, “coalitional consensus concerning threats and use of force requires the presence of one or more states ... willing and capable to take the lead and accept most of the costs.” However, accepting the greatest costs will most likely also provide the state, or states, with a greater voice in strategy and policy formulation.

Unlike coalitions, alliances have established mechanisms for decision making which are designed to work by consensus. Although alliances are based on member equality, in recent operations a hierarchy has emerged even among the members who contribute to the operation. This hierarchy is based on the part their forces are willing to play and whether contributing nations will accept a combat role. In this sense, the level of risk assumed by the nation determines the role it will play in decision-making. This is an important factor to be considered for Canada’s role in both the Kosovo and Libya interventions.
COERCION AND MILITARY ACTIONS SHORT OF WAR

Coercion is an important gambit used by states in international relations. There are several variations and nuances to using a coercive strategy; however, at the heart of any theory of coercion is force: armed violence in support of a state’s objectives. Thomas C. Schelling believed that “the threat of violence continuously circumscribes international politics.” From this perspective of international relations, it only seems reasonable that he understood coercion in terms of violence and military threats. He also understood that violence in diplomacy is most effective when “the power to hurt … is held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.” Schelling creates a broad understanding of how coercive violence is used in international relations from diplomacy to warfare. When considering both case studies, Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), two facts emerge. Firstly, both are examples of the coercive use of force in military actions short of war and, secondly, both case studies can be understood within the concept of coercive diplomacy. In order to further define the two case studies, I will outline both coercive military actions short of war and coercive diplomacy. The intent is to provide greater context to the case study analyses.

A coercive military threat, or action, can be present both in war and in conflicts short of war. As Stephen Cimbala explains, a “coercive military strategy is politico-military competition short of war, or a politico-military strategy within war itself.” In the process of outlining an analytical framework for the subsequent case studies, it is important to distinguish between coercive acts during war and coercive acts in conflicts short of war. At first glance, it may seem plausible to distinguish between the acts themselves; however, the problem is that coercive military acts in conflicts short of war may be extremely similar to coercive military acts conducted during a war. For example, Peter Viggo Jakobsen concluded that the air war launched against Saddam Hussein in January 1991 was a coercive diplomatic strategy because it left it up to “him [Saddam Hussein] to decide whether he wanted to withdraw or not.” For Jakobsen, one way to distinguish between coercive acts in war and in conflicts short of war is whether the adversary is given the choice to comply or not. During the Vietnam War, the United States conducted four separate bombing campaigns against North Vietnam. The intent of those bombing campaigns was to force the North Vietnamese into halting ground offensives into South Vietnam and to force them to conduct peace negotiations. In that instance, North Vietnam was also given the choice to comply or not; however, the coercive strategy took place during a war. The point is that a considerable amount of grey area exists between coercive acts in war, or what Schelling referred to as “coercive warfare,” and in conflicts short of war. Returning again to the First Gulf War, the air war was also used to cripple the Iraqi air defence and command and control. From an alternative perspective, these types of strikes could be considered the initial phase of the war.

If it is not possible to strictly determine which types of coercive military actions are used in conflicts short of war and which are used during war, then the distinction must be made between the conflicts themselves. In other words, the threshold between what constitutes war and what does not needs to be determined. Paul Gorden Lauren went as far as to say there is a lack “of any universally accepted criteria for determining precisely at what point conflict becomes war.” The Correlates of War Project was “designed to identify the variables that are
most frequently associated with the onset of war during the century and a half since the Congress of Vienna.\textsuperscript{25} More specifically, it outlines in operational terms “the criteria that must be satisfied in order for a sequence of military hostilities to be classified as an international war.”\textsuperscript{26} Using the project’s criteria, a working definition can be extrapolated. An inter-state conflict can be considered a war if it is waged between two or more national entities that are members of the international system where a minimum of 1,000 military battle fatalities were sustained by the participants.\textsuperscript{27} Using this definition, both the Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) air campaigns can be considered military actions short of war. The second key element to refining the case studies is that in both instances demands were made to the targeted state, with which it had the choice to comply or not. Further, there was a gradual escalation to the use of military force, which implies that both examples fall within the realm of coercive diplomacy.

Coercive diplomacy does not emphasize the early use of physical military moves to communicate commitment and enhance the credibility of the threat. As Lawrence Freedman notes, “diplomacy looms large in coercive diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{28} According to George and Simons, even if force is used, “it takes the form of an exemplary or symbolic use of limited military action to help persuade the opponent to back down.”\textsuperscript{29} This does not mean that military force cannot be a crucial element of coercive diplomacy, and one of the shortcomings of George and Simons’s definition is that it does not specify what constitutes limited military action or limited force. Realizing this gap in the theory, Peter Viggo Jakobsen attempted to provide a definition for what would constitute limited force:
The proposed definition has two components that are directly observable and easy to measure: (i) a communication of limited intent to the adversary and (ii) military operations that do not achieve decisive outcomes. Some will no doubt object that ignoring the amount of force employed will create paradoxical results. Successful limited military operations such as the use of special forces to rescue hostages will be classified as full-scale force because they settle the issue at hand, whereas major air campaigns will be classified as limited use of force. This will have the unfortunate effect of making it easier for policymakers to characterize major use of air power resulting in massive human and economic costs as “limited use of force.”

From this perspective, coercive diplomacy could involve a significant military component, even if the intent is to use just enough force to achieve the desired effect.

One of the benefits of coercive diplomacy is that it can be a relatively “low-cost strategy when it succeeds, [however] failure is unfortunately very costly as the coercer then faces the … choice of backing down or executing his threat.” Coercive diplomacy also has the benefit of assuming less risk of unwanted escalation, which is not necessarily the case for coercive military strategies. For middle powers that do not have extensive resources, a strategy based on coercive diplomacy may be the most plausible option.

**COERCION AND AIR POWER**

The use of air power as a coercive military strategy has become increasingly popular among western powers since the end of the Cold War. In *The Future of U.S. Coercive Airpower*, Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman and Jeremy Shapiro explain why air power has become the preferred coercive military strategy, in relation to other forces:

> Even before the Kosovo crisis, many American political leaders appeared to view airpower almost as a first resort to enhance the credibility of their threats or to demonstrate their resolve. Economic sanctions are now widely viewed as ineffective and cruel; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are imprecise and disproportionate; and ground forces are too risky and too slow to use for such nuanced purposes. In contrast, attacks from the air—be they isolated cruise missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan, prolonged intimidation of Iraq, or a concerted bombing campaign against Serbia—offer U.S. political leaders the possibility of a coercive option that is precise, scalable, rapid, and relatively risk-free.

The search for low-risk coercive strategies also speaks to the desire by democratic states, in general, to reduce war costs. Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth and Sarah E. Croco contend that a nation’s choice of military strategy is one method used to keep war costs to a minimum.
Although their analysis did not discuss the coercive application of military power, the idea that a democratic state will choose a military strategy that minimizes war costs is relevant. The problem with this reasoning is that it does not take into account the actual effectiveness of using air power as a sole coercive military threat.

Looking at air power as a coercive strategy, Robert A. Pape determined that, used alone, it could not achieve coercive goals. When the Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) air campaigns are viewed within the context of Pape’s conclusions, two problems arise. Firstly, Pape examined air power as a coercive strategy within war, not in situations short of war. This is an important distinction because the strategy’s goals will be different, as will the risk the coercing state is willing to assume. In a war of necessity, a nation is more willing to accept greater risk with regards to the types of strategies it is willing to employ and, more specifically, the types of targets it is willing to engage. In limited conflicts short of war, the reverse will be true. Secondly, because Pape focuses on military coercion in war, he does not consider the role of middle powers within the larger campaign. As previously discussed, it is inherently difficult for middle powers to embark unilaterally on a preventive military action, since they lack the necessary resources and capabilities.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: KOSOVO INTERVENTION, 1999
The seeds of the Kosovo conflict, which resulted in NATO military intervention in March 1999, had been sown 10 years earlier when Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević made constitutional changes that deprived the Serbian province of its autonomy. As a result of the systematic oppression, rights abuses and violence, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed in order to vigorously oppose Serbian control of Kosovo. Conflict escalated throughout the 1990s until 1998, when major clashes resulted in the deaths of 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and the displacement of 400,000 people from their homes.

The international community, which was becoming increasingly concerned about the escalating humanitarian crisis and the threat to regional stability, sought to resolve the crisis. Diplomatic efforts intended to halt Serbian oppression of Kosovo Albanians carried on throughout 1998 and early 1999, but no settlement was reached. Since “diplomatic and economic pressure … failed to produce a change in Serbian policy toward Kosovo, air power was viewed as the most acceptable next step given these previous efforts.” NATO members not only saw air strikes as an appropriate escalation of force, but also felt that they would result in a lower risk of casualties and collateral damage. On 24 March 1999, NATO launched Operation ALLIED FORCE, a 78-day air campaign, which ended with Milošević’s capitulation on 10 June 1999.

The NATO air campaign followed in roughly three phases, with each phase signalling an increased level of alliance commitment. Targeting during the first phase of the operation was limited to “command and control facilities, air defence sites, and airfields.” In part this was due to political friction over target selection, bad weather, and limited air resources; however, those initial targets also represent an important military strategy called Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), which is the preliminary phase in an air campaign. Its purpose is to gain air
superiority, which is “a necessary step” in the pursuit of a coercive air strategy. Although the initial targets did not strike at the heart of the Milošević regime, they signalled a commitment by NATO to act on its threat of force. More importantly, they signalled the commencement of an air campaign. As the campaign continued and the prospect of a quick capitulation dwindled, the second phase was initiated. That phase included a “broader range of fixed targets throughout Serbia proper and also ... escalate[d] attacks on Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.”

The third phase involved strategic targets and included “civilian infrastructure with military applications” such as radio and television facilities, as well as electrical power facilities. Although the third phase was never officially launched, the prosecution of strategic targets increased into April and May, particularly following the NATO summit held in Washington from 23 to 24 April 1999, where NATO members reinforced their commitment to the campaign.

The process of escalation through each phase of the air campaign signalled increased levels of commitment. Although immediately striking strategic targets may have signalled a higher level of commitment, the demands of alliance warfare required target selection based on consensus. Some alliance members were not as willing to strike non-military targets at the outset of the war. The process of escalation acted as an “…approval process designed to ensure allied consensus.” It was equally important to maintain alliance cohesion because a fragmented membership would have signalled a lack of commitment and weakness more damaging than a staged escalation of force.

Operation ALLIED FORCE was approved by all 19 members of NATO with 13 providing aircraft in support of the operations, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although the number of contributing nations demonstrates a certain level of alliance cohesion and determination, it was the U.S. that contributed the majority of the aircraft (700 out of 1,055) and flew the majority of the 10,484 strike sorties. Consequently, the U.S. was the principal player in the international political arena and dominated the planning and conduct of the air campaign. In contrast, by the end of the campaign Canada had contributed 18 CF18s and 300 personnel to the allied force and had flown 10% of the strike sorties. Based on a total of 10,484 allied strike sorties, Canadian aircraft flew approximately 1,048 sorties. That means that, over a 78-day bombing campaign, Canada flew approximately 13 strike sorties a day. From the perspective of a large power with extensive resources, like the U.S., 18 fighter aircraft may not be a significant commitment, but 18 CF18s represent almost a quarter of Canada’s entire fighter force. For a middle power, that is a significant contribution.

Canada contributed less than 2% of the total number of aircraft for Operation ALLIED FORCE, but flew 10% of the strike sorties, averaging 13 strikes per day. These figures represent a significant operational tempo based on the size of the force contributed. They also suggest the possibility that middle powers must work harder within an alliance or coalition construct. The benefit that may result is an increased level of influence within the decision-making apparatus and the alliance as a whole. When middle powers contribute to an operation, their contribution
is normally compared to that of the dominant power. It is much more telling to compare their contribution to other smaller powers within the alliance. From the analysis thus far, there are four criteria which stand out as relevant in judging the commitment level of a middle power to alliance operations, including the size of the contribution relative to the size of the national forces, the size of the contribution in relation to other middle powers’ contributions, the operational tempo of the contributed force, and whether the middle power is acting in a combat role. The last criterion is important because it signals a level of commitment based on the willingness to assume risk.

In the Kosovo case it was clear that, without U.S. strategic assets, other members of NATO would not have been able to conduct the air campaign. It seems that, due to their limited military capacity and strategic resources, middle powers such as Canada must align themselves with large powers in order to implement a preventive military strategy. If that is so, then the secondary goal of middle powers like Canada will be to ensure that their national objectives are not marginalized or subsumed by the objectives of the dominant power. Although the benefit of the alliance structure is that the decision-making apparatus is based on member consensus providing each member an equal voice, greater influence within the alliance appears to be gained through the level of contribution.

OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR: LIBYA INTERVENTION, 2011

The Arab Spring protests, which commenced in Tunisia in late 2010, eventually spread to Libya in February 2011, erupting in the streets of Benghazi with protesters calling for the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. The government response to the initial protests was quick and violent. Firing on protesters rapidly escalated to using all available means to crush the rising rebellion. On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, which condemned the use of violence and force against civilians and called for an arms embargo, as well as a travel ban and asset freeze for individuals complicit in the use of violence and force against civilians. Despite international condemnation and UN Resolution 1970, violence and the use of force against civilians continued unabated, with the overall situation devolving into a civil war.

On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which authorized member states “to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack … while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” Resolution 1973 also authorized the creation of a no-fly zone to be enacted by member states. On 19 March 2011, following the adoption of Resolution 1973, a coalition made up of the U.S., Canada, Britain, Italy and France struck Libyan air defences under Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. On 23 March 2011, NATO commenced the enforcement of the arms embargo under Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, which on 25 March 2011 took over responsibility for enforcing the no-fly zone, and on 31 March the mission to protect civilians, from Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. The campaign ended on 31 October 2011, not with Gaddafi’s capitulation, but with the overthrow of his regime by rebel forces. In that respect it stands as a stark contrast to the Kosovo air campaign.
Between 14 and 15 April 2011, NATO foreign ministers outlined the objectives for Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR at the Berlin Conference, including an end to all attacks and threat of attacks against civilians, the withdrawal of all regime forces to bases, and immediate humanitarian access.\textsuperscript{56} Undaunted by NATO military action, Colonel Gadafi remained defiant, vowing not to surrender but to continue fighting, even as rebel forces were securing the Libyan capital of Tripoli.\textsuperscript{57} The NATO air campaign was not successful in coercing Gaddafi to concede and accept the goals of the Berlin Conference, but that may not have been the actual goal. Alliance air strikes were crucial to protecting civilians, but more telling was their role in supporting the rebel forces in ousting the Gaddafi regime.\textsuperscript{58} Initial air strikes were directed at Libyan air defences and air forces, and they also degraded ground forces by striking targets such as tanks and artillery pieces. Further attacks on logistical nodes aided in severing the supply lines to Gaddafis forward forces, hampering their ability to attack civilian targets.\textsuperscript{59} In mid-April, air strikes began to focus increasingly on command and control nodes in Tripoli in order to further degrade the Libyan regime’s ability to direct attacks against civilian targets. When the Libyan capital was liberated between 19 and 22 August, “reports indicated that the city’s fall was brought about by a sophisticated military operation involving the close coordination of coalition air power, NTC [rebel] ground forces and amphibious landings.”\textsuperscript{60} From that perspective, it appears that the NATO air campaign was designed less to force Gaddafi to capitulate than to implicitly support rebel forces in forcing a regime change.

It is apparent that a gap exists in the current research with regards to the NATO intervention in Libya, in large part because Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was concluded just 17 months ago.
As a result, there are several questions which still need to be investigated, but unfortunately an in-depth analysis of all the factors and nuances of the Libyan intervention is beyond the scope of this case study. What can be discussed in more detail is Canada’s role in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, as well as some implications for middle powers and the use of preventive military action within an alliance or coalition construct.

In support of NATO’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Canada provided seven CF18 Hornet Fighters, one CC150 Polaris tanker, two CC130 Hercules tankers, one CC130 Hercules airlifter, and two CP140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. In total, Canadian planes flew 1,538 sorties, 944 of which were strike sorties flown by the CF18 Hornets; this represented 10% of the total strike sorties flown by NATO aircraft. Canada also deployed the HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN, whose patrolling directly off the coast of Misrata became integral to the rebel defence of the town. In particular, the HMCS Charlottetown developed a relationship with rebel forces in Misrata and assisted in coordinating air strikes with rebel commanders, resulting in 260 targets destroyed.

Finally, the overall commander for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard. It is also significant that the Commander of Maritime Command Naples was an Italian, Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri. The operational command and control appointments were more heterogeneous than in the Kosovo campaign and were not dominated by U.S. personnel. That was in part a result of the U.S.’s desire to minimize its involvement in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR due to ongoing commitments in other operations within the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. Nevertheless, the U.S. still made a significant contribution which was crucial to the success of the mission.

As in the Kosovo campaign, U.S. forces destroyed the majority of Libyan air defences, provided reconnaissance assets, and made 80% of the refuelling flights. As mentioned previously, the destruction of air defences is an important first phase in an air campaign and requires a certain degree of professional knowledge and experience. U.S. forces, in particular the Navy, have a great deal of experience with SEAD operations, dating back to bombing campaigns in North Vietnam and subsequently in Iraq during the First Gulf War. From this perspective it could be considered a strategic capability that other forces do not possess to the same level, or do not possess at all. Moreover, U.S. planes still flew 26% of all 26,500 air sorties, more than any other country. Sources tend to vary on the total number of air assets that took part in the operation, as well as the specific breakdown by nation, but it is safe to say that the U.S. contributed approximately 60% of all aircraft. Interestingly, one source revealed that the number of combat aircraft contributed by the U.S. was almost equal to the number contributed by the other nations combined. The wide discrepancy was in support aircraft such as AWACS/EW, refuelling and specialty air assets: in each of those cases, the U.S. contributed at least three times more aircraft than the other contributing nations combined. In addition, once NATO assumed command under Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the U.S. focused on providing key enablers, with the majority of the combat sorties being flown by other participating countries such as Canada. Canada was also able to provide operational-level assets, which it had not been able to do in Kosovo in 1999, and that contribution reinforced its commitment to the mission and its credibility within the alliance.
Beyond the seven CF18 Hornets Canada contributed to the Libya intervention, it also provided operational assets such as one CC150 Polaris tanker, two CC130 Hercules tankers, one CC130 Hercules airlifter and two CP140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. Further, the overall commander for CJTF Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard. In the Kosovo air campaign, Canada had contributed tactical-level resources, but its contribution of operational assets in Libya demonstrated a desire to play a leading role in the campaign. In particular, having a Canadian as the overall CJTF commander provided greater influence on how the military action would be prosecuted, enhancing Canada’s political influence within the alliance.

CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this paper the question asked was whether a middle power, such as Canada, would be able to conduct a preventive military action involving the use of military force. The answer to that question is yes, but with some caveats. Compared to a major power, a middle power with constrained resources will be limited in the type, size and scope of preventive military strategy it can follow. The constraining influence arises from two factors. Firstly, because middle powers have fewer resources, they must act through an alliance or coalition structure. Secondly, the alliance itself imposes constraints because the middle power is one state among many; therefore, it is necessary for middle powers to influence the decision-making apparatus of the organization in order to achieve national objectives.

These two case studies made it apparent that middle powers would not be able to conduct a preventive military strategy involving the use of force without the support of a major power such as the U.S. In both cases it was necessary for the U.S. to provide more than 60% of all aircraft, and it was the only state able to provide vital specialty platforms such as the joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) and the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which were necessary for both air campaigns. Moreover, when an alliance or coalition prosecutes a preventive military strategy, the objectives of the campaign are alliance objectives; therefore, it becomes increasingly important for middle powers to be able to influence the decision-making process within the alliance. The important question for middle powers is how this can be achieved.

Alliance structures are designed based on the idea that members are equal and decisions are made by consensus. However, outside the established structure, nations are able to exert influence on the decision-making process. Christian F. Anrig alludes to this process when he identifies the emergence of a hierarchy within the alliance during the Libya air campaign. NATO countries were placed into one of three categories: “those that conduct offensive air operations; those that relegate their actions to air policing, effectively a non-combat role; and those which fail to appear at all.” From another perspective, Brigadier J.P. Riley noted that it is not necessarily the size of a nation’s contribution, but “the provision of high-value assets or the acceptance of greatest risk” that determine the level of influence within an alliance operation. Following
these two streams of logic, there are three factors which should be considered by middle powers when determining whether to participate in a preventive military action under the auspices of an alliance.

The first factor to be considered is what size of contribution the middle power is willing to make. The size of the contribution must be relative to the size of the contributing nation’s forces. Measuring Canada’s contribution to the Kosovo or Libya air campaigns against the size of the U.S. contribution is not a fair comparison. Instead, the decision should be made based on a percentage of the particular nation’s military. For example, if a nation which possesses only
100 fighter aircraft contributes 25 of them to an alliance operation, that represents 25% of all their fighter aircraft. A larger power may be able to contribute more aircraft, but it might be a smaller percentage of their overall number of aircraft. This is an important aspect to consider when gauging member commitment to an alliance operation.

The second factor to be considered is whether the contribution will be relevant and desired by the alliance. During the Kosovo air campaign, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), USAF Lieutenant-General Short, “requested that we [component commanders] all tell our nations not to send or offer any more day, Visual Flight Rules, air defence fighters. He needed

“HMCS VANCOUVER’s Sea King helicopter conducts air surveillance operations off the coast of Libya during Operation MOBILE.”
precision bombers, and particularly wanted multi-role aircraft that could be employed where and when needed.”71 Looking specifically at Canada’s contribution to the Kosovo air campaign, “the theatre air commander for Operation ALLIED FORCE considered the CF18s to be ‘on the first team’ because of its valuable day/night capability to deliver laser guided bombs.”72 The relevance of the contribution can also have the secondary effect of increasing the operational tempo for a particular nation. If only 5 out of 10 nations possess the required level of interoperability and technological capability desired by the alliance, it stands to reason that their operational tempo will be significantly higher than that of the remaining nations. For a middle power, this may have the added benefit that they will be perceived to be doing more than their share of the work. That perception could translate into political influence within the alliance because it lends credibility to the overall national contribution.

Lastly, middle powers must carefully consider the role they choose to play within the operation: specifically, whether it is a combat or non-combat role. The greater the risk a nation is willing to accept, the greater potential political influence it will be able to wield within the alliance. During the Cold War, burden sharing normally revolved around the sharing of costs, national defence expenditures and national contributions to NATO’s defence against the Warsaw Pact.73 It appears as though a new measure of burden sharing has evolved since the end of the Cold War. It seems reasonable that the acceptance of risk, denoted by a nation’s willingness to contribute to a combat role in operations deemed discretionary by the home nation, has become a new and important element of burden sharing within the alliance. The potential exists for middle powers to use this new measure as a means to gain greater influence within the alliance.

As stated at the beginning of this article, middle powers must view military power from a different perspective than great powers because they do not have the level of resources and capabilities that allows great powers to conduct unilateral preventive military actions. Since middle powers will consistently operate within an alliance or coalition context, military power should be considered in terms of influence and less in terms of direct force on the targeted state. Levels of contribution to an alliance or coalition preventive military action can equate to varying levels of influence, which can further support the attainment of national goals, both directly and indirectly.

ENDNOTES

1. The “comprehensive approach” to operations is not necessarily a new concept. Its tenets have existed within both counter-insurgency and civil–military cooperation doctrine, but since 2001 they have been rediscovered due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.


3. Traditional realist theories consider “preventive war” as a response to a “balance of power” system where states are in constant competition for power. Three significant considerations of “preventive war” within the context of the


10. Ibid., 19.


18. Ibid., 3.


21. Ibid.


26. Ibid., 37.

27. Ibid., 37–39.


32. Ibid., 9.


40. Ibid., 2.


43. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power, 58.

44. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War Military Operation.


50. Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis,” 573.

51. Ibid., 576.


63. Perry, *Leading from Behind is Still Leading*, 17.

64. *Ibid*.


An infantry battalion is an organization that regains its sense of purpose in wartime; the role of its members is to close with and destroy the enemy. The organization is capable of physically and mentally projecting itself through space and remaining there over time. The infantry battalion is also an organization with a culture that is meaningful to its members, where self-sacrifice plays a central role. That culture is common to the combat arms and has served warriors from all nations for centuries. Today, it continues to imbue their undertakings with a shared sense of meaning. In order that the organizational culture can fulfill its role, some of its values are elevated above others.
The infantry soldier profession generally attracts young people who are seeking adventure and excitement. They find those things during field exercises and operations, when decisiveness, mental agility and physical courage are tested. It is also under those circumstances that infantry soldiers are indoctrinated, through training, to military thought. That military thought has many attributes, but it is generally based on reaching objectives that are short-term or that require an immediate response.

Work tools that are adapted to emergency situations combined with decisive, dynamic leaders will naturally promote organizational involvement in ad hoc, non-repetitive undertakings and create a culture of urgency. It is fairly common for planning within infantry battalions to resemble, at all decision-making levels, a race in which going backwards is rarely possible. It is not unusual to hear that the only thing people are doing is putting out fires.

As with firefighters, police officers and ambulance workers, this culture of urgency is vital to the success of an infantry battalion in its natural element, war. But is that culture of urgency as useful to the organization when it is in garrison?

In light of the new management principles adopted since the end of World War II, I will try to determine whether or not the organizational culture of a Canadian infantry battalion is an obstacle to sound resource management when battalions are in garrison. I will examine the topic with the aim of optimizing structures and processes using lean management principles.

I will define certain concepts that are crucial to establishing a conceptual framework. Then I will present the arguments in favour of shifting organizational culture so that they include and/or strengthen process optimization and flow principles. After that, I will suggest ways to carry out that shift and identify the pitfalls to avoid. Finally, I will describe the planning, coordination and execution process of a Level 3 live firing range exercise (motorized platoon), and I will formulate the recommendations that the case study has allowed me to highlight.

CONCEPTS

World War II served as a launch pad for management sciences and made it possible to develop the conceptual tools that are central to military staffs and large-firm management. The most important of those tools is, without a doubt, operational research. That new branch of management tried to take a scientific approach to resolving complex problems. Its relevance is unquestionable in the field of logistics and operations. The Battle of Britain is a historical example of how operational research can be applied to a large-scale military problem.¹

While the Allies were developing mathematical and scientific tools for resolving complex operational problems, a Japanese company was looking for ways to optimize its structure and processes. The Toyota Motor Corporation, created in 1937 as a separate corporation, had formerly been a division of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, a textile manufacturing company.² During its
existence, numerous principles were developed within that organization, and a model to follow in the automobile industry was created. The Toyota Production System is the method behind their success, and that system is the foundation of lean management.\(^3\)

The lean management philosophy was advanced by James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones and Daniel Roos in their seminal work, *The Machine That Changed the World*.\(^4\) Here are the philosophy’s five core principles:\(^5\)

- **Client**: Define the value that the client is searching for;
- **Value stream**: Graphically represent the value stream of each product that contributes to the value sought by the client and eliminate all of the steps that are unnecessary to its production;
- **Flow**: Ensure that flow is continuous through value-added steps;
- **Pull**: Organize the logistical chain so that the production pressure is in line with client demand. That is a [trans] “flow steering model in which raw materials and parts only move forward in the manufacturing chain when demand requires it.”\(^6\)
- **Perfection**: Manage in the pursuit of perfection in order to reduce the number of steps, the production time and the amount of information required to serve the client.

In other words, lean management is a way of optimizing processes so as to eliminate unnecessary work (loss or *muda*), and it is motivated by client satisfaction. Lean management must also permeate the organizational culture and be used to constantly question its structures and processes with continuous improvement in mind. Certain concepts must first be defined in more detail so that we can better understand their application within an infantry battalion.

- **Client**: The client is defined as the beneficiary of the work completed as part of a process. For example, the client behind an ammunition request for a company exercise is the commander of that company (via his/her staff). The client behind a request for parental leave is the member requesting that leave. In a military context, one must take into account the fact that numerous processes are used to give effect to the will of commanders, who are the clients in those circumstances. It is also possible, as part of training, to view the organization being trained as the client of a process.
• **Value stream**: The value stream includes all of the actions (with and without added value) that arise from the raw material and that transform it into the finished product. That representation of work also applies to decision-making and administrative processes.

• **Graphic representation of the value stream**: This is the graphic representation of the steps throughout the entire value stream.

• **Added value**: All processes will be made up of steps that add value, of useful steps that add no value, and of useless steps that add no value.

• **Muda (loss)**: *Muda* is the consequence of inefficient processes. There are two types of muda. One type provides no value to the client but is useful to maintaining operations (ie, maintaining machinery, product inspections, etc). The other type consists in unnecessary work without added value, and it comes in seven forms: over-production, waiting, transportation, over-processing, inventory, motion and defect.

• **Kaizen**: *Kaizen* refers to activities that continually and progressively improve the production process.

• **Kaizen blitz**: A *kaizen blitz* is a time-limited group activity during which the organization devotes as much effort as possible to improving one or more production processes.

• **Gemba**: *Gemba* is a Japanese term meaning “the real place”; it is a work philosophy aimed at making decisions according to needs on the ground (of the base), rather than from the office.

**PROCESS OPTIMIZATION**

Infantry battalions employ a great number of distinct processes. Those processes are used to perform the tasks that are ordered by commanders and their staffs. Some of the processes fall under the commanders and their staffs and others do not. In many cases, the battalion is responsible for a part of the whole process, and it is only able to improve that part. For example, an ammunition request from a LAV captain to the unit operations cell must comply with the processes set out in the unit standard operating procedures (SOPs). That part of the process is under the control of the operations officer, and he/she can improve it as he/she sees fit. When the ammunition request is sent to the next level, the operations officer can no longer improve it, unilaterally speaking, at least. Efficient, effective management requires that each of the processes be reviewed and optimized. That work can be done as part of the *kaizen* process and should be integrated into the battalion’s leadership culture.

It will become apparent to all members of the battalion, in analyzing the value stream, that numerous processes are unnecessarily cumbersome—they are full of steps that add no value. During a *kaizen* that was held by the members of the administration office of 1 Battalion,
Royal 22e Régiment, an analysis of the master corporal promotion process showed that it was far from lean. In breaking down the process, it was determined that, to confirm the promotion of a corporal to the rank of master corporal, there were 25 steps to follow and the process involved 19 different people, required an average of 53 minutes of work, and required between 14 and 59 business days to complete. Following those observations, the CAF members involved in the process considered the matter to determine which steps added value and which did not. A discussion then arose on ways to streamline the process. The solution, in this case, was to replace the old promotion screening form with a new form that eliminated the steps that added no value. The improved process involves 14 different people, takes an average of 45 minutes, and requires only 2 to 7 business days to complete. That considerable improvement in execution time made it possible to avoid a number of administrative problems and ensure that members were promoted within the prescribed timeframes.

Process optimization is an undertaking that must continually be improved. The constraints and the context in which the processes are established change based on operational needs and the preferences of commanders and their staffs. One must not underestimate the importance of the decisions made by an organization’s leaders on the evolution of their unit SOPs. Decisions by a commander that may appear benign can have repercussions on the graphical representation of a process. A common example, in all organizations, is that of a change in decision-making level. The impacts can be felt on the document chain of transmission and on the relevance of approvals from lower levels. A process is often made more cumbersome and significantly slower if people do not focus on optimizing it as soon as it is modified.
In short, all managers from lean organizations must focus on process optimization, and the organizational culture must be instilled with that principle at all times. The fact that the analysis must be redone on a regular basis requires that the organization and its leaders believe in the value of this philosophy. At present, few Canadian infantry battalions have converted to lean management.

**FLOW**

Most military operations have a cycle of intensity that varies in the course of their execution. For example, a deliberate attack begins with a phase of planning and reconnaissance (low intensity) and is followed by a practical phase (low to medium intensity), the deployment and the advance to objective (medium intensity), the fight through and, possibly, the pursuit (high intensity). The consolidation phase then follows (high to medium intensity) and, finally, there is a return to planning or a rest phase (low intensity).

**FIELD EXERCISE (EG, DELIBERATE ATTACK)**

Most military operations are based on reaching the culminating point at the decisive moment. That culminating point, which is a concept developed by Clausewitz in *On War*, is defined in American army doctrine as the moment in battle when the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued offensive operations therefore risk the overextension, counterattack and defeat of the forces on the ground. The culminating-point concept presupposes varying intensity over time.

Varying intensity over the course of a military operation results from the fact that battles, campaigns and wars are not recurring, predictable events. In addition, they are subject to the friction and will of the enemy. It goes without saying that the methods and results of each victory are different each time.

The analysis tools, thought processes and intellectual abilities of military professionals are crucial to resolving tactical problems and are compatible with the battlefield-specific work environment. It is less clear that they contribute to solving redundant, predictable problems that managers control. They may in fact be inefficient for that purpose.

A battalion in garrison must try to avoid periods of high intensity and attempt to stabilize its workload. Given that the essential work in garrison is imposed by commanders (at all levels) or
comes from higher up, sound management could potentially smooth out significant fluctuations. After all, surprise in war is best reserved for the enemy. Many military and civilian organizations must contend with structural variations in workload. Those variations can be minimized.

It is necessary to recognize the predictable and repetitive nature of numerous processes, such as training-area and ration requests, vehicle inspections, leave requests, personnel promotions, etc. Those repetitive processes are perfect candidates for continuous improvement. The intrinsic analysis and elimination of non-value-added tasks is relatively easy to accomplish if leadership gets involved. After a certain amount of time, the organization acquires the necessary reflexes and integrates research and efficiency into its values.

Then, one must understand that vehicle and equipment maintenance, personnel administration, individual training, sports competitions and exercises are also repetitive tasks. Those activities happen once a month, once a quarter, once a year or every two years, but they are very similar every time. One of the challenges of Canadian military organizations in this area comes from the fact that leadership changes very quickly, such that the organization has trouble maintaining its corporate memory. Soldiers in key positions generally take on new roles every two years; they have only just familiarized themselves with procedures and begun planning for future activities when they are transferred to a new position. That has its advantages when it comes to personnel development, and it need not be changed. The organization, however, must learn to cope with it. It must also, at all planning levels, try to eliminate non-value-added tasks. One approach that has been tried and tested in the industry involves process standardization. Although familiar in the military world, it is not rigorously applied to activities of this type. It is common to have to reinvent an operational directive that is nearly identical to the one produced the year before.

In practice, seeking flow in an infantry battalion in garrison involves synchronizing activities, optimizing processes and maintaining institutional memory. The following graph illustrates how unsynchronized administration leads to variations in workload to the point that the organization’s production capability is exceeded (dotted line).

**UNSYNCHRONIZED ADMINISTRATION**
Imagine that the three lines of operation were a patrol exercise, a mountain warfare course and a general inspection of equipment and vehicles. Suppose that the three tasks begin and culminate at the same time. The culminating point here is the moment where the resource requirements (personnel, equipment and vehicles) are highest. We can see that there will be a period where the workload will be smaller than the organization’s production capability and that the workload will be too great at the critical moment. The organization will not be able to adequately accomplish one, two or all three of its tasks.

By breaking down the production curve of the various lines of operation, we see that synchronization is one key element in standardizing the total workload. If the activities were synchronized so that the culminating point of one activity corresponded to a period of low intensity in another, the periods of underproduction and overproduction would be reduced so that they would ultimately reach a state of equilibrium. That state of equilibrium would result in a much straighter line. Let us examine how that cultural transformation of an infantry battalion could be carried out.

**LEAN TRANSFORMATION**

Transforming organization culture is a complex process that takes place over a long period of time. Traditions and ways of doing things are well entrenched in any large-scale organization. A crisis usually has to occur before old mentalities are re-evaluated. Numerous companies have adopted lean management methods as a result of competitive pressure.

To carry out a change of this magnitude within an infantry battalion in garrison, one must first be able to understand the current state of things and what lean organizational management is as well as be able to imagine it in the future. Implementation, although difficult, can be done with the right people at the right places. It is not necessary to have a crisis before making the change. It is necessary, however, to have the mandate. In October 2013, the mandate was given to the Defence team to lead such a change. It had to comprehensively transform its major business processes to “create a lean and efficient organization that can generate savings to be reinvested in military capabilities and readiness.” The vision of the Deputy Minister, Richard Fadden, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Lawson, is line with the objectives.
of the federal government to balance the budget in 2015. It is set out as follows: “Our renewal vision for the Defence Team is a lean and efficient organization that continuously finds ways to better conduct the business of defence, that frees up resources to be reinvested in operational capabilities and readiness, and that delivers the best military capabilities at the best value for Canadians.”

Although the objectives of the Defence renewal project are strategic and operational in scope, it is important to understand the planned paradigm shift at the lowest level. The institutional leaders of tomorrow learn the ropes within tactical units, and “lean and efficient” management must be implemented at the base level. It is important that high-level managers make a habit of managing effectively and efficiently as soon as they embark upon their careers.

Lean management can be adapted to operational requirements and the organizational culture of a combat unit. Senior personnel must take ownership of it and, as elsewhere, the organization must find transformation champions and guides.

**PITFALLS TO AVOID**
Transformation champions and guides must avoid numerous pitfalls. Extensive documentation already exists on the topic and should be reviewed carefully. Here is a summary of the pitfalls to avoid, according to Rother:

- Confusing techniques with lean objectives;
- Thinking that training alone will make an organization lean;
- Not being on the ground, i.e., leading from the office using plans and analysis (contrary to *gemba*);
- Relying solely on *kaizen blitzes* and procedural improvements;
- Quitting after failures.

All organizations are subject to such pitfalls, but an infantry battalion has very particular constraints. One of the main conceptual objections to lean management is based on the preconceived notion that it runs counter to the warrior spirit. Another problem lies in the lack of exposure that senior military officials have to the theories and principles of business administration.

**MAINTAINING WARRIOR SPIRIT**
There is a close relationship between how business administration has developed and how the art of war has developed. The two disciplines have influenced one another since the Hundred Years War. Logistical breakthroughs made it possible to deploy increasingly larger forces, and their sustainment always constituted one of the keys to victory. That being said, within infantry units, it is clear that administration is a discipline that is held in relatively less high esteem than others. An informal hierarchy exists between operations, administration and logistics cells within various Canadian Army combat units. The warrior culture has naturally valued work based on
operations. There are legitimate reasons for that: victory or defeat is mainly dependent upon the commanding officer’s tactical plan and the capability of the operations centre to coordinate its execution. It is also the domain where the need for a culture of urgency is highest.

Lean culture is not really at odds with the one described above. It seeks just-in-time, flow stability, process optimization and system efficiency. Although those concepts are foreign to the culture of urgency, they are very useful to the conduct of war.

The art of war and lean management certainly need to be more thoroughly reconciled, but the administration of a battalion in garrison must be done using the best methods that are currently available. Commanders who institute those management principles must preserve this precious warrior spirit all while valuing the prudent, methodical spirit of a good manager.

“\nThe art of war and lean management certainly need to be more thoroughly reconciled, but the administration of a battalion in garrison must be done using the best methods that are currently available.”
TEACHING BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES

Business administration is a relatively little studied field in the context of infantry officer training. The Canadian Forces Professional Development System (CFPDS) is designed to develop officer leadership along the following lines: expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities, and professional ideology. Within the Officer General Specification (OGS), the performance requirements are divided into four categories: lead military operations, lead organizations, lead people and lead through the application of professional competencies. Although the different trades expose members to varying degrees of business administration theory as part of their mandatory training, it is understood that subordinate officers will assimilate, through their contact with military administration, the tools needed to make them good managers.

In our opinion, it remains to be demonstrated that that is enough to make combat arms officers excellent managers. The lack of formal theoretical training in administration makes it more
difficult to develop the critical thinking skills of senior leaders when it comes to administration. We see, however, that the development of critical thinking with regards to tactics, leadership and planning is thoroughly covered in the professional development plan of combat arms officers. Without completely reversing priorities, it would be useful to integrate more administration concepts into the curriculum. That is all the more important considering the significant portion of an officer’s career that is devoted to administrative duties.

Now let us examine how to implement some of the previously proposed tools within an infantry unit.

**CASE STUDY:**

**A LIVE FIRING RANGE EXERCISE INVOLVING A MOTORIZED INFANTRY PLATOON**

In spring 2014, as part of its buildup, 1 Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment, took on the mandate of validating the infantry platoons’ training with a Level 3 firing range exercise that involved manoeuvre exercises and LAV III firing. The planning, coordination and execution of that exercise were subject to a process study by the main architects. In order to measure the efficiency of the process in place, we represented it graphically. To do that, a certain number of elements were determined before the analysis:

- The commanding officer was the process initiation authority.
- The troops validated during the firing range exercise were clients.
- The graphical representation of the value stream was limited to the actions of members of 1 Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment.

Those three elements were the limitations applied in analyzing the process and constituted its premises, to a certain extent. They also served as the basis of the conceptual framework and modeled the way we looked at the work that is done within an infantry unit. Those elements deserve a certain amount of analysis.

*The commanding officer was the process initiation authority:* The decision to consider the commanding officer as the process initiation authority came naturally to the members of the team conducting the analysis. In an organization where the hierarchical distance is very high, as is the case in a combat unit, it is common to attribute the initial impulse to the commanding officer. Reality is often very different, but the fact is that, in a culture promoting mission command, the work that is done must be driven by the commanding officer’s intent. In that sense, most of the processes of a combat unit will begin with the commanding officer communicating an intent. In addition, the choice of putting the commanding officer at the start of the value stream presupposes that it is the commanding officer’s vision that is the raw material, and that his/her staff, subordinate commanders and other members of his/her team add value to the product at each step.

*The troops validated during the firing range exercise were clients:* The choice of client, defined as the beneficiary of the work contained in the process, provoked an interesting discussion.
3R22eR is on the move using Norwegian BV-206 vehicles for the duration of Exercise COLD RESPONSE near Sjøvegan, Norway on March 13, 2014.
Planning and executing a live firing range exercise involving a motorized infantry platoon
It is not a trivial matter, and the final decision philosophically orients the work that is done. The question, when it is asked at the strategic level, has serious consequences. At the strategic level, the CAF client can be considered to be the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, the government as a whole, the Governor General or the Canadian public. The choice made at different times in our history can have major consequences on the evolution of our country. Identifying the client, at the tactical level, will not have the same type of effect, but will nonetheless orient the work in a concrete manner. The commanding officer’s philosophy must guide that thought. In this case study, the unit’s nine infantry platoons were considered to be the clients.

*Defining the limitations of the graphical representation:* It is useful to define the limitations of the graphical representations early on in the analysis. This phase is aimed at defining the problem within the fields of influence of the organization leading the analysis. It is also important to identify at what point the other organizations come to participate in the process.

Interestingly, the process analysis revealed that there were few steps that did not add value. In that sense, the hierarchical structure, ie, the chain of command and staffs, served to efficiently accomplish the task. Certain weaknesses in the process became apparent during the analysis:

- Clear directives before the process from the commanding officer and the operations officer would have reduced the amount of planning time.
- The change in direction from the commanding officer while the plan was been developed caused friction.

The case study led to five recommendations that will make the implementation of Level 3 firing range exercises more efficient:

- Infantry companies must be involved earlier in the decision-making cycle. That way, the needs of the client will be quickly taken into account in the development of the product.
- Considering that numerous firing exercises of this type have been executed in the same training areas by other brigade units for a number of years, a planning and execution template must be created and distributed to the units.
- The operations officer must coordinate the efforts in a centralized manner with initial, main and final planning sessions.
- A guidance document must be used as a guide throughout the entire process of planning and executing the training. It must be shared and used by all actors involved.
The commanding officer must validate the operations officer's plan at the start of the process. The graphical representation of the initial tasks will change from this:

![Original Graphical Representation]

To this:

![Updated Graphical Representation]

**CONCLUSION**

Those last lines made it possible for me to defend the thesis that the organizational culture of a Canadian infantry battalion sometimes creates obstacles to healthy resource management when it is in garrison. I studied the problem through the lens of lean management principles and the historical context in which business administration and management have evolved since the 1930s. It became apparent that understanding the various business administration concepts, such as the value stream, the client, and losses (*muda*), among others, can be used to improve the management of a military unit. Graphically representing the value stream was examined as a tool for analyzing the administrative processes within the infantry battalion, as was its utility in optimizing those processes. That led me to compare how the intensity of military operations and ongoing activities at the garrison evolves. That analysis of the intensity of operations raised the issue of managing flow and of the fundamental difference between military operations and ongoing operations of an administrative nature. The change in conceptual framework and the need for separate mental models led me to critique the training of combat arms officers and to propose that they be more exposed to management and administration concepts as part of their professional training. I then examined a case study that made it possible to see how a graphical representation of the value stream and its subsequent optimization can be employed within a combat unit.

In light of the Defence renewal project and the new requirements concerning the stewardship of resources, it seems crucial to look into what best practices are being applied elsewhere. We must learn to use those management methods, approaches and philosophies within our organizations. That must be carried out quickly while strengthening the warrior spirit that is at the heart of our military ethos. Preserving a force that is truly capable of defending Canada and asserting its interests abroad, in peacetime and in wartime, in periods of abundance and in periods of scarcity, is dependent, in large part, on the force’s ability to effectively manage its resources. Our generals of tomorrow must learn that lesson today.
Captain Julien Chaput-Lemay, CD, is currently chief of staff to the commander of 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and has just completed a two-year posting as adjutant within 1 Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment. Since enrolling in the Canadian Armed Forces, he has served in Canada and abroad within various infantry and intelligence units. He has a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from the University of Ottawa and a master’s of business administration from Université Laval. His interests include operational planning, organizational behaviour, and the evolution of new economic models.

ENDNOTES

17. Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5031-8, Canadian Forces Professional Development, Chapter 5.1.
18. Ibid, Chapter 5.5.
19. According to the hierarchical distance concept developed by Geert Hofstede.
Sergeant Harold Marshall, of the Calgary Highlanders Scout and Sniper Platoon, near Fort van Brasschaat in Belgium, 6 October 1944.

Canada went to war in 1939 faced with the formidable task of raising and training a massive field force. But after nearly a decade of low defence budgets and a decentralized training system that allowed regiments considerable liberty in interpreting and teaching official doctrine, the Canadian Army was ill-equipped to train highly skilled infantrymen. Canadian soldiers saw no action at the front in the first two years of the Second World War and, during that time, infantry training in Canada and overseas lacked coherence and consistency between units and formations. Those who were deployed to the United Kingdom had grown bored with the seemingly pointless defensive training designed to meet a German invasion of the British Isles. But in October 1941, Canadian infantry units in the United Kingdom began to undergo a new method of training dubbed “battle drill” that quickly became popular. The new training involved breaking tactical manoeuvres into simple movements, practising them first on the parade square and then gradually progressing to more realistic conditions. Battle drill improved morale and generated an enthusiastic following among the troops and even among a number of senior officers.

In early 1942, Ottawa decided to bring battle drill training to Canada. It became an integral part of the Canadian Army’s efforts to devise and disseminate a common infantry doctrine and marked an important part of the infantry’s professional development. As the war progressed, the Canadian high command ceased to view the infantry as an unskilled arm of service and began to realize that infantrymen required sophisticated training of their own. Battle drill training was at the core of that transformation. What had begun as a training fad among Canadian troops in the United Kingdom developed into an officially sanctioned method of training in Canada—a method that later became the nucleus of a centralized school of infantry. This article offers a closer examination of Canadians’ introduction to battle drill overseas, its arrival in Canada, and the special centres created in British Columbia devoted to training battle drill instructors.

Historians have paid surprisingly scant attention to battle drill, and the few works that have examined it in any detail have presented mixed views. During the war, the Army Historical Section did preliminary work on the history of battle drill in the Canadian Army, but very little of it made it into the official history. The first true analysis of battle drill did not appear until the publication of John A. English’s *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign* in 1991. English found that battle drill left much to be desired and considered it to have been a “pedagogical dead end,” as Canadians latched onto it simply because it was a change from their usual training. According to English, it may have detracted from more worthwhile training efforts.

In recent years, two historians have re-examined battle drill and have supplied a more temperate opinion of it. In *Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944* (2000), Timothy Harrison Place contended that, while battle drill may have stifled initiative to a degree, it was largely the longstanding doctrine of the British Army that was to blame for the infantry’s caution on the battlefield in the first place. That the British Army’s training system during the interwar years
stressed obedience and discouraged initiative is well established. Nevertheless, Place maintained that, since large set-piece attacks with artillery barrages were never rehearsed in conjunction with battle drill, as no one believed this was practicable, battle drill failed to break free of the overreliance on artillery and artillery-based tactical planning. It “underestimated its own potential.” Most recently, in *Instruire une armée* (2007), Yves Tremblay argued that battle drill was just what the Canadian infantry needed: “Ce qui est indéniable... c’est qu’un entraînement plus réaliste accroissait la confiance; les soldats n’étaient pas des idiots et ils comprenaient bien que les défilés et les marches ne serviraient pas à grand-chose une fois sur le champ de bataille.”

Tremblay’s sympathetic view of battle drill deserves greater scholarly attention, especially with respect to battle drill training conducted in Canada. A thorough analysis of the records surrounding the Canadian Battle Drill School and its successor, the Canadian School of Infantry, reveals the difficulties encountered in establishing, managing, and reorganizing a new training centre under wartime conditions. But it also reveals how the Canadian Army senior leadership gradually came to recognize the importance of standardized doctrine and modern training methods for the infantry.

**THE ORIGINS OF BATTLE DRILL**

Boss defined “battle drill” as “the reduction of military tactics to bare essentials which are taught to a platoon as a team drill, with clear explanations regarding the objects to be achieved, the principles involved and the individual task of each member of the team.” It formed a part of “battle drill training,” which, according to the British instruction manual on the subject, comprised a more comprehensive system consisting of “fieldcraft, the battle drills proper, battle discipline and battle inoculation,” as well as a high standard of weapons training. The Canadians based it on the axiom that “until every soldier looks on himself as a ruthless killer, using cover with the facility of an animal, using his weapons with the practised ease of a professional hunter and covering the ground on the move with the agility of a deer-stalker, infantry battle training will be based on false foundations.”

The concept of battle drill had its origins in the interwar period. The famed British military theorist Basil H. Liddell Hart advocated replacing ceremonial drill with simple tactical movements; he even used the term “battle drill” to describe this concept. But nothing came of Liddell Hart’s idea until the Second World War was underway. British historian David French has shown that many of the British Army’s problems in the early years of the war were the result of the high command’s insistence on a rigid hierarchy that discouraged initiative among subordinates. The British, as well as the Canadians, had relied on prewar infantry manuals, namely *Infantry Training: Training and War* (1937) and *Infantry Section Leading* (1934; 1938), which made it clear that the infantry’s job was manoeuvre and the artillery’s job was to provide firepower. In an attack, an infantry sub-unit was to take full advantage of external fire support; under no circumstances was it to stop to use its own weapons until enemy fire made movement impossible. In short, the established doctrine was not conducive to the infantry’s mastery of its own firepower; its role had essentially been reduced to occupying ground. It did not help
that infantry training in both countries during the interwar years had been constrained by budgetary restrictions and other practical problems. All of this translated into a training program that was weak in small unit tactics and an officer corps that lacked problem-solving skills.

The shortcomings of British doctrine were exposed during the German invasion of France in the spring of 1940. The Germans outclassed the British and French in every way: German doctrine emphasized speed, coordination between combat arms, and rigorous tactical training. Rather than rely on an inflexible, autocratic command and control system like the British, the Germans had trained their junior officers and NCOs to develop their own initiative and respond to tactical situations quickly and aggressively.\(^{13}\) British forces were expelled from continental Europe in a humiliating defeat at Dunkirk in late May and early June. France fell shortly thereafter.

In the wake of Dunkirk, some progressive commanders looked for innovative ways to train the British Army in order to transform it into a modern fighting force that could rival Hitler’s armies. Lieutenant-General Harold Alexander presented battle drill as a solution to the infantry’s deficiencies in tactical skill. He distributed his notes on tactical training drills through his I Corps in October 1940. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) studied and practised them in the corps’ schools. By the following spring, a much more enthusiastic movement emerged from the efforts of one of Alexander’s disciples, Major-General J. E. Utterson-Kelso, who had commanded a brigade in France and had become acquainted with Alexander during that time. Utterson-Kelso shared Alexander’s interest in minor tactics, and upon taking command of 47th (London) Division (part of IV Corps) in April 1941, he oversaw the establishment of a divisional battle school at Chelwood Gate.

Meanwhile, units in the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions, which were both fully deployed in the United Kingdom by the end of 1940, had had trouble conducting any serious training in the first two years of war. Equipment and uniform shortages plagued every regiment in Canada. After mobilization, units could only focus on close order drill, marksmanship, route marches, sports, and simplistic battalion schemes before they went overseas. Guard duty in Newfoundland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom badly interfered with training, as did the absence of officers and NCOs who left for courses at British schools for weeks or months at a time. Large-scale exercises were fraught with traffic jams and long periods of inactivity; they tested the skills of commanders and their staffs rather than infantrymen.\(^{14}\) Battle drill reached the Canadians when the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division worked closely with 47th Division within IV Corps in late 1941. The Calgary Highlanders sent three officers to attend a demonstration at Chelwood Gate at the end of October, and they returned as enthusiastic battle drill supporters. Their commanding officer (CO), Lieutenant-Colonel J. Frederick Scott, was impressed with the new training, and under his direction, the officers established a battle drill school for the regiment.\(^{15}\) Battle drill then spread to other Canadian units, and by December most Canadian units were conducting their own battle drill training.
Battle drill was controversial among the British high command. The debate was focused on the issue of what effect the new training method would have on men’s initiative. At first, the War Office was generally against 47th Division’s School of Battle Drill and had even strongly discouraged tactical drills since 1939. That battle drill advocated standardized solutions to tactical problems suggested that it was dangerous to initiative. Battle was inherently unpredictable and chaotic, and critics were concerned that if men spent their time rehearsing tactical drills, they would not know how to respond to real tactical situations when they differed from the scenarios presented in battle drill training. This criticism made little sense, as the British high command had spent the interwar years ensuring that doctrine emphasized obedience above all else. The damage to infantrymen’s initiative had already been done. Supporters of battle drill argued that it was designed to help officers who had no initiative or tactical skill to develop them. Men who had initiative would use it regardless of what they had been taught. As for the critique about standardized tactics, it was better that the troops learned standardized tactics than no tactics at all. Eventually, official opposition subsided. After Lieutenant-General Bernard Paget (Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces) visited Chelwood Gate in December, he ordered all divisions to establish similar schools. By early 1942, the GHQ Battle School was established at Barnard Castle to train battle drill instructors.

In light of Paget’s order, Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London established a battle wing at the Canadian Training School (CTS) to train instructors for unit and divisional battle schools. The CTS had been established in 1940 to lessen the Canadians’ dependence on
British schools. No. 5 (Battle) Wing opened on 1 May 1942 at Rowlands Castle. 20 Brigadier M. H. S. Penhale (Brigadier, General Staff, CMHQ) visited the camp in June and remarked that he was impressed with the keenness of the instructors and students after he witnessed an exercise complete with Bren gun fire, grenades, pyrotechnics, and smoke. 21 In July, it was reorganized into three sub-wings: rifle, carrier, and mortar. 22

Battle drill clearly had a tremendous effect on training in the United Kingdom. Infantry training was no longer left entirely up to regimental officers. Simply having rank was not enough; tactical instructors required specialized training. The rigorous nature of battle drill prompted the creation of schools that specifically addressed minor infantry tactics.

A NEW METHOD OF TRAINING

Officially, battle drill training was intended to give “the junior commander a firm base on which to develop his individual initiative.” 23 According to the 47th Division’s “Battle Drill Précis,” the unofficial “bible” of battle drill before the publication of The Instructors’ Handbook on Field-craft and Battle Drill in December 1942, the purpose of battle drill was “to inculcate into a fighting body a system of Battle Discipline and Team Spirit and to give every man a knowledge of certain basic team ‘plays’ which will guide him in any operation which he may undertake in
Battle.” Whereas in the First World War, it was possible to introduce men to battle gradually on quieter sectors of the front, the British and Canadians’ circumstances of the Second World War did not allow for such training. Thus, battle drill sought to “translate the discipline of the [parade] square into the operations which will be carried out in battle.”

Lessons usually began with a short lecture. After a demonstration, the students would practise movements on the parade square. Much of the available literature on battle drill often fails to fully illustrate how tactical manoeuvres could possibly be practised as if they were ceremonial drill movements. As an example, in “A Battle Drill for Infiltration,” the instructor would have the section commander order his men to fall in and announce their role in the section (“No. 1 Bren,” “2 i/c,” etc.). The instructor would then order the section commander to move his men into an arrowhead formation. The section would then advance and, after a short time, the instructor would call “Under fire!” at which point the men would halt, order arms and stand at ease, shouting, “Down, crawl, observe, fire!” The section commander would then order his Bren group to “fire” on an imaginary group of enemy soldiers. This was simulated simply by having the Bren group march into position and stand to attention. The section commander would then order his rifle group to turn to the left (or right) and stand at ease. Once the section commander moved to the head of the group, he would call “Follow me!” and the men of the rifle group would move at a right angle to the direction they were facing to the parade ground’s front. Movements would continue in this manner until the rifle group was in position to charge the “enemy.” The Bren group would then move forward to consolidate. This drill involved no less than 37 discrete actions, most of them made up of close order drill movements.

Once they had mastered the basic movements, soldiers could move to the field where they would first practise on ground that perfectly suited the tactical situation for which the drill was designed. Then, they would practise on less-than-ideal ground, which was an important part of developing their own initiative and problem-solving skills. Once the men had learned a number of drills, instructors were to test them by putting them through a large exercise in which men had to work through a series of tactical situations. In between each “leg,” men were to change positions within the platoon so that each man fully understood everyone else’s role.

An important part of the advanced stages of battle drill training was “battle inoculation,” which was primarily psychological in nature. Its objective was twofold: firstly, battle inoculation was designed to accustom men to the sights and sounds of battle by teaching them that loud noises and traumatic sights themselves were harmless. For instance, the use of live ammunition during tactical schemes would help soldiers gain practical experience in fire and movement, using ammunition efficiently, hitting the enemy, and avoiding hitting one’s own troops. More curiously, the second objective of battle inoculation was to counteract twenty years of the public’s perception of the horrors of the First World War. Incredibly, a War Office pamphlet from 1942 entitled “Notes for Psychiatrists on Battle Inoculation” argued that the horrors of war had been “exaggerated” to the point that “the individual has a false inner mental picture of it as an overwhelmingly terrifying thing.” For battle inoculation to work, the pamphlet continued, it had to be administered gradually, lest the training only confirm men’s “false inner mental picture” as
accurate. Rather, it was hoped that by gradually increasing the level of danger during training, men would come to realize that the sensations of combat were not so terrifying.28 The psychological literature on the subject also insisted that candidates not be given excessive warning or reassurance before and during war noise training because it would only make them more apprehensive. Telling men not to be afraid would only inform them that there was something they ought to fear in the first place. Likewise, telling men that battle inoculation was a test of their manhood would only make them more contemptuous of the training.29

Battle inoculation was administered in a number of ways. The simplest method involved introducing men to loud noises. During such training, men would be exposed to the detonation of two pounds of explosives with progressively closer proximity. Explosions were to be made part of tactical manoeuvres while troops were in the open or under cover.30 Other methods accustomed men to the sound of projectiles. Men could gradually be exposed to small arms fire by first having them stand still while a Bren Gun fired rounds five feet over their heads. In the next phase, the men could be forced to crawl while a Bren Gun fired rounds three feet over their heads. Finally, rifles and Thompson submachine guns would be fired over their heads while they were not expecting it; the men would be ordered to continue in their daily tasks and ignore the noise.
There were also a number of suggested techniques to desensitize men to things they would see on the battlefield. To get men past their fear of encountering enemy or armoured vehicles, it was suggested that they be allowed to examine a tank firsthand so that they would understand it was simply a human-made vehicle. Later, men would sit in slit trenches while a tank rolled over harmlessly. Efforts to get men accustomed to the sight of blood were controversial—it was recommended that men be taken to an emergency room but not to a slaughterhouse.31

The value of battle inoculation has received criticism. As English’s research has shown, exposing men to realistic sights and sounds often served only to confirm the citizen soldiers’ worst fears of battle. Also, there was some doubt that firing at men with the intention to miss did anything to prepare them for combat. While battle inoculation was supposed to go beyond preparing men for the sounds of battle by developing their skills in identifying and locating enemy weapons, English notes that this was not always achieved in practice.32 Similarly, Place has argued that battle drill failed to break the British and Canadians’ overdependence on artillery support because exercises with artillery barrages were never rehearsed in conjunction with battle drill.33 However, these should not be regarded as criticisms of battle drill or battle inoculation themselves, but rather as assessments of the degree to which they were taught effectively. The process of training men to identify and pinpoint enemy weapons correctly was vulnerable to logistical problems, since it depended on a ready supply of captured enemy weapons and ammunition. More importantly, none of battle drill’s doctrinal literature precluded training men to discern the type or location of an enemy weapon or employing battle drill in large exercises with realistic artillery simulation. In any event, critics of the limitations of this kind of training have often failed to acknowledge that reproducing actual battle conditions in a training setting was neither practical nor safe. Regardless of the training method being used, there was simply no way to give men the full experience of being fired upon with the intent to kill. Battle drill may not have been perfect, but there did not seem to be any better alternatives.
Battle drill was thus intended as a system of training men to function as a team under fire by introducing them to a variety of tactical situations. Breaking manoeuvres into components and simulating the conditions of battle was one way citizen soldiers could be trained to function in combat.

**THE CREATION OF A BATTLE DRILL SCHOOL IN CANADA**

In May 1942, the army established a battle drill training centre in Canada. Designated A31 Canadian Battle Drill Training Centre, its purpose was to train officers and NCOs in battle drill so that they could establish courses in their units; it was also to periodically conduct research that might be incorporated into official doctrine. The new training centre would be located in Pacific Command. British Columbia was the only part of the country with a climate that could support year-round battle drill training.

The introduction of battle drill to Canada came at the right time. The Canadian infantry needed to improve more than just its tactical skills; according to a circular letter from the Chief of the General Staff’s (CGS) office, the army in Canada had a serious morale problem that more realistic training could address: “it is essential that training must develop in all ranks the confidence that they can both give it, and take it, harder and better than the enemy. . . . all training must be designed to develop a high fighting morale—not just the soft kind which is largely dependent upon good quarters and food, no unnecessary discomforts and the removal of all unpleasantness.” Of course, bringing battle drill to Canada included battle inoculation. The Directorate of Military Training (DMT) authorized advanced training centres, officer training courses and instructional schools like A31 to begin exposing men to the noises and dangers of battle as part of their training.

A31’s first commandant was Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, who had returned to Canada after being removed as CO of the Calgary Highlanders in February 1942 on account of his age. Scott’s enthusiasm for battle drill training made him the perfect choice to create the new training centre. Upon touring Pacific Command, Scott decided that the Courtenay area was suitable for the new training centre, as it could be used for training in the winter and its location on Vancouver Island would allow for combined operations training. The first three courses would be confined to men from infantry units and training centres in Pacific Command, particularly the 6th and 8th Canadian Divisions, two home defence formations based in British Columbia.

The first course at A31 began on 8 June 1942. The 38 students had begun to arrive two days earlier, although on inspection only half were medically fit for battle drill; Canada’s most capable and fervent infantrymen were already overseas. The first live fire exercise took place on the 10th; a simulated river crossing, occurred on the 13th. The training centre’s war diarist stated that the latter was “very realistic with flashes bursting all around, men bustling through the water—looked like the real thing.” The second course, this time with 74 students, began at the end of the month. At this early stage, the course lasted three weeks, during which students spent their mornings attending lectures and demonstrations and then had the opportunity to practise movements in the afternoon.
Because of possible fire hazards at Courtenay, the camp had to be moved to Coldstream Ranch, four miles southeast of Vernon, on the mainland, for the commencement of the third course in late July. The war diarist’s reaction to the new site was less than favourable: “What a hell-hole after Courtenay. Not one bit of shade on the camp ground and the students will have to travel miles in order to get suitable training areas, which we had on our doorstep in Courtenay.”

Conditions at A31 were indeed harsh. The school had no permanent buildings, only tents, and there was no talk of building new accommodations until the summer of 1943 when the new Canadian School of Infantry was to be built, and, even then, construction of permanent structures was stalled. It seems that even though the DMT had authorized the establishment of a battle drill school, the Canadian high command still had doubts over whether battle drill was a passing fad. Brigadier W. H. S. Macklin, a staff officer in Pacific Command, opined, “I really think the Battle Drill School has had the poorest deal of any unit that ever has been formed.” The camp’s facilities included a small village (for training purposes), an obstacle course made mostly of natural obstacles, and a trench in which candidates were trained to recognize weapons from the sounds made by their projectiles.

By August, the training centre had enough students for four platoons, two for officers and two for NCOs. On a typical day during the course, students underwent several lecture, demonstration, and practice sessions covering topics such as observation, crossing obstacles, flanking movements, and village fighting.

In February 1943, the training centre was redesignated S10 Canadian Battle Drill School. The name change is an indication that the Canadian Army was starting to appreciate that the infantry required a degree of professionalism, since the school was no longer considered an advanced infantry training centre but was rather seen as a specialist training centre on the same level as S11 Canadian Chemical Warfare School and S16 Combined Operations School. That spring, the school began to offer a special carrier course. The syllabus for that course was infused with drills pertaining to the use of Universal carriers, including mounting and dismounting, track repair, and pincer movements.

The school also attracted visitors. Colonel John K. Howard of the United States Army arrived at S10 in August 1943 and was allowed to inspect the camp. Howard was the commandant of First Service Command Tactical School and would go on to command the Army Training Schools at Harvard University in September 1943. Owing to his position, he was highly experienced in American training policy and had visited several schools across the United States. According to the school’s war diary, Howard got along very well with the staff and “left for home thoroughly sold on Battle Drill.”

Howard’s report on the school is significant because it provides an outsider’s perspective to the Canadians’ training. He noted that the purpose of live firing in British–Canadian battle drill was more thorough than in similar training in the United States. Whereas the Americans used it simply to desensitize soldiers to the sounds of battle, the British and Canadians also used it to train men to determine the range and type of weapon. Howard recommended the Canadian
Calgary Highlanders undergo Battle Drill Training in the UK, 1944.

Source: www.calgaryhighlanders.com
approach to battle inoculation be incorporated into American training. His comments on the high quality of S10’s battle inoculation facilities are at odds with English’s claims in *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign* that battle inoculation was not used to teach men to identify and locate enemy weapons. Indeed, one of English’s own sources indicates that those concepts were, in fact, incorporated into the program at S10. According to a letter to Pacific Command on the matter, candidates were taught to pay close attention to the discrepancy between the sound of an enemy weapon firing and the sound of the projectile passing over their heads in order to identify the type of weapon and estimate its position.

Howard dismissed the idea that battle drill hindered initiative. He reasoned that football players essentially used the same training methods and were no less capable of exercising initiative. An infantryman who already had initiative, he said, would use the principles and movements he had learned in battle drill training to solve tactical problems. He believed that battle drill would still be helpful to a man who made poor soldier material: “he will have learned an orthodox action based on sound principals [sic] that is better than action based on no principals [sic] or no action at all.”

Howard’s report challenges some of English’s criticisms of battle drill in other ways. It reveals that British and Canadian tactical training was not much different from American tactical training. Howard noted that the main difference between American and British–Canadian battle training is that the latter emphasized close-order drill to a much greater degree. Movements were first practised on the parade square, without cover, so that students would have a clear view of the actions being demonstrated. Whereas English believed that the British and Canadians may have focused too much on close order drill, Howard saw it as a welcome innovation. Demonstrating and practising movements on the parade square was beneficial, as students were exposed to tactical concepts with increasing difficulty rather than seeing a movement being demonstrated in the field and being told to execute it. Howard had seen battle training at American schools, and he stated that students did not really learn much of anything if they were asked to make the jump from demonstration to application too quickly. Moreover, he believed that the parade square aspect of battle drill was helpful because it developed useful habits in the men, such as adopting formations that allowed for quick deployment and all-around security, taking cover immediately when fired upon, and responding to brief, terse orders. Using the training materials provided to him at S10, Howard experimented with battle drill at First Service Command Tactical School and noticed a marked improvement in the men’s training. He concluded that the United States already had similar training, but that it should incorporate more use of parade drill.

It is important to note that, for nearly a year and a half, S10 was not the sole battle drill school in Canada. Another facility, S52 Junior Leaders’ School at Mégantic, Quebec, was converted to a battle drill school in summer 1942 because Vernon could not train enough NCOs and because eastern Canada needed its own battle drill school. Originally, S52’s NCO course had been designed “to give a thorough grounding in minor tactics, and to teach the Junior Leader to adapt and fit himself for the responsibility of handling his men in battle” and “to establish a sound,
mental base upon which the Junior Leader may build a concise sequence of thinking." The syllabus emphasized attack, defence and protection, fieldcraft, map reading, and patrols, and called for two night exercises every week. Upon its conversion in late August 1942, S52 (later re-designated S6 Junior Leaders’ School) replaced its old syllabus with one that fully embraced battle drill. The course was lengthened from four to six weeks and put more emphasis on section leading, tactics and weapons training than before. But late 1943 would see both of Canada’s battle drill training centres superseded by a single consolidated school of infantry.

THE CANADIAN SCHOOL OF INFANTRY

A major development in the professionalization of Canadian infantry was the establishment of a central infantry school in October 1943. Prior to that, there had been no effective means in Canada of studying small unit tactics and the role of the infantry in general. That the Canadian School of Infantry was created so late into the war suggests just how committed the army was to its decentralized regimental system of infantry training. But by late 1943, it was difficult for the Canadian Army’s senior leadership to ignore the need for a centralized school to provide instructors with a common infantry doctrine. Battle drill training permeated nearly every aspect of the new school.

The idea of a formal Canadian school of infantry had gained momentum earlier in the year. The British Army had struggled for years with a vague and inconsistently taught tactical doctrine for the infantry. To address that problem, the School of Infantry had been established in July 1942 with the GHQ Battle School at Barnard Castle as its nucleus. Returning from a visit to the United Kingdom in January 1943, Canada’s CGS, Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart, decided that Canada should form a school along the same lines as the School of Infantry. Such a school was necessary to ensure doctrine was consistent among all Canadian infantry units by training junior leaders in the tactical handling of sub-units and as instructors. The Canadian School of Infantry would “provide an authoritative source of information concerning details of technical and tactical developments in the Infantry Corps” and advise NDHQ on an effective common infantry training program for units across Canada. The commandant of the school would have the power to coordinate infantry doctrine in Canada. From the outset, it was clear that a battle drill wing would be an essential part of the new school.

The new facility would have to be established in a location that already had accommodation available, had sufficient space for tactical manoeuvres, and allowed for year-round training. Canadian Infantry Training Centre at Calgary seemed like a suitable candidate at first, but it was so isolated from troops of other arms of service that it would be too difficult to organize combined-arms training. Camp Borden was another candidate, but one advanced infantry training centre would have to be transferred elsewhere to make room for the School of Infantry. In the end, Vernon was selected for the site of S17 because much of the school’s training was practical in nature, and most of Canada was unsuitable for such training during the winter months. There, it could take up the accommodations of the outgoing No. 110 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre. The nearby S10 would be absorbed into the Canadian School of Infantry, and S6 Junior Leaders’ School would be wound up by the end of the year. Despite its primi-
tive conditions, it was decided not to build new accommodations at Coldstream Ranch and instead simply move S10 into the accommodations left by the basic training centre at Vernon proper, alongside S17 headquarters, even though that would mean transporting candidates to and from the training areas at Coldstream every day. The Battalion Weapons Wing of S4 Small Arms School, located at Nanaimo, would also form part of the Canadian School of Infantry.

The inaugural commandant of the Canadian School of Infantry was Brigadier Milton F. Gregg. A veteran of the First World War and a recipient of the Victoria Cross, Gregg had first been exposed to battle drill while he was commander of No. 1 (Officer Cadet Training Unit) Wing at the Canadian Training School in the United Kingdom. He had been transferred back to Canada in April 1942 to command No. 1 Officer Training Centre (Eastern Canada) at Brockville, Ontario. There, he had devised a new and more rigorous syllabus that focused on physical fitness (which included battle drill), developing leadership skills, learning combined arms theory, and cooperating with other arms of service. Two weeks were devoted to large exercises.

Gregg thoroughly understood battle drill training. Before battle drill, he noted, men simply repeated their basic training, and exercises only taught them to take long convoy rides to an assembly area, march, wait for orders, and then charge in a seemingly pointless “attack.” Like American Colonel Howard, Gregg used a sports analogy to explain the need for battle drill and for greater infantry professionalism in general. Instead of football, he likened battle drill to hockey: it was not enough to have a team captain who was excellent at hockey and knew the
game well. Nor was it enough that every individual player was highly skilled. Rather, all players had to be able to work together, and in order to do that they would have to work out a series of plays, use initiative to be responsive to changing circumstances, and be in peak physical condition.69

In September 1943, a special platoon was raised at S10 to train instructors for the Canadian School of Infantry. In the interim, S10 was considered to be No. 2 (Battle) Wing, Canadian School of Infantry.70 S10 was officially wound up on 9 October 1943, whereupon it was absorbed entirely into S17.71 At its inception, S17 was organized into five wings. No. 1 (Senior Battle) Wing was designed for current or prospective infantry company commanders, with some spots reserved for the other arms of service. The course was designed to produce company commanders who could effectively train their companies in battle drill. No. 2 (Junior Battle) Wing included junior officers and non-commissioned officers down to the rank of sergeant. This course sought to produce highly capable platoon commanders and introduce them to company tactics. The two wings shared four weeks of battle drill training, after which No. 1 Wing remained at S17 for another five weeks of training. No. 3 Wing trained candidates in the tactical handling of a carrier platoon. The remaining two wings concerned battalion weapons: the 3-inch mortar in No. 4 Wing and the anti-tank gun in No. 5 Wing.72

The school also occasionally ran senior officer coordination courses. They were designed to bring senior officers together with the school’s instructors so that the training programs at S17 could incorporate lessons from the officers’ experience. The senior officers, in turn, could also be kept abreast of the school’s work. The idea was to establish and continuously hone a common doctrine.73 Participants usually held the rank of lieutenant-colonel or higher. Participants attended lectures and demonstrations on a variety of tactical situations, such as concealment, instruction methods and the use of mortars at night.74

Early 1944 saw the introduction of a wing for training centre instructors.75 The first course went well, although, according to a report by the acting commandant, most candidates felt the course should be lengthened from three to five weeks and that the tempo of training be slowed, since the men were accustomed to training privates and operating at a slower training tempo. The syllabus for No. 7 Training Centre Instructors’ Wing closely followed that of No. 2 Junior Battle Wing, to which improvements were made such that lessons progressed smoothly from the section level to the platoon and company levels.76

Of course, examining S17’s own records cannot offer a fully unbiased assessment of the school’s performance, but fortunately the school was subject to the same routine inspections as every other training centre in the country. The first review by the Inspector General (Western Canada) was conducted from 7 to 10 April 1944. Major-General J. P. Mackenzie remarked on the high quality of the officers and senior NCOs at S17. As for the training itself, Mackenzie sat in on some lectures and noted that students were attentive and asked clever questions, which the instructors answered fully. On field movements, Mackenzie was impressed with the amount of care taken to prevent accidents. Not everything was perfect, however. The camp suffered from
some logistical problems. Mackenzie noted that the school’s firing range was too small to serve both the training centre and 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, stationed nearby, and that there were no facilities to train with the 25-pounder field guns.77

Some of S17’s problems were beyond the control of the staff. In a monthly report to National Defence Headquarters from May, the school complained that No. 2 Wing lacked sufficient numbers of captured enemy weapons and ammunition. That was a serious problem because it interfered with battle inoculation. Enemy weapons would add to the realism of the training. Worse, the wing had recently lost eleven instructors to various other assignments, putting a terrible strain on the remaining instructors. This suggests that even though the Canadian high command had taken big steps in establishing a battle drill school in the country and then forming a centralized school of infantry, S17 was still not considered the army’s highest priority school. No. 3 Wing was in worse shape because the syllabus was so rigorous, and yet its students lacked sufficient rifle training before they came to the school.78 Advanced training centres were responsible for sending highly trained candidates who would make good instructors. That they frequently failed to do so is an indication that the training system in Canada still had significant problems with coordination even as the war was approaching the end of its fifth year.

The last twelve months of the war saw a number of organizational changes at the Canadian School of Infantry. There were two reasons for that: first, the needs of Canada’s war effort were changing. In late July 1944, for instance, the school formed a new wing for officer refresher training.79 Second, and sadly for the staff of S17, the school experienced a change of command. Gregg announced his retirement to civilian life in August 1944.80 His replacement would be Brigadier T. E. Snow, who had recently returned from commanding 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade in Italy. Like Gregg, Snow was also a battle drill enthusiast. Prior to taking command of S17, he told Gregg in a letter (which Gregg relayed to the school) that 11th Brigade’s experience in battle revealed that platoon leaders often had greater initiative than their battalion or company commanders. They often had to wait for their superiors to catch up.81 In other words, the men’s training was clearly conducive to greater aggression and speed on the battlefield.

The Canadian School of Infantry functioned quite well under Snow. Under his leadership, new courses were introduced. For instance, an assault pioneer wing, which focused heavily on demolitions, was raised in late October 1944.82 By that time, the Senior Battle Wing’s courses had 36 spots; the Junior Battle Wing, 70; the Mortar Battle Wing, 18; the Anti-tank Battle Wing, 23; the Carrier Battle Wing, 13; and the Training Centre Instructors’ Wing, 40.83 A second inspection of S17 occurred at the end of the month. Major-General R. O. Alexander, Mackenzie’s successor as Inspector General for Western Canada, noted that, for the most part, the officers were excellent, and he specifically commended Colonel Snow’s work. He was more critical of the lack of deportment in the camp (eg, student officers would call their NCOs by their given names) and poor discipline in the canteen. As for training, Alexander noted the same thing that his predecessor had in April: many candidates in the Mortar and Anti-tank Wings had no prior experience with
those weapons.84 In other words, six months later, other training centres were still not satisfying S17’s joining instructions by sending inexperienced troops. Nevertheless, by all accounts, Snow commanded a highly functional and rigorous training centre befitting a central, specialized school.

In the spring of 1945, though the war in Europe was in its closing stages, Germany had made it clear that it would not make the final victory easy for the Allies. The army desperately needed to replace casualties at the front, and one source of reinforcements was the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was scheduled to end in March, and the surplus aircrew could be remustered into the army.85 To that end, the Canadian School of Infantry ran a sixteen-week course, from March to July, for a platoon of former RCAF personnel.86

Of course, the school’s RCAF conversion course had no effect on the war effort, since the war against Germany and Japan ended before graduates could return to their units and teach battle drill to their men. Indeed, the end of hostilities produced mixed feelings at S17. When V-E Day was announced, for instance, the school’s staff members paused and gave a sigh of relief and then went back to work, while the candidates were disappointed that they would not get the opportunity to see action against Germany.87

CONCLUSION

Battle drill training was by no means perfect, as critics during the war and historians such as John English have demonstrated. But in the most difficult years of the war for the United Kingdom, there was clearly a need for a more organized approach to tactical training that fostered an offensive attitude in the troops. Moreover, battle drill challenged the underlying assumption of the British Army’s tactical doctrine that infantrymen at the sub-unit level were unskilled and had to be closely led at all times. Battle drill was not supposed to teach junior leaders to respond to tactical situations in a dogmatic way but to teach them how to think tactically. Much of the criticism levied against battle drill has concerned not the ideas behind it as a method of training, but whether unit battle drill instructors taught it effectively.

Canada was fortunate to have senior officers such as Milton F. Gregg, who completely embraced the new type of training. While his age precluded him from serving in a frontline unit, Gregg’s deep understanding of infantry tactics and his enthusiasm for battle drill made him the ideal commandant for the battle drill school in Canada. Under his leadership, A31 Canadian Battle Drill Training Centre evolved from a small, fledgling camp to the nucleus of Canada’s foremost infantry academy.

The establishment of a battle drill school in Canada, and its subsequent transition to the Canadian School of Infantry, marks a significant point in the evolution of Canadian military professionalism in the twentieth century. Rather than relegating infantry training to individual regiments, the Canadian Army ended the war with a mechanism for studying infantry tactics and disseminating new tactical doctrine. This transformation was one of battle drill’s legacies.
ABSTRACT
In late 1941, Canadian troops in the United Kingdom embraced a new method of tactical training called “battle drill,” in which tactical manoeuvres were broken into simple movements, practising them first on the parade square and gradually progressing to more realistic conditions. Battle drill training arrived in Canada in early 1942 when a new battle drill school was established in Vernon, British Columbia. Battle drill became an integral part of the Canadian Army’s efforts to devise and disseminate a common infantry doctrine and marked an important part of the infantry’s professional development. As the war progressed, the army ceased to view the infantry as an unskilled arm of service and began to realize that infantrymen required sophisticated training of their own. Analysis of official documents suggests that battle drill training was at the core of this transformation. What had begun as a training fad overseas grew into an officially sanctioned method of training in Canada—a method that became the core of a centralized Canadian school of infantry in late 1943.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...
R. Daniel Pellerin is a PhD candidate in the Department of History at the University of Ottawa. He holds undergraduate degrees in business administration and history from Wilfrid Laurier University. He completed his MA in history at the University of Waterloo in 2009.

ENDNOTES
5. Place, Military Training in the British Army, 77–78.
11. An excellent discussion of the prewar British Army appears in French, Raising Churchill’s Army, chap. 5.


15. War Diary (WD), Calgary Highlanders, 22 Oct 1941.


19. *Ibid.*: Brig M. H. S. Penhale (BGS, CMHQ) to DAG, 10 Apr 1942.


21. LAC, RG 24, Vol. 9764, file 2/Battle Sch/1: Brig M. H. S. Penhale (BGS, CMHQ) to MGen the Hon P. J. Montague (Senior Officer, CMHQ), 13 Jun 1942, par. 3.


24. LAC, RG 24, reels C-5236–C-5237, file H.Q.C. 8542-7, pt. 1: No. 1 (Officer Cadet Training Unit) Wing (Wg), Canadian Training School, Battle Drill Précis, 1.


35. WD, A31 CBDTC, 2 Jul 1942.


43. Ibid., 22 Jul 1942.

44. LAC, RG 24, reel C-5238, file H.Q.S. 8542-12, pt. 1: Director of Staff Duties, memorandum to Brig E. G. Weeks, 23 Jul 1943, pars. 1–2; DHH, file 322.009 (D590): Maj J. B. Hardinge (DA & QMG, MD 11), Adm O No. 323, 14 Jul 1942, par. 5; Brig S. Lett (for BGS, Pac Comd), “Memo of Long Distance Telephone Call – Major-General Murchie – Brigadier Lett – 1420 hrs, 27 July, 43: Battle Drill School, Vernon, B.C.,” pars. 4–6.

45. LAC, RG 24, reel C-5238, file H.Q.S. 8542-12, pt. 1: Director of Staff Duties, memorandum to Brig E. G. Weeks, 23 Jul 1943. Quoted in par. 3.


47. WD, S10 Canadian Battle Drill School (S10 CBDS), 4 Feb 1943.

48. WD, S10 CBDS, Feb 1943: app. 6, Syllabus, 2nd Carrier Course.

49. Howard Report, 12.


51. Howard Report, 12.

52. WD, S10 CBDS, 19 Aug 1943.


57. Ibid., 9–12.


60. Tremblay, Instruire une armée, 239–240.


63. WD, S17 Canadian School of Infantry (CS of I), Oct 1943: Brief Summary of Events.


65. Ibid., pars. 6, 13.

66. Ibid., pars. 2–3.
67. Ibid., Brig E. G. Weeks, memorandum to LGen K. Stuart re: “Canadian School of Infantry,” 27 Apr 1943, pars. 1–2; Brig E. G. Weeks, memorandum to Col J. G. K. Strathy (DMT) re: “Canadian Infantry School/Battle Drill School,” 1 May 1943, par. 1; LGen K. Stuart to DMT, 28 Jul 1943, par. 2; WD, S17 CS of I, Oct 1943: app. 10, Brig M. E. Gregg, draft, “School of Infantry (Canada),” 18 Jul 1943, par. 1(a)(i); WD, S6 JLS, 31 Dec 1943.

68. Tremblay, Instruire une armée, 222–225.

69. WD, S17 CS of I, Oct 1943: app. 10, Brig M. E. Gregg (Commandant, S17 CS of I), draft, “School of Infantry (Eng),” 18 Jul 1943, pars. 2–3.

70. WD, S10 CBDS, Sep 1943: app. 8, Syllabus, CS of I Platoon.

71. Ibid., 9 Oct 1943.


75. WD, S17 CS of I, Mar 1944: app. I, Syllabus, 7 Wg, 1st Course.

76. LAC, RG 24, reel C-5238, file H.Q.S. 8542-12, pt. 3: LCol D. C. Stephenson (Acting Commandant, S17 CS of I), Training Liaison Letter No. 2, 31 Mar 1944, pars. 1(b), 3(d), 7(c–d).


80. Ibid., 15 Aug 1944.


82. WD, S17 CS of I, Oct 1944: app. B, Syllabus, 8 Wg, 1st Course.

83. “Schedule of Courses, 4th Quarter, 1944,” Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 42 (Sep 1944): 49.


87. WD, S17 CS of I, 7 May 1945.
Canadian Minister of Defence, J.L. Ralston, talking with Canadian troops in England during World War II in 1940.
In October and November 1944, the federal Liberal government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King nearly tore itself apart over whether to order 16,000 conscripted Canadian soldiers overseas. It was the final act in a crisis that had been brewing since late 1941, when Cabinet spent weeks debating the limits that should be set on the size of the Canadian army—most of which was made up of volunteers who could be sent to fight anywhere in the world, but which also included conscripts who were required to serve only in Canada, given that in the First World War the conscription issue had intensely divided English and French Canadians (among other groups). By mid-1942, Cabinet had approved a final total of five volunteer divisions for Europe, as well as two independent tank brigades and two Corps headquarters, and an Army headquarters to command them all. Even then, King and some of his colleagues worried whether Canada had enough men and women to sustain such a large volunteer army for the duration of the war, along with a greatly expanded air force, navy, and industrial workforce. In April 1942, they asked Canadians in a national plebiscite to release the government from its promises not to send conscripts overseas. After the vote indicated a split of 64% in support of the proposition overall, but 73% against it in Quebec, they spent further months debating before finally agreeing to wait to actually extend conscription, in the hope that it would not in fact prove to be needed before the war was won. Events finally came to a head in late 1944, however, after the army had become involved in combat in both Italy and northwestern Europe, and it suddenly found itself short of front-line infantrymen.1

Ultimately, the crisis of 1944 was not simply over shortages of volunteers, but specifically shortages of infantrymen due to incorrect estimates of the proportion of casualties they would suffer.2 Yet, in a broader sense, Prime Minister King and other Cabinet members who worried about expanding the army in 1941 and 1942 were correct, in that the strain of attempting to
maintain such a large volunteer force throughout the war did shape events. The key advocate in Cabinet for this large army was J.L. Ralston, who served as Minister of National Defence from June 1940 until he was forced to resign on 1 November 1944, in the midst of the final crisis. Over the years since then, some contemporaries and then later historians have suggested that the army’s growth resulted mostly from Ralston pressing its wishes too strongly at the Cabinet table. As a former battalion commander from the First World War, he seemed to be too sympathetic to his military subordinates, while his personal tendency towards overwork and his inability to delegate administrative responsibilities prevented him from seeing beyond his day-to-day duties to maintain control over his generals who had pressed for such a large force.

In drawing such conclusions, we can sometimes be a little too wise after the fact. The growth of the army was shaped by many events and issues during the war, including the dramatic turn that took place in the fighting after the spring of 1940, and what historians have increasingly come to see as reluctance on the part of all of Canada’s senior wartime political leaders to face having to make difficult decisions on manpower policy. As the pivotal link between the military and the politicians, Ralston struggled to reconcile these and other influences. He was not aided by his own personal characteristics, or by his intense sense of duty to the people around him, both of which sometimes led him into difficulty. Yet it is also unfair to criticize him for aspects of his job that almost any civilian leader in his position might have been forced to deal with during the war.

In addition, this article makes a broader point about relations between Canada’s military and civilian leadership between 1939 and 1945. In the classic view of civil–military relations, the military’s duty is to provide advice on military matters to its political superiors. In return, civilian leaders are expected to respect the military for its expertise and to choose from among the options offered to them by their advisors when making decisions. But the task of maintaining civilian authority was complicated by the sheer scale of what was necessary in order to fight the Second World War. In Canada, the difficulty was compounded by the fact that politicians have almost always had by far the greater weight in this relationship, especially in peacetime. During the war, some of them found themselves forced to rely on the military for its expertise, to an extent that many were uncomfortable with. For the most part, Ralston was simply trying to play what he considered to be his proper role in conveying to his Cabinet colleagues the advice of its military. But in the end, it proved easier for them to blame the army, and Ralston as its minister, for causing their wartime difficulties rather than their collective failure to impose greater civilian control if they did not truly agree with that advice.
In guiding the army through the war, Ralston was driven above all by a sense of service to the community that could sometimes be overwhelming. Yet it also made him a loyal and hard-working public servant. Born in 1881 in Amherst, Nova Scotia, “Layton”—as he preferred to be called—had these ideals instilled into him by his devout Baptist parents. By 1914, he was a rising lawyer in Halifax and had achieved some political success as a provincial Liberal MLA. After agonizing for months over whether to serve in the First World War, which would mean being separated from his wife and young son, in September 1915 he enlisted in the 85th Battalion, serving first as its adjutant and after April 1918 as its commanding officer in France. During his roughly twenty months at the front he was wounded four times, awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Bar, made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George (CMG), twice mentioned in despatches, and recommended for the Victoria Cross. He also lost his youngest brother, Ivan, who was killed in action while serving as second-in-command to Layton at the Battle of Amiens.6

As a result of his wartime service, Ralston drew the attention of William Lyon Mackenzie King, who became Prime Minister of Canada in 1921. In 1922, King appointed Ralston to head a major Royal Commission that reviewed postwar pensions for veterans. Four years later, he convinced Ralston to become Minister of National Defence.7 Although Ralston soon came to be well respected in that role, he seems to have been more interested in serving as Finance Minister, likely because by the mid-1920s he had become an increasingly successful corporate lawyer in Nova Scotia and thus had developed an interest in financial policy.8 Several members of his family were affected by the Great Depression that began in 1929,9 however, and when the King government was voted out of office in 1930 Ralston joined a legal firm in Montreal and prepared to retire from politics so that he could...
devote more time to his personal affairs. King managed to convince him to remain in the House of Commons by offering him a position as the Liberals' finance critic. But as a result Ralston soon found himself working even harder, a frequent occurrence throughout his career almost every time he tried to force himself to lessen his burdens. In this case, he spent the next five years commuting regularly between Montreal and Ottawa to manage both his legal and his Parliamentary duties. Just when it looked as if the King government was on the verge of returning to power in 1935, Ralston chose to walk away from public life entirely when his senior law partner died and he became directly responsible for preserving the livelihoods of his employees. Yet King still did not wish to lose Ralston, and over the next few years appointed him as government counsel, first to the Royal Grain Inquiry that attempted to settle the Liberal government’s policy towards the Canadian Wheat Board in 1936–1938, then to a second Royal Commission that investigated the army’s controversial Bren light machine gun contract in 1938. As another war began to appear more and more likely in August 1939, King tried once more to convince Ralston to return to politics. Ralston declined, but said that if another conflict broke out, his sense of duty would compel him to serve. Within a few days of the invasion of Poland on 1 September, the two men were back in touch, and Ralston replaced the ailing Charles Dunning as Minister of Finance.
It is worth remembering that Ralston did not lobby to become Minister of National Defence when he returned to Ottawa in 1939. In fact, King gave Ralston his choice of the two portfolios, and Ralston took Finance. Thus, when he returned to Defence ten months later, he did not necessarily do so because he personally supported the army’s policies. Despite the assumptions that are usually made that as a former soldier his sympathies were for conscription, he did not blindly support that policy. Instead, he seemed to see it as his duty to advocate as firmly as possible for any interest he represented in Cabinet. In the late 1920s, he had played a key role in pressing his Cabinet colleagues to accept at least some of the recommendations of the Duncan Commission that attempted to calm agitation for “Maritime Rights” in that region, because he was its Cabinet representative for Nova Scotia. And after September 1939, he performed his tasks as Minister of Finance as single-mindedly as he would later carry them out as Minister of National Defence. In particular, he clashed more than once with the holder of the Defence portfolio at the time, Norman Rogers, opposing any expansion of the army due to its financial implications. He also worked to keep Canada’s share of the costs of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan as low as possible when that agreement was negotiated with British representatives in November 1939. In the early days of Germany’s invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, he even opposed spending additional money to send greater aid to the United Kingdom until King shared with him just how serious the situation was in Europe.

In a sign of one of his other weaknesses throughout his career, Ralston also became immersed in details as Minister of Finance, intervening to question a number of individual defence projects and purchases throughout the winter of 1939–1940. While he was preparing his 1940 budget, he also wrote to his fellow ministers repeatedly to urge them to make significant cuts to non-war spending, so that more of the government’s revenues could be put towards paying for the war. He even went so far as to lecture some of them about the specific programs they should cut. But in the end, the result was very positive: an overall reduction of 15 per cent to the government’s regular operating expenditures for 1940–1941 (closer to 30 per cent after fixed costs that could not be changed were factored out), an accomplishment that many recent Ministers of Finance might envy.

Ralston took over as Minister of National Defence when Norman Rogers died in an airplane crash on 10 June 1940. It was a personal tragedy for Prime Minister King, who had guided Rogers’s career since the early 1930s. But it was at least as much so for Ralston, since both men’s families came from Amherst, Nova Scotia, and they had known each other for years. In the rush of events that June, there seemed to be few other choices to replace Rogers. Ralston completed tabling his budget as Minister of Finance on 24 June, only 48 hours after France’s armistice with Germany, and officially became Minister of National Defence on 5 July. In the meantime, King acknowledged the tremendously expanding workload of the post by dividing up its responsibilities. From then on, Ralston’s focus would be the army, while Charles G. (“Chubby”) Power took over as Minister of National Defence for air and Angus L. Macdonald resigned as Premier of Nova Scotia to become Minister of National Defence for naval services. All three men were members of the Cabinet War Committee, the narrow group of ministers that guided most Cabinet decision making throughout the war.
The above developments had also come about because of changes in the war itself. Between early April and late June, Germany overran most of northern and western Europe, and the bulk of the British army barely escaped being trapped on the continent at Dunkirk. Suddenly, the majority of the Allies’ continental armies had been lost, and for the next eighteen months the British Commonwealth was the only source outside of Britain itself from which manpower could be drawn to replace them. In the early days after Germany’s invasion of the U.S.S.R. in June 1941, things looked even bleaker. Even in later years, after the United States entered the war in December 1941 and the fighting was reversed in various theatres, the Allies were still intent on building up armies as large as possible because they expected to face heavy losses in retaking western Europe. Thus, for the rest of the war British officials looked to the Canadian army to provide much more manpower than had originally been projected.26

For Ralston and the other leaders who were responsible for making Canadian defence policy, the result was that many of the previous restrictions that had been placed on the growth of the army were set aside. In the summer of 1940, the Cabinet War Committee agreed to rush a brigade of troops to Iceland, as well as individual battalions to Newfoundland and the British West Indies, all to replace British garrisons so that those men could return to defend their homeland. Canada’s own 2nd Division was rushed overseas to join the 1st Division in England, and a Canadian Corps was formed to command them for the first time since 1918. The 3rd Division was authorized to join them as soon as possible. It began to seem that even Canada itself might be in direct danger, and the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) was enacted on 21 June. Its main purpose was to provide for conscription for home defence, but it was also intended to help impress upon Canadians the general seriousness of the situation.27

Another factor with which Ralston had to contend in guiding the army, that first summer and afterwards, was his relationship with its senior commanders. For much of the period up to the Second World War, the Canadian army had been a small, mostly part-time militia force, and its civilian ministers had dominated decision making. Yet by the 1930s the officer corps had become much more professionalized, and in a time of war they had some right to expect that as the experts in the field they would play a greater role in advising the government. The key figure in advancing this view was Major-General H.D.G. Crerar, a personally ambitious career officer who became the army’s overall commander as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in July. Crerar was guided by professional as well as personal goals. He agreed with British planners’ views of the necessity to create larger forces after 1940, and he believed that these views needed to be pressed forcefully to Canada’s civilian leaders, most of whom had tended to minimize the role of the army in civil–military relations before 1939. He also hoped to use the war to create an army that would play an important role in the fighting, winning a greater place in the public mind and thus among policy makers in Canada after 1945.28

Crerar’s behaviour in advancing all of these goals has made it difficult to be detached in assessing his career. For example, Richard Walker has recently argued that Crerar and the group of officers around him at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) took advantage of the war to almost coerce the government into accepting the army of five divisions and ancillary troops that was built up in
England over the next three years. From the time that Crerar became Chief of the General Staff, he certainly did advance his views to Ralston very forcefully. Yet he also argued that the army’s expansion was necessary in Canada’s own interests, and not just to aid the British. In a seminal paper in September 1940, he noted that if Canada did not help Great Britain survive and the war
crossed the Atlantic, then the United States would likely mobilize on a much greater scale. Canada would be forced to keep pace, placing an even greater burden on its resources than would be needed to help the Allies defeat Germany in Europe. By late 1941, Crerar was recommending to the Cabinet War Committee the full five-division army that would eventually be created overseas. He then handed off his post to Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart and went overseas to begin the further ascent that would bring him to command First Canadian Army in northwestern Europe in 1944–1945.

Ralston and Crerar found themselves at odds from the start. Ralston was put off by Crerar’s efforts to have the branch heads’ access to the minister limited, so that all policy making would have to go through the CGS. Later, Crerar pressed strongly to be promoted to Lieutenant-General, justifying his apparent personal ambitions in pursuit of the same goal. At times, Ralston felt obstructed in his efforts to gain information from Crerar and other subordinates, and thus to maintain civilian control within his department. By June 1941, he had reportedly stated that he “hates Crerar:
despises the general staff from top to bottom. Yet this account comes third-hand, from a private memorandum by Grant Dexter of the Winnipeg Free Press, quoting Victor Sifton, the former publisher of the same newspaper. Ralston had brought Sifton into the Department of National Defence as Master-General of the Ordnance in December 1940, to help coordinate wartime procurement with the separate Department of Munitions and Supply, and the former civilian was very critical of the career generals throughout the war.

One way or the other, despite his own concerns Ralston still defended his generals to outsiders. He did this not so much because he had a military background himself, but out of his sense of duty as minister to respect the opinions of anybody who was serving as his advisor, and the broader ideals of civil–military relations that suggested that those experts deserved to be heard. As he put it more than once in comments reported to Dexter both by Victor Sifton and by Ralston himself, he felt that Crerar was the most capable man available for the job as CGS. Ralston “was minister but must act upon the advice of his staff of professional soldiers. Being a civilian, he could not set aside his advisors simply because he disagreed with what they said.”

At a higher level, Ralston also had to deal with his Cabinet colleagues, and more specifically the Cabinet War Committee and their conflicting views over wartime policies. In theory, it was their duty to thrash out the alternatives, and once a decision was reached all members ought to back the decision fully. Here again, however, Ralston seems to have been influenced more by his ideal of what his responsibilities should be than by reality. He had only returned to politics for the duration of the war, and therefore he tried to be guided by his own sense of principles rather than political pragmatism. A number of times over the winter of 1941–1942, he hinted that he might resign or openly threatened to do so, as he and his colleagues debated first the plan to produce the five-division army overseas, then the later conscription plebiscite and its aftermath, despite what his loss as one of the government’s most significant ministers might have meant politically. It made him seem obstructionist to some of his colleagues. But in his view, if they disagreed with him strongly enough then it was their duty to oppose him openly, and he would walk away and let them manage the war, satisfied that he had done his best to argue for what he felt should be their priorities. At one point, as Grant Dexter put it when recounting another conversation with Ralston (this time about the latter’s inability to get Crerar to explore possible ways to reduce the army’s demands for manpower), “You know, he said, the war committee of the cabinet could decide to do any of these things, and I would simply have to tell Crerar that these were my orders as well as his.”

When Ralston presented Crerar’s near-final plan for the overseas army in November 1941, he reportedly “put it forward not as his own but as Crerar’s” and expected it to be rejected. In July 1941, he had submitted an earlier proposal in the same manner, and it had been denied. But as the discussion went on in late 1941, he seems to have decided once more that as minister he had to back his subordinates, and he did so more and more strongly over the following weeks.

The discussions on the army plan were heated at times, but in January 1942 the bulk of it was accepted, and an Army headquarters was added in March to command the force in the field. That led to new concerns about whether conscripts might still eventually need to be sent overseas to maintain it. Prime Minister King hit upon the notion of holding the plebiscite that was mentioned
at the beginning of this article. As was noted there, when the divided results instead made things worse, more months were spent debating where to go from there. Finally, a compromise was reached wherein the legal restrictions in the NRMA against using conscripts overseas were repealed, but Cabinet did not act immediately to take advantage. If conscription later proved to be necessary in Europe (King and Ralston would openly disagree about the exact definition of “necessary” in 1944), then it would be extended without delay.42

Beyond these various factors that shaped defence policy related to the army, there is also the question of how Ralston operated as a minister himself. He was well known even at the time for the long hours he worked and for his inability to avoid becoming immersed in detail. He reported his usual routine to a friend in October 1940: “I am out of the apartment at 8.40 in the morning, and not back there generally until after midnight.” He worked the same long hours for most of the war.43 Early on, he was also not averse to intervening in technical duties that ought to have been left to his military subordinates.44 Once or twice each year, from December 1940 to September 1944, he also spent a month or more overseas, dealing with army matters and visiting Canadian troops. During the First World War, he had been known for writing personal letters to the families of every man he lost in action. During this second conflict he recorded the names of hundreds of men and women he met while viewing various units, and then dictated individual letters to each of their families after his return home to let them know that they were not forgotten—a task that brought heartfelt expressions of gratitude, but that might not have been the best way to use his time as Minister of National Defence.45

To aid him in his duties, Ralston brought into the department two close friends from Montreal, fellow lawyer Allan A. Magee and accountant George S. Currie, in July 1940. Magee served Ralston intermittently, while Currie stayed on until late 1944.46 Yet Currie too seems to have become preoccupied with trying to help Ralston deal with the many daily items of business that crossed the minister’s desk. In April 1942, for example, over one two-day period Currie reviewed files and wrote recommendations on topics ranging from authorizing the addition of 15 men to the war establishment of a coast defence artillery unit, to approving assigning an additional platoon of men to do fatigues in Halifax, and disbursing $531.83 to repair a damaged army vehicle, up to more serious decisions such as placing the Régiment de Montmagny on active service in Gander, Newfoundland, and spending $2.2 million to build a staging camp for 550 men on the east coast.47 Apparently, it was sometimes difficult to escape such tasks, as a result of the survival of peacetime attitudes towards ministerial responsibility that seemed to require personal approval for almost every action.

From at least 1942 onwards, Ralston attempted in other ways to reduce some of the many demands that arose out of the sheer number of issues that crossed his desk. One of his civilian secretaries, James E. Wells, seems to have been specifically assigned to read reports and other items of correspondence and reduce them to brief summaries, to highlight the relevant points for Ralston’s attention.48 But soon Wells also seems to have become immersed in details, and began to summarize individual telegrams and other items that were arguably already brief enough that Ralston could just as easily have read the original documents.49 It seemed that every time Ralston tried to delegate more substantial duties, it backfired on him. In the spring of 1943, Prime Minister King
assigned a number of Members of Parliament to act as Parliamentary Assistants to individual ministers for the first time in Canadian history, due to the growth of work that the war had engendered; Ralston was assigned Halifax M.P. William Chisholm Macdonald. In September 1944, when Ralston was in Europe investigating charges of shortages of reinforcements that would soon lead to Macdonald’s resignation, Wells wrote to inform him that despite instructions to Macdonald to deal in Ralston’s absence with the large amount of incoming correspondence and public charges that were being thrown at the government related to the issue, the M.P. had gone “off to Halifax almost at once. The draft letter he left simply thanks the person for writing and says it will be brought to the Minister’s attention upon his return. A fine help!” C.G. Power, the senior Minister of National Defence in Ralston’s absence, was also nowhere to be found.

No matter who might have carried out the duties of Minister of National Defence for the army during the war, the number and scope of the issues with which Ralston had to deal as head of a complex organization of half a million men and women were clearly immense. Yet tensions within the department lessened after Ken Stuart succeeded H.D.G. Crerar as Chief of the General Staff in late 1941. Ralston got along with Stuart much better. And the number of files and memoranda in Ralston’s papers that address matters of excessive detail seem to decline after 1942, as he became more accommodated to the wartime demands of his office. He also became more forceful in imposing his will. In September 1942, he revised procedures for senior administrative military appointments, so that he could have more say and choose men in whom he had greater confidence.
He also elevated George Currie to Deputy Minister, with much stronger powers to hold the generals to account. Currie continued to serve in that post until September 1944, when he resigned to return to his family and private business in Montreal.

By the later years of Ralston’s time as minister, his attention to detail, and more particularly his demands for more accurate record-keeping, also came to have a more positive effect. This was true especially in attempting to manage the army’s drain on manpower, a central concern in both the military and political conduct of the war, but a task which could easily be overwhelming. During 1941, Ralston tried more than once to get a firm grasp on the army’s exact requirements. After the final army program was approved in early 1942, he had to keep after the Adjutant-General’s branch to provide firm numbers as to how it was being fulfilled, since at first they seemed unable to reconcile even their own varying projections. By late 1941, however, he had begun to receive weekly summaries that tabulated the strengths of the army in Britain and all major home defence units and formations in Canada. Over the following months, procedures were also regularized for reporting the numbers of recruits that were being raised to maintain and add to those numbers. By early 1944, Ralston’s staff was providing monthly returns of those figures. Throughout that year they also produced daily summaries of overseas casualties; even when Ralston was out of the office for several days in late May and early June, the numbers were relayed to him daily by telegram.
Another issue that made the task of managing manpower more difficult was the army’s tendency to keep adding new ad-hoc units for various purposes overseas. On the basis again of reports from Victor Sifton, in 1941 Grant Dexter described it as a deliberate ploy by the army to keep incrementally increasing the forces. As E.L.M. Burns has suggested, it was much more likely simply the result of too many men seeming to be available for such duties in overseas holding units earlier in the war, when large numbers were arriving regularly to build up the five-division army but were not yet actively involved in combat. They did tend to sap the reinforcement pools, and from early on Ralston attempted to rein them in. By January 1942, he was having trouble reconciling figures at NDHQ with those of Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London, as well as within Canada as mentioned above. By early 1943 his staff at NDHQ were preparing weekly reports on the implications for manpower of any change in the official manpower ceilings of any unit.

This is not to say that Ralston’s difficulties did not persist. And in December 1943 he faced what was clearly one of the greatest crises of his time as minister, when Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton was removed as head of First Canadian Army in England. Since at least early 1942, the general had been openly critical of Ralston as minister, both to acquaintances and to Ralston directly. And since mid-1943, British commanders had expressed concerns about McNaughton’s command abilities. By that fall he was also physically exhausted. But when Ralston attempted to speak to him about the situation in London that December, McNaughton immediately sent a follow-up telegram directly to the Prime Minister, calling on King to fire Ralston. Regardless of his personal weaknesses, Ralston was still the duly chosen civilian minister, and although officially McNaughton was removed for reasons of ill health, his open insubordination left him with little support from either King or Ralston.
In the aftermath, Ken Stuart took command of the army’s overseas administration at CMHQ. Yet even then (and despite the cordiality with which he did so), Ralston found himself having to remind Stuart of the need to consult with Ottawa before making appointments, as senior personnel were reorganized to fill the gaps left by McNaughton’s departure. In December 1943, in correspondence that hinted at later problems, officers at NDHQ also grew frustrated with CMHQ after proposing to cut shipping rates for reinforcements to England. According to calculations in Ottawa, there were already more than enough men in reinforcement pools overseas. But CMHQ protested, noting that for a variety of reasons 14,293 of those men were not actually available as reinforcements—a sizeable number, and one that not only included the usual levels of sick and wounded but also confirms the significant impact of the ad-hoc units mentioned above, since the majority were men who were said to be “temporarily employed” but now apparently “definitely indispensable” in such duties. Officers at CMHQ asked that NDHQ at least wait until mid-1944 before reducing the shipments. In March 1944, Stuart also quietly reported that changes had been made in British wastage rates for upcoming operations, and that the numbers of infantry should therefore be increased over other arms among future reinforcements. Furthermore, he had started remustering surplus men into the infantry from the armoured corps, artillery and engineers in England. This program would become one of the central issues in the crisis that blew up over reinforcements later that year. Ralston sent George Currie and Brigadier J.A. deLalanne from the Adjutant-General’s branch to England to look into these issues. But given that Stuart downplayed the situation, as well as the broader complexity of trying to keep track of all of these statistics, not enough evidence seems to have emerged to suggest the true seriousness of the problem at that time.

At the highest political level, meanwhile, despite the fact that Cabinet had decided in 1942 that its policy would be to build up a five-division army overseas, Ralston’s efforts to bring his colleagues to pursue tougher civilian manpower policies to support that goal met regular resistance. In early 1942, Cabinet collectively decided to create a system of National Selective Service (NSS) to begin imposing restrictions on civilian labour. By the end of that year, many of these measures had been considerably extended. Nevertheless, debate still arose over the extent to which officials should resort to compulsion as opposed to voluntary cooperation. Some of Ralston’s ministerial colleagues felt that too much emphasis was being placed on the army’s needs, and that is how the events have come to be portrayed by historians. From the point of view of Ralston and his advisors, however, the policies were biased towards civilian priorities. In February 1943, the Adjutant-General’s branch reviewed a recent report by the Director of National Selective Service, noting that it tended to emphasize the needs of industry and agriculture over the army, while minimizing to an ideal figure the number of men that needed to be called up under the NRMA each month in order to meet its minimum requirements. Ralston and his officials were even more upset by a flyer that was circulated by NSS in April 1944, which stated that “Mobilization Boards are giving postponement of military training to farm workers of military age ... Practically no applications are refused.”

By mid-1943, in fact, provisions had been made to give men leave from the army to work in agriculture, war industries, lumbering, coal mining and other seasonal and essential occupations. In addition, as calls were extended to older age groups and then to married men under the NRMA,
more and more Canadians seemed to need to be called up just to find enough potential recruits each month to fill the training centres. Also, a proportion of conscripts always volunteered to serve overseas once they were in uniform, which also lowered the army’s ability to maintain the flow of volunteers for essential work at home. The situation led to an increasingly acrimonious series of letters between Ralston and Humphrey Mitchell, the Minister of Labour and the man responsible for NSS, who was protesting various aspects of the administration of mobilization between April 1943 and April 1944.

Ralston also clashed with C.D. Howe, who was responsible for maintaining production as the Minister of Munitions and Supply. Despite Howe’s quite deserved reputation for mobilizing industrial production during the war, not everyone was enamoured of his performance. Ralston had almost the same views about Howe’s inability to control his department as others had about Ralston’s, and at least one of Ralston’s own critics shared the opinion. Howe called repeatedly for the army to release men to meet shortages in various civilian occupations, often with success.
despite rarely providing what Ralston’s advisors considered firm evidence to support the appeals. In several cases, they argued, other factors were at play, such as employers being unwilling to alleviate harsh working conditions or provide competitive rates of pay in certain companies or industries. They also suggested that such situations could be dealt with more effectively by applying civilian manpower regulations more rigorously. But with hundreds of thousands of men in uniform, the army always seemed to be an easy target from which to try to find solutions for other shortages. Before the war was out, another 500 soldiers had been detailed while still in uniform to help maintain tracks for the national railways, and two similar port companies totalling over 650 men were formed to help load outgoing war material onto ships.

At the same time as these developments were going on, by late 1943 the army had begun to reduce the numbers of its own men on home defence duties in Canada. Scaling back and consolidating these units freed up 14,000 more volunteers to be sent to Europe, although the number was smaller than had been hoped. Other disbanded men returned to civilian life, presumably to help ease the demands for industrial workers. In April 1944, an intensive campaign was launched to find one more round of volunteers from among conscripts in operational formations on the west coast, by promising that if enough men volunteered they could go overseas as a unit. Ultimately, the campaign netted 1,284 converts, and the 13th Brigade proceeded overseas with a total of 2,664 other ranks. They soon moved on to reinforce other units in Europe, while the brigade headquarters itself became responsible for providing refresher training to later arrivals from Canada. Similar experiments were attempted on the east coast, but only 700 men were found there from all sources. Clearly, Ralston was trying to cut down the army’s own requirements within Canada. But the number of men who remained suitable for overseas service was beginning to run dry.

The rest of this story is well known: in September 1944, Conn Smythe, the owner of the Toronto Maple Leafs and the commander of an overseas anti-aircraft battery made up of former professional athletes, was wounded in the field. After speaking to other men as he moved through the military hospital system, he declared publicly that overseas infantry units were short of reinforcements, and that those they were receiving were not adequately trained. In August, Lieutenant-General Stuart had returned to Canada and reported directly to Ralston and his fellow ministers that the situation was satisfactory. Ralston accelerated a planned trip overseas and, although he found no evidence of a major lack of training, he became fully aware of what had been going on with Stuart’s remustering program, in what seems to have been a misguided effort by Stuart to try to avoid having to call on the government to extend conscription. It also became clear that if casualties continued at the present rate there would be no infantry reinforcements left for the Canadian army in Europe by the end of 1944. Ralston returned to Canada in late October and recommended conscription to keep the army up to strength.

Yet to Prime Minister King, the key question was whether conscripts were necessary to win the war rather than simply to maintain the army’s current strength, and the final debate over conscription began. Between the apparent urgency of the situation, and the fact that a convenient source of reinforcements did seem to exist in the thousands of conscripts who were still in uniform at home, admittedly it was easier for Ralston and his generals to discount other, more complex poten-
tial solutions that were advanced over the next few weeks to try to meet their needs. Instead, he held stubbornly to his position, feeling that he and his colleagues had made a commitment to the men who were already in the army, as well as to all Canadians, to maintain it at its existing strength. 81

On 1 November, King decided to remove Ralston and replace him with A.G.L. McNaughton. But McNaughton’s military subordinates now also resisted him when he attempted to organize a new recruiting campaign among the remaining conscripts in Canada, pointing out that they had already spent years trying to do the same thing but with diminishing results. Within three weeks, several senior commanders were preparing to resign—the appropriate way for them to express dissent if in all good conscience they felt that they had offered their best advice to the government but it was being ignored, in order to spark debate and allow the public itself to decide whether it supported the government’s policy. On 22 November, King finally yielded and agreed to send 16,000 conscripts overseas to deal with the immediate crisis.

Ultimately, that proved to be enough. Over the winter, Canadian troops finally received a reprieve from combat, pools of volunteers were restored, and the fighting in Europe ended a few months later, before further shortages could occur. Ralston chose to play as quiet a role as possible after 1 November, and was just satisfied that the situation was eventually resolved favourably for the men overseas. 82 But the amount of energy he had devoted to his job and the stress of the war years had clearly affected his health, and he died in May 1948 of a heart attack at the age of 66.
In recent years, Ralston has come to be remembered more negatively than positively for his role in these events and for the way he guided the army throughout his four years as Minister of National Defence. We tend to forget that other ministers also had some of the same difficulties managing their own departments (most notably A.L. Macdonald, whose lack of attention to monitoring his service helped lead to the sudden removal of its Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Percy Nelles, in January 1944). At varying times during the war, several of Ralston’s colleagues also showed signs of overwork or exhaustion, and he himself took over for J.L. Ilsley as Acting Minister of Finance in addition to his own duties in the late summer of 1944, so that Ilsley could travel to California to recover from what seems to have been a nervous breakdown. As this article has hopefully shown, however, while Ralston had weaknesses as a minister, he tried to carry out what he considered to be his duties as conscientiously as possible, and to balance the many conflicting factors that affected his department during the war. His experience also reminds us that civil–military relations are never simple, and of the degree to which influences other than directly military ones also shaped his role during the war, particularly in a democratic country with as much of a tradition of lack of peacetime interest in the military as Canada had had before 1939.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...
Daniel Byers is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at Laurentian University. This article grew out of his doctoral thesis, which investigated the history of conscription and particularly the role of H.D.G. Crerar and other army leaders in administering the policy during the Second World War, and out of more recent research for a book-length biography of J.L. Ralston, which builds on a number of questions raised by the earlier study.

ENDNOTES


2. Too many losses had been projected for other parts of the army due to experiences in North Africa, where non-infantrymen had suffered higher casualties. Planners had also not counted on the fighting continuing without letup after the Allies landed in France in June 1944. The Canadian army’s difficulties were aggravated by the problem that it found itself fighting both in Italy and northwestern Europe, when it had not planned to have to maintain two separate streams of reinforcements. And generally its forces were smaller than those of Great Britain and the United States. Thus, to be able to provide many of the same services for its men, the Canadian army had to have a larger proportion of them serving behind the lines rather than at the front, with the resulting further diversion of manpower. E.L.M. Burns provides an excellent discussion of all of these factors in *Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1956). On the shortages of 1944, see specifically 89–100, as well as Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 425–428 and 436–437.


7. On Ralston’s role as Chair of the Royal Commission, see Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915–1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 166–177, as well as Ralston’s own reports: Report of the Royal Commission on Pensions and Re-Establishment – Report on First Part of Investigation (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1922); … – First Interim Report on Second Part of Investigation (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1923); … – Second Interim Report on Second Part of Investigation (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1923); and … – Final Report on Second Part of Investigation (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1924). On Ralston’s joining the King government in 1926 see H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924–1932. The Lonely Heights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 165–166 and 173–174, and on his work as Minister of National Defence in the 1920s see the relevant sections of Harris, as well as James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964). For the 1920s as a whole, see also Campbell, 18–25.

8. For my understanding of Ralston’s status as a corporate lawyer in the 1920s, I am indebted to Dr. Mark Kuhlberg for sharing with me the preliminary results of unpublished research related to Ralston and forestry interests in Nova Scotia.


13. Ralston comments on this decision in various letters that run through his personal correspondence, and more particularly in two files devoted specifically to it in Ralston Papers, Vol. 31, titled “Ralston, J.L. – Retirement from Public Life, 1935. Correspondence (1);” and “…Correspondence (2).” Also H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1932–1939: The Prism of Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 129.


16. For earlier assumptions about Ralston’s views, see in particular J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War, 202 (“Emotionally, Ralston was a conscriptionist.”). For differing views, see Campbell, 2–3, 80–82, 85–86, and 97–98, and Byers, “J.L. Ralston and the First World War,” 11–13.


18. Ralston’s work as Minister of Finance generally, and his resistance to increased spending and especially Rogers’ and the army’s demands more particularly, are covered in Campbell, 36–52. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 11–12, 21–24 and 32. Granatstein, Canada’s War, 25, 49–55, 81, 93, and 97, and Walker, 58.

19. For example, Ralston exchanged several letters between November 1939 and April 1940 with Ian MacKenzie, the Minister of Pensions and National Health, and MacKenzie’s Deputy Minister, over spending $70,000 to build new hospital accommodations in Saint John, New Brunswick. For this correspondence, see LAC, Record Group [RG] 19, Records of the Department of Finance, Vol. 2675, file D-11, “Pensions [and] National Health – Hospitalization, St. [sic] John, N.B., File.” For several other cases related to the Department of National Defence and the War Supply Board, see also various items in ibid., file D-12(a) [no title]. In discussing developments in the Department of Finance in 1939–1940, Marsden also comments on Ralston’s “inability to delegate to subordinates, no matter how trusted and experienced” (202), and see also 209.

20. RG 19, Vol. 2677, file E-02, “Estimates” [vol. 2], memorandum titled “Estimates Procedure, 1940-41,” 18 November; copies of form letters sent by Ralston to various colleagues, 21 November–4 December 1939; draft form letter forwarded to Ralston by his personal secretary, Olive Waters (“OJW”), 24 January; copies of form letters to various colleagues, 13 May; and Ralston to P.J.A. Cardin, 20 May 1940. Also ibid. [vol. 1], memorandum titled “Mr. Ralston’s pencil notes made at Estimates meetings held May 17, 1940.”


27. For an overview of all of the developments of May–June 1940, see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 31–36.


29. Walker, passim.


33. Ibid., 96–97, and Dickson, 147–151. Also Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 25 March 1941, 135. Most of the correspondence on these issues between Crerar and Ralston that is cited by Granatstein and especially Dickson from the Crerar Papers can also be found in Ralston Papers, Vol. 43, file titled “Crerar – General H.D.G., Operational Report (Secret) – 2.”

34. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 12 June 1941, 177 [emphasis in original]. Similar comments can be found in ibid, 10 October 1941, 200–201.

35. For examples of critical comments by Sifton, see the memoranda cited in the two immediately preceding endnotes, as well as ibid., 17 October 1940, 80, 16 September 1941, 195–196, and 14 April 1942, 307–309. Also Ralston Papers, Vol. 57, “Sifton, Victor, General (Secret),” Sifton to Ralston, 1 March 1944.

36. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 25 March, 135; 12 June, 177; 16 September, 196; and 10 October 1941, 200–201 [source of quotation]; as well as 14 April 1942, 307. The same comment is also quoted in Dickson, 151, and Walker, 63.

37. Ralston made a number of statements at this time that suggest such an interpretation, either directly to Grant Dexter or as passed on to Dexter by others. See especially Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 10 October 1941, 201, and 9 December 1941, 231, and 13 March 1942, 296.

38. Ibid., 10 October 1941, 201.


40. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 30 July 1941, 189.


42. See Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 45–46 and 399–402, Granatstein, Canada’s War, 214–43, and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 158–180. For Ralston’s point of view on the events of 1942, see also various documents in Ralston Papers, Vol. 54, “Plebiscite 1942, Gen. (Secret).”

43. For example, Ralston’s personal secretary Olive Waters recorded in June 1942 that “Since the [Parliamentary] Session began we have been desperately busy, working literally every day from 8:30 or 9 until midnight and later each night.” For this quotation and the one from the main text, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 30, “Ralston, J.L. Correspondence and Securities, Personal. 1939–44,” O.J. Waters, “Memorandum To: Mr. [David] Mason,” 16 June 1942, and Vol. 26, “Mathers, H.L. (and family), General Correspondence,” Ralston to Harry J. Mathers, 2 October 1940. Ralston’s office ledger that recorded all of his appointments and meetings whenever he was in Ottawa throughout the war is also available in Vol. 67, “Ralston, J.L. Diary 1941–44 (incomplete);” and for another similar view of Ralston’s working hours from H.D.G. Crerar, see also Dickson, 152.

44. For example, after reviewing a report on defence installations on the east coast by his Inspector General in August 1940, Ralston submitted a three-page list to the Quartermaster-General, highlighting deficiencies he had noted and directing the QMG to provide updates every two weeks as to how they were being addressed. During trips of his own to the maritimes and especially the prairies in summer 1942, he took copious notes on the facilities he visited, and his impressions of local officers, and then forwarded these to the appropriate branches within NDHQ for their information. Ralston Papers, Vol. 1, file titled “43,” “Crerar – General H.D.G., Operational Report (Secret) – 2.”

separate file seems to have been preserved from Ralston’s first overseas trip in December 1940, he did bring home with him a list of 25 names of people to write to, which can be found in Vol. 63; “English Trips Sept. 1940–Jan. 1941, Ralston’s Notebook 1940–41,” document titled “List of Members of Forces Seen Who Are to be Remembered to Their Friends in Canada,” 27 December 1940.


47. Ralston Papers, Vol. 43, “Currie, Col. – Recommendations, General (Secret),” various memoranda from Currie to Ralston, all dated 21 and 22 April 1942.


49. For example, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 64, “English Trip Fall 1942, Canadian Army – General Notes on,” copy of two-page report on state of morale, tactics and views on leave within Canadian army in England, n.d., and the later one-page summary produced by Wells on 3 November 1942. In the most extreme example, Wells rewrote a one-page telegram listing the total casualties suffered so far in the war by each part of the British Commonwealth, into a very similar single-page listing of the same numbers. Vol. 73, “Casualties 1943, Canada and British Empire, (Army, RCAF, Navy), February,” telegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 February, and “Summary...” by Wells, 25 February 1943.


52. Ibid., 27 and 29 September 1942, 372–373.


66. For Ralston’s attempt to collect recruiting statistics himself, and the realization that none were being tabulated regularly, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 72, “Recruiting 1942, Statistics, January 1941–July 1942,” various notes for individual days from March to July 1942, and memorandum, Colonel A.J. Everett, Director of Mobilization and Requirements, to Adjutant-General, 1 May 1942.


58. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 12 June 1941, 178. Walker, 64, also shares this opinion.


61. A full set of these reports, running from March 1943 to October 1944 when Ralston left office, can be found in Ralston Papers, Vol. 52, “Manpower, Gen. (Secret), Vol. 2,” and “Manpower Gen. Vol. 3.”


64. Ralston Papers, Vol. 61, “Overseas Trip Nov.–Dec. 1943, Shipping Accomodation [sic],” telegram from NDHQ to CMHQ, 3 December, and memorandum, Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale, for Major-General P.J. Montague, Senior Officer, CMHQ, to CGS, 11 December 1943.


67. On the creation and evolution of the National Selective Service system, see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 403–411, Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 185–197 and 201–204, and Stevenson, 4–11 and 26–36.


72. On the specific programs that were put in place to pressure many of these conscripts to volunteer, and their consequences for the conscripts themselves, see Daniel Byers, Mobilising Canada: The National Resources Mobilization Act, the Department of National Defence, and Compulsory Military Service in Canada, 1940–1945, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, New Series, No. 7 (1996), 184–192.


81. Among the expedients suggested in late October were cutting the number of infantry companies per battalion from four to three, reducing age or physical requirements for overseas service, removing an entire infantry division from the country's order of battle overseas, accelerating training in Canada, forcibly reverting non-commissioned officers in rank to make them eligible to be sent overseas, and a new, more rigorous attempt to recruit volunteers from among conscripts who remained in uniform, including offering possible financial and other incentives. Given that rifle companies within the Canadian army were already operating well below strength overseas, all of its divisions were in operations, and most of the other suggestions seemed to require too much time to become effective, however, the army also had some grounds upon which to argue that none of these efforts would meet the immediate requirements. Dawson, 31–33, provides the most critical comment on resistance to these measures, and for further descriptions see Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 447 and 451–452, Granatstein, *Canada's War*, 345–350, and Granatstein and Hitsman, *Broken Promises*, 214–217.

82. Comments by Ralston to this effect can again be found in particular letters throughout his personal files, and more specifically in the many letters contained within a separate set of correspondence related specifically to his 1944 resignation, which comprise all of Vol. 84 as well as part of Vol. 85 of his Papers.


Colonel
Ardant du Picq

Source: wikipedia
MORALE IN BATTLE: THE THEORIES OF COLONEL ARDANT DU PICQ

Mr. Vincent J. Curtis

In the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale.
—Ardant du Picq

Editor’s Comment: Please note the author has employed parts of Du Picq’s ‘Etudes sur les combat: Combat antique et moderne (often referred to by its common English title as Battle Studies), throughout this article, and several passages and lists below are directly cited from this source. Readers may further reference, Colonel Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies. Translated from the 8th Edition in French by John Greely and Robert C. Cotton, (Macmillan, New York, 1920) for additional details.

Ardant du Picq was an officer in the French Army from his commissioning in October 1844 until his death in the Franco-Prussian War in August 1870. He served France in the Crimean War, in the French intervention in Syria from 1860 to 1861, in Algeria from 1864–1866 and, lastly, in the Franco-Prussian War. His writings on military thought and application greatly impressed the French General Staff, particularly Marshal Ferdinand Foch, whose thinking he powerfully influenced. After World War I, Foch held that du Picq’s theories were amply verified.

Du Picq’s experience was primarily of muzzle-loaded rifles and infantry battalions fighting in close order. However, he lived to see the effect that breech-loaded rifles and quick firing artillery would have on such formations and the consequential development of fighting in the open order.

His theoretical work began with a study of ancient battles that took place before the invention of firearms. Of particular interest to him were the Battle of Pharsalus, between Pompey and Julius Caesar, and the Battle of Cannae, between Hannibal and Terentius Varro. He came to regard those battles as exemplars of the theory he promulgated. It would be fair to say that his attempt to recreate ancient battles in his imagination was what led him to revolutionary conclusions about the details of those episodes; it furthermore helped him develop an ability to foresee events on the battlefield that would have well served the French in wars to come.

His works on modern battle amounted to an application of the insights he gained from the study of ancient battle to the situation of modern battle, which featured a dramatic increase in the power to kill from afar. His paper on ancient battle was published in pamphlet form in 1868. The papers and fragmentary studies on modern battle were not published until 1880. His collection of insights came to be embraced, albeit imperfectly, by the French Army after the disaster of 1870, and the study of his works became mandatory in the French military academy under Foch. His collected works were published in 1902, and they were translated into English in 1920.
A canard sometimes attached to the reputation of du Picq is that his work provided the basis for the conception of *l’offensive à outrance*, which was the catastrophic French operational doctrine at the beginning of World War I. The doctrine set out that the attacker held the moral high ground, and since higher morale meant victory, then to attack constantly and everywhere meant victory. Du Picq’s theory indeed holds that victory inheres in morale, and the bulk of his work is dedicated to proving and applying that proposition and to finding ways of developing and sustaining morale in fighting troops, particularly in French troops. However, the details of his work contain the rejection of *l’offensive à outrance* precisely because that simplistic doctrine failed to take into account the new conditions du Picq had seen: the dramatic new power of modern weaponry to kill from afar, and the consequential effect of the physical upon the moral.

Du Picq does not offer a general theory of war, but of battle alone. The relationship between du Picq’s theory of morale in battle and military science is like the relationship of micro-economics to general economics: by studying the behaviour of the individual soldier in combat, he develops a theory of victory. He is in agreement with Clausewitz on the centrality of battle to war, and his theory of morale is about a universal truth concerning victory in battle. None of du Picq’s work is concerned with strategy, of relating one victory to another to form a successful campaign. Du Picq in that respect concurs with Moltke the Elder, ie, that the demands of strategy grow silent before a tactical victory.\(^1\) Du Picq’s theory is practically unconcerned with the details of tactics; rather, it focuses on something prior to tactics and strategy: the willingness of men to fight in the heat of battle rather than run away. In terms of military science, this is the willingness of efficient causes to serve as material causes in the heat of battle.

Morale in the heat of battle is the central concern of du Picq’s work. Other military theorists and many famous generals mention the importance of morale in victory just before they proceed to their theories of tactics and strategy. Du Picq is the only one to focus his attention entirely on the morale of the soldier in combat and relate that to victory. Clausewitz refers to morale as a sense of strength or weakness, and du Picq both agrees with that proposition and develops it in great depth.

A treatment of morale is essential to military science. Recently, we have seen the American-trained Iraqi army, equipped with modern weapons and tanks and otherwise well-supplied, collapse without battle before a ragtag group of Islamic fanatics mounted on pickup trucks. In Mali, a western-trained Malian military collapsed and withdrew before a group of fanatical tribal fighters who were poorly equipped and supplied relative to the Malian government’s force. As between an Abrams tank and a pickup truck armed with a machine gun, there is no doubt as to the outcome of a trial by battle. Something other than material combat potential must have been at work to explain such widespread collapses. Without reference to morale, military science has no explanation for such outcomes.

Since man and his characteristics are the only constants of war—and morale refers to the willingness of men to fight in combat—an understanding of morale in combat is essential to a complete military science.
CONCLUSIONS FROM ANCIENT BATTLES

One of the exemplary battles in ancient times on which du Picq relied was the Battle of Pharsalus, which took place between Pompey and Caesar in 48 BC. On the basis of material factors, Pompey had the advantage at the opening of the battle. Pompey possessed both superior numbers and superior cavalry. He had 45,000 soldiers and 7,000 cavalry against Caesar’s 22,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. Du Picq estimated that the battle took four hours to complete, and the result was some 200 killed on Caesar’s side and 15,000 on Pompey’s. A further 24,000 of Pompey’s soldiers fled to the hills.

Because Pompey had superior numbers, Caesar thinned his already understrength formations to cover an equal front. Anticipating a tactic by Pompey, he also added a fourth line to his formation. In the event, the fourth line, as it was intended to do, intercepted and compelled the withdrawal of the cavalry attack Pompey made against Caesar’s flank. Pursuing the retreating cavalry brought Caesar’s forces onto the flank and rear of Pompey’s army. Surprised by this, Pompey’s army collapsed, and a slaughter ensued. Pompey himself, seeing the developing effect of Caesar’s counterattack, abandoned the field on a pretext and left his army to shift for itself.

What was interesting to du Picq was that, in four hours of combat, Caesar’s forces suffered only 200 casualties.² There is no question that Caesar’s and Pompey’s legions were fully engaged in actual combat for a great length of time, so how could there be such a discrepancy between casualties? Du Picq concluded that frontline fighting between two skilled Roman legions simply did not produce them, and that the discrepancy arose because Pompey’s army, panicked by the surprise of Caesar’s forces suddenly being on its flank and rear, collapsed into a rabble without formation. Terrorized, the individual soldiers tried to flee for their lives. Presenting their backs to Caesar’s soldiers, the soldiers of Pompey were slaughtered. The greater depth of Pompey’s formations proved to be of no use: they provided no forward impetus and all the actual fighting took place in the front ranks only.

Thus a catastrophic collapse in formation was occasioned by terror, by unexpected fear. Panic spread rapidly, and led to a collapse in discipline and in the willingness to fight. Bringing about that sudden collapse of the enemy’s morale in battle was, to du Picq, a secret of victory. Before the battle, Caesar explained to his troops the reason for the new formation and what he expected Pompey to try, and he instructed them in how to counter it and expressed his confidence in his troops and in the victory that would occur if they fought well. The events turned out as Caesar had forecasted, and his troops therefore had no reason to doubt in the midst of the battle that their commander had matters well in hand. Pompey, in contrast, saw his gambit fail and abandoned his fighting troops in their hour of need. Had these troops kept their cool, du Picq believes, they might have been able to cut their way out with far fewer casualties. But lacking leadership and gripped by panic, their formation broke apart and it was every man for himself.

The second exemplary battle from ancient times was Cannae, which took place in 216 BC. At Cannae, we see again a tactical outcome completely at odds from what one would expect on
the basis of the material factors at the opening of the battle. The Carthaginian forces were greatly outnumbered by the Romans and, except for cavalry, the fighting qualities of the Roman legions were in the aggregate superior to that of the Carthaginians. Du Picq estimated that the Carthaginians had 10,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry against 70,000 Roman soldiers and 6,000 to 7,000 cavalry.

Understanding the fighting qualities of his troops well and the tendencies of Roman tactics, Hannibal arranged his troops in a thin convex line such that the least constant of his fighters were pushed forward in the centre and the steadiest fighters were on the flanks. The Romans shortened their line and deepened their formation so that they could drive a wedge through the middle of the convex Carthaginian formation, as Hannibal expected they would try upon seeing his battle arrangement.

The impetus of the Roman attack caused the backward movement of Hannibal’s inconstant centre. The dynamics enabled the wings of Hannibal’s formation to move up against the flanks of the deep Roman formation as that wedge moved forward. At the same time, the superior Carthaginian cavalry drove off the Roman cavalry and enabled them to engage the rear of the Roman infantry wedge. Upon seeing this development, Hannibal’s inconstant centre steadied,
the wedge ceased to move, and the Roman infantry soldiers became hemmed in. The forward surge of victory turned out to be a trap. Fighting was suddenly all around the wedge. Panicked Roman soldiers dropped their weapons and tried to save themselves. A legendary slaughter ensued. Most of them died without dreaming of selling their lives. Du Picq estimated that Hannibal suffered fewer than 5,000 killed, most of them from the inconstant centre sustained in the course of their retreat. The Roman army, infantry and cavalry, was essentially annihilated.

What makes this battle exemplary for du Picq’s theory is that the fighting characteristics of the troops were used to guide the tactics. Hannibal, du Picq holds, was a master of the psychology of combat. He did not believe in the courage of despair in the masses as the Romans might suffer; he believed in terror, and he knew the value of surprise in inspiring terror. Hannibal inspired his own people, on the other hand, with absolute confidence. He carefully explained to the troops what he expected and that the following of their natural tendencies would bring about the desired result. In the course of the battle, Hannibal’s troops had no reason to doubt that their commander had matters well in hand.

From his study of ancient battles, du Picq reached revolutionary conclusions about actual combat. First, he discounted talk of “collisions” and “mêlées.” He observed that the natural
tendency of horses is to avoid running full speed into each other, for they would be crushed by the collision. Horses stop beforehand. Mêlées do not occur among trained troops because men naturally desire that their flanks and rear be protected, and formations are designed to do just that. He dismissed dramatic descriptions of ancient battle as poetic rather than factual. He assessed deep formations as useless for the purpose of adding impetus to forward movement and observed that ranks of soldiers not exchanging blow for blow were potential fuel for panic when they could see the horror of battle without being able to strike a blow themselves.

Du Picq’s theory of how victory inheres in morale can be summarized in a few propositions:

1. Nothing can be wisely prescribed in an army without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument—man—and his state of mind and morale, at the instant of combat.

2. Battle is the final objective of armies, and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. Man will not fight except under disciplinary pressure. The purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves.

3. Man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. He does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second. The continued improvement of all appliances of war has no other goal than the annihilation of the enemy. Absolute bravery, which does not refuse battle even on unequal terms, trusting only to God or to destiny, is not natural in man; it is the result of moral culture.
4. In battle, two moral forces, even more than two material forces, are in conflict. The stronger wins. Moral effect does not come entirely from destructive power, real and effective as it may be. It comes, above all, from its presumed, threatening power, present in the form of reserves threatening to renew the battle, of troops that appear on the flank, and even in the form of a determined frontal attack.

5. Tactics were invented for the weak to overcome the strong. Tactical doctrine prescribes beforehand proper means of organization and action to give unanimity of effort, and discipline ensures united efforts in spite of the innate weaknesses of combatants. The only real armies are those to which a well-thought-out and rational organization gives unity throughout the battle. There is no army without organization, and all organization is defective which neglects any means to strengthen the unity of combatants.

6. To secure unity in combat—to make tactical dispositions to render it practically possible—one must be able to count on the devotion of all.

7. Reason shows us the strength of the wisely united effort; discipline makes it possible.

8. Discipline alone does not constitute superior tactics.
9. In studying ancient combats, it can be seen that it was almost always an attack from the flank or rear, a surprise action, that won battles, especially against the Romans.

10. Discipline is used to dominate the horror of death by a still greater horror, that of punishment or disgrace.

11. Men may know how to die without flinching but, without discipline, without solid organization, are vanquished by others individually less valiant but who are firmly, jointly and severally combined.

An observation and a story illustrate du Picq’s insights. The observation is that no one man could defeat an Achilles; but Achilles himself could not withstand ten men. The story, for its part, is of a lion and four men. Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and, consequently, of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. “There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell,” du Picq wrote.

THE DECISIVENESS OF MORALE

Du Picq believed that, for armies of equal skill, training, and equipment, and absent generals of genius or luck, the army with the higher morale would prevail in battle. Victory inheres in morale. Morale is manifested in the willingness to fight. When one side is willing to fight, and the other side no longer is, then victory belongs to the side willing to fight, which is the one with higher morale.

Du Picq furthermore believed that morale, in turn, was the product of discipline. Discipline in combat, in turn, was the product of surveillance by those the soldier was familiar with—his comrades and officers. Familiarity, for its part, was produced by changing the manning of sensible combat formations as little as possible and by exercises that taught the troops how to work together. Soldiers, no matter how well drilled, who were assembled haphazardly into companies and battalions would never have, and never have had, that entire unity that is born of mutual acquaintanceship. Surveillance by the familiar is a crucial sequence of cause and effect in du Picq’s theory of the maintenance of morale in battle. Morale remains the decisive factor because it is for the purpose of morale that discipline is maintained.

The caveat “sensible,” used above, has two senses, both of which apply to the theory. The first sense of sensible is that the formation(s) be well adapted for the battle about to commence. The close order of infantry ceased to be well adapted to battle when the breech-loading rifle, the machine gun, and quick firing artillery were adopted, for example. The second sense is that the formation and tactics be adapted to the characteristics and capabilities of the troops and to their temperament, their national character, their fighting skill, what they are likely to experience, what they are likely to do in the face of that experience, and so on. It was hazardous to discipline to ask the men to do something in battle that they had not the capacity to do. For example,
du Picq would not expect, and therefore would not ask, battalions of the Arabs he knew to stand steady in line of battle as battalions of Englishmen did at the Battle of Waterloo. Such are the differences in national character meant by du Picq.

Surveillance for the purpose of morale is most necessary among those at one tactical remove from combat.

Those were the lessons of ancient battle. Du Picq observed that terror and panic took hold not of the soldiers in actual combat but of those in immediate reserve, who saw the horror unfolding before their eyes but were not striking a blow. Panic first broke out among those in the immediate reserve, and that was why the Romans placed their most experienced and dependable troops in that position and their least experienced troops in the front ranks.

Du Picq undertook to apply those lessons to the age of modern firearms in works that were not published until after his death.

In those later works, Du Picq held that vigilance was an essential requirement for the maintenance of morale and discipline in battle. With the development of skirmishers and the open order of battle in the later 19th century, the problem of vigilance in battle by a soldier’s officers and comrades became more difficult, and du Picq sought means of supplying vigilance through closer attention to familiarity. The private soldier would have in battle the sense of being under the surveillance or vigilance of his fellows and his superiors even when at that moment it was not being perceived by him.

Du Picq therefore held that a wise organization was one that ensured that the personnel of the combat groups changed as little as possible so that the comrades in peacetime manoeuvres were comrades in war. From living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from cooperation among men who quickly understood each other in the execution of warlike movements, could be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, and above all, unity. The duty to obedience, the right of imposing discipline and the impossibility of escaping it, would naturally follow. Because man could not change, du Picq argued, what needed to increase with the increasing power of weapons was the strength of organization, the unity of the fighting machine.

Behind du Picq’s rationale was his understanding of the French national character in particular. He believed that French sociability would supply the needed discipline in battle. The prescription above for developing vigilance relied upon a social bond developing among the future comrades in battle. In contrast, the ancient Romans cultivated discipline through exhausting work and punishment by death. Into the 20th century, the British executed men for cowardice, a practice Australian discipline would not tolerate. That, again, points to differences in national character.
DISCIPLINE

The purpose of discipline was to enable soldiers to maintain their rationality and not yield to the animal terror rising in them while in the midst of battle. Discipline itself depended upon moral pressure that actuated men to advance from sentiments of fear or pride. That moral pressure, in turn, depended on surveillance, the mutual supervision of groups of men who knew each other well.

Without discipline, tactics are impossible. For as Du Picq noted in his writings a soldier, “a sense of discipline includes the following: respect for and confidence in his chiefs; confidence in his comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them in danger; his desire to go where others do without trembling more than they; the whole of esprit de corps. Organization only can produce those characteristics”.

The maintenance of discipline in battle requires all troops to fight with maximum energy, not just some of them. Those who do not undermine the morale of those who do. Ensuring that all troops fight with maximum energy is a command matter. The essential of tactics is as follows: the science of making men fight with their maximum energy. That alone can give an organization the means to fight fear because everyone is busy striking a blow.

The maintenance of discipline in battle requires:

1. Leaders with firmness of command.
2. Good arms.
3. Methods of fighting suitable to those arms, and those of the enemy, and which do not overtax the physical and moral forces of men.
4. Rational decentralization that permits the direction and employment of the efforts of all, even to the last man. In French history, its fighting men were variously animated with a passion, a violent desire for independence, a religious fanaticism, national pride, a love of glory and a madness for possession.
5. An iron discipline before battle.

Methods of bringing about discipline cannot be identical, but depend upon national characteristics. The draconian discipline of the Romans, for instance, did not fit with French customs.
Discipline must be a state of mind, a social institution based upon the salient virtues and vices of the nation. Discipline cannot be secured in a day. It must be an institution, a tradition. The commander must have absolute confidence in his right to command. He must be accustomed to command and proud to command.

**ROLE OF TACTICS**

The aim in battle was to cause the enemy to break in panic. Breaking in panic meant that the officers had completely lost control of their troops. One effect of tactics is the breaking of the morale of the enemy by the threat of what is possible. Du Picq listed means of creating panic: making the enemy believe that support is lacking; isolating, cutting off, flanking, turning, and in a thousand ways making the enemy’s men believe themselves to be isolated. Du Picq declared that if one isolated in like manner the enemy’s squadrons, battalions, brigades, and division, then victory would be yours. If, on account of bad organization, the enemy’s troops did not anticipate mutual support, there was no need for such a manoeuvre: the attack was enough.

Breaking in panic is a different thing from the commander suddenly believing that he has lost, which is the collapse of his personal morale. As Clausewitz observed, the morale of the troops weighed on the morale of the commander.

“The moral effect of destruction is in proportion to the force applied” With that statement, du Picq brought his theory into full accord with reality. Against steady troops, the moral equals the physical. In the worst instance, that which tactics made possible had to be made actual. In full agreement with Clausewitz, du Picq said that the effect of an army, of one organization on another, is both material and moral. The material effect of an organization is in its power to destroy, the moral effect in the fear it inspires. Against unimaginative men (those who retained some coolness and consequently the faculty of reasoning in danger), moral effect would be the same as material effect, and it follows that it is necessary to destroy them.

Tactics needed to be appropriate to the national and personal characters, both in respect of the friendly troops and the enemy troops. Endorsing a standardized doctrine, du Picq said that prescribing tactics that conformed to the national character would serve as a guide to ordinary officers without requiring them to have exceptional ability.

Manoeuvre was possible only with good organization; otherwise it was no more effective in battle than the passive mass or a rabble in an attack. With fighting in the open order, the soldier could not be controlled. Often he could not be directed. Consequently, du Picq argued, it was necessary to begin an action at the latest possible moment and to have the immediate commanders understand what was wanted, what their objectives were, etc.

Officers often lose control of their men in the attack and sometimes in the defence. That takes the form of firing without orders or of running towards the enemy rather than away from him. Du Picq saw these as releases of moral tension that needed to be anticipated, controlled and even ordered to avoid a breakdown in discipline.
Based on the need to keep everyone busy striking a blow and recognizing the power of modern weapons, du Picq believed that the best disposition for material effect in attack or defence was that which permitted the easiest and most deadly use of arms. That disposition was the scattered, thin line. The whole of the science of combat, du Picq argued, lay then in the happy, proper combination of the open order, scattered to secure destructive effect, and a good disposition of troops in formation as supports and reserve, so as to finish by moral effect the action of the advanced troops.

In the attacking position, to retain control, du Picq recommended starting the charge at the latest possible moment, when the leader thinks he can reach the objective not all out of breath.

**THE ROLE OF COMMAND**

Du Picq believed that officers were essential to the maintenance of discipline, especially in combat. He believed that the French mass needed leaders who had firmness and decision of command that proceeded from habit and an entire faith in their unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law and society. Officers had to always be present and seen in battle. The role of the commander was to maintain morale, to direct those movements that men instinctively execute when heavily engaged and under the pressure of danger.

Prior to combat, soldiers are content if they are merely directed; but when the battle becomes hot, they must see their commander to know that he is near. It does not matter if he is without initiative, incapable of giving an order. His presence creates a belief that direction exists, that orders exist, and that is enough.

Du Picq took great umbrage at certain practices among the French officer cadre that undermined the prestige of subordinate officers. These he felt undermined the discipline on which success in battle depended, writing:

“Today there is a tendency... on the part of superiors to infringe on the authority of inferiors.... It results in lessening the authority of subordinate officers in the minds of their soldiers. This is a grave matter; as only the firm authority and prestige of subordinate officers can maintain discipline. The tendency is to oppress subordinates; to want to impose on them, in all things, the views of the superior; not to admit of honest mistakes and to reprove them as faults; to make everybody, even down to the private, feel that there is only one infallible authority. A colonel, for instance, sets himself up as the sole authority with judgement and intelligence. He thus takes all initiative from subordinate officers, and reduces them to inertia, coming from their lack of confidence in themselves and from fear of being severely reproved. How many generals, before a regiment, think only of showing how much they know! They lessen the authority of the colonel. That is nothing to them. They have asserted their superiority, true or false; that is the essential. With cheeks puffed out, they leave, proud of having attacked discipline.”

Du Picq believed that ordering the impractical was an attack on discipline:
“Ask much to obtain a little; is a false saying, an attack on discipline,” he wrote. “One ought to obtain what one asks. It is only necessary to be moderately reasonable and practical. Never order the impossible, for the impossible becomes then a disobedience.”

**L’offensive à outrance**

“With equal or even inferior power of destruction he will win who has the resolution to advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his adversary with a new phase of material action, who in a word has the moral ascendancy. Moral effect inspires fear. Fear must be changed to terror in order to vanquish.” With this passage, du Picq seems to endorse the view that moral ascendancy is sufficient for victory, and that the resolution to advance and thereby threaten battle, or more battle, upon the enemy will vanquish him. That is the doctrine of *l’offensive à outrance*.

This chain of reasoning is missing a few links. Fear must be *changed to terror* in order to vanquish. Against troops armed with modern weapons who are quick firing and able to kill from afar, formations of advancing infantry are not able to strike blow for blow until they close with the enemy and, until they do, are themselves subject to blows they cannot return. Being unable to return blow for blow, the advancing formations are the ones subject to disorganization, to fear changing to terror, not the defenders. So long as the defenders are able to strike blows without taking any in return, they have no cause for their fear to be turned into terror. It is only when the advancing infantry close with the enemy and are able to strike their own blows that the defenders become subject to fear changing to terror.

In many passages, du Picq emphasizes the importance of disorganizing the enemy formations before advancing one’s own well-ordered formations, and the moral effect is of the organized upon the disorganized. It is true that a frontal attack by a formation possessing the moral ascendancy can cause the enemy to collapse, but the morale of the enemy has to be pretty low to start with. Otherwise, against experienced and resolute men, tactics have to be used to create unexpected surprises. It is *unexpected fear* that causes morale to collapse and discipline to disappear.

Against the quote above, one can set the following:

> “[K]nowing that the moral effect of destruction is in proportion to the force applied, we are able to predict that, tomorrow, less than ever will studied methods be practicable. Such methods are born of the illusions of the field of fire and are opposed to the teachings of our own experience.”

The error of *l’offensive à outrance* was that the studied methods du Picq warned were impractical were precisely those employed by the French in 1914 in the course of attacking everywhere, always.
Du Picq was a veteran of the Crimean War and of France’s guerrilla wars in Algeria and Syria. He was aware of the discrepancies in combat power between organizations brought about by differences in the destructive power of weaponry, superior training, and good tactics. He dismissed those as important for the application of his theory to wars in Europe because the major powers of Europe were quickly able to put themselves on the same footing as regards to armament. Absent generals of genius and luck, the difference in combat power between European armies in a continental war, therefore, was reduced to differences in the quality of the troops. “We can do nothing without good troops, not even with a Napoleon,” he wrote, having Hannibal at the Battle of Zama in mind.

Ironically, the assumption that European powers would be on the same footing as regards to armament, was falsified almost immediately. A great age of technological innovation began in the late 19th century and continues through to the present day. Superior technology was often the essential factor in successful battle in the wars of the 20th and 21st centuries. Therefore, it was the agency of superior material power that played the decisive role. The victim of the superior technology or method was unable to return blow for blow, with the consequential effect of the physical on the moral. Nevertheless, superior technology requires discipline and training for its application to be decisive in battle against a disciplined enemy.

Du Picq could not foresee the temporary and capricious advantages conferred by superior technology. He addressed himself to the eternal problem of having quality troops in battle. The quality of the troops depended upon training and an appropriate formation and on battle tactics. At the bottom lies morale, discipline, and the amalgam of concepts that ensure that these are maintained in the heat of combat. This is how victory inheres in superior morale.

When one is faced with a cool enemy, his morale may be equated with his physical strength. In such cases, the troops and formations have to be destroyed by firepower and by tactics, which brings firepower to a position of advantage; the potential becoming the actual if necessary. If the formations break in terror before they are destroyed, then victory is quicker and easier. If, as a result of the superior technology in one’s possession, the enemy is unable to strike blow for blow, his morale is more likely to collapse first.

The formation and combat tactics employed have to be in accordance with the natural tendency of the troops so that the officers order that which the troops will naturally do in the heat of battle; thus discipline is not breached.

Du Picq’s theory that victory inheres in morale becomes most interesting when his assumption of absolute equality in other respects does not hold. This happens when equality in armament, training, and strength does not obtain, and when national characteristics are widely different. The interplay among superior discipline, superior numbers, superior technology, superior tactics, and morale becomes more obvious. Collapsed morale is the effect, and the other factors must
therefore be causes. Nevertheless, morale is the decisive consideration because those prior things are done for the moral effect they cause. Though annihilation remains the goal in battle, in modern times large numbers of captures substitutes for numbers killed.¹

Let modern battle be said to commence with World War I. The power of modern weapons had made the frontal attack by massed formations practically suicidal, and since frontal attack was the only kind possible on the Western Front, morale obliged the adoption of trench warfare in late 1914. The year 1915 saw the first use of poison gas as a technological means of breaking the stalemate, and, though locally successful at Ypres, poison gas proved to be insufficient in scale to be decisive.

The first large-scale use of tanks and new artillery tactics at Cambrai in November 1917 caused German resistance to collapse on the first day. The severe limitations of the tanks of that era gave respite to the Germans and enabled them to regroup.

The surprise German offensive of 21 March 1918, which employed Hutier tactics for the first time on the Western Front, caused the collapse of the 5th British Army.

The German Army itself collapsed in the Battle of Amiens, on 8 August 1918, “the black day of the German army,” according to Field Marshal Erich Ludendorff. A surprise attack featuring large
numbers of tanks, good artillery tactics, the use of two powerful corps, and ground fog resulted in the capture of large numbers of German soldiers and a deep penetration in the German line. It seems that the losses of good quality troops in the ultimately failed German offensives of the spring told against the morale among the German soldiers of the second line.

It is interesting to note that the German elastic defence and Hutier (or infiltration) tactics, both developed in 1917, structurally resembled the arrangement of forces recommended by du Picq for a modern battle. In du Picq's modern battle, a thick screen of skirmishers needed to precede or cover the front of the large, ordered formations as they manoeuvred on or around the battlefield. The role of the skirmishers in battle was to create disruption, confusion and disorder in the front ranks of the enemy formation by sniping. The formation that was better organized possessed the superior moral impulse, and as the two formations approached each other, the troops of both sides could see which side had the power of organization and the resolution to win. The disorganized side, if it did not break in panic immediately, would be destroyed by the superior power of the well-organized formation. The role of reserves was to continually threaten and present a renewal of the engagement to the exhausted and disorganized formations of the enemy. It is well known that a rapid counterattack can be surprisingly successful. The erstwhile conquerors are exhausted and disorganized after their victory, and they are psychologically unprepared to renew the combat against a fresh formation. Reserves represent the threat of renewed combat to exhausted troops.

On the Eastern Front of World War I, the fighting qualities of the Germans as a result of training, temperament and discipline were greatly superior to that of the Russians and the Austro-Hungarians, who were roughly equal in number. At Tannenberg, superior generalship by the Germans brought about a Cannae-like battle that broke up and destroyed two confused Russian armies. Likewise, at Gorlice-Tarnow, Russian resistance collapsed in the face of superior German organization and manoeuvre, which was only possible as a result of discipline and training. At the outset of the surprise Brusilov offensive, Austrian resistance collapsed. On the Eastern Front, the superior qualities of the Germans balanced the superior numbers of the Russians. Nevertheless, it was a balance. It was the collapse of morale on the home front that caused Russia to drop out of the war in 1917.

In Palestine, Lawrence of Arabia adapted his tactics to the capacities and character of the Arab tribesmen. By a succession of ambushes and the destruction of critical bridges and trackage of the Turkish railroad, Lawrence was able to materially aid the British advance into Palestine under General Allenby. Pressure in the front and havoc in the rear caused Turkish resistance in Palestine to collapse in September and October 1918.

The Spanish Civil War saw the use of air power as a means of creating panic. The bombing of Guernica was intended to cause a general collapse in morale by terrorizing the civilian population.

At the opening of World War II, the Poles were utterly outclassed in weaponry and fighting doctrine by the Germans, and no amount of personal bravery could overcome it.
Poland collapsed and, after a brief siege in which Warsaw was isolated with no hope of relief and a terror-bombing campaign was held, the capital of Poland surrendered a month after the invasion began.

In France, in 1940, the superior fighting power in the well-designed German armoured formations and blitzkrieg tactics overcame the French in every instance. The morale of the French High Command collapsed after the breakthrough at Sedan. Then, after Dunkirk, French resolution collapsed when it became obvious that their fighting doctrine and state of disorganization made them unable to fend off the Germans.

Later, in 1940, in North Africa, Italian forces were surprised and suddenly isolated when they were attacked by a numerically inferior British Army under General Wavell. Assailed front and rear, the Italian formations collapsed without major battle.

In Russia, in 1941, superior German fighting skill up and down the chain of command nearly overcame Russia’s superior numbers and great strategic depth. In battle after battle, Germany used its “Keil und Kessel” (wedge and cauldron) method to surround and collapse large Russian armies. However, Hitler’s interference with Germany’s greatest advantage over Russia, superior generalship and staff work, eventually led to a German collapse—not in morale, per se, but as a result of loss in manpower between 1942 and 1944. Disparity in numbers eventually began to tell even if there was no catastrophic collapse in morale and discipline among the Germans.

On the Western Front in 1944, tactical air power, general air superiority, and vastly superior numbers of outclassed equipment helped the Allies overwhelm a German army that had the more experienced fighters and the better fighting doctrine. The breakout at Avranches led to the creation of the Falaise pocket and the disorganization, general collapse, and destruction of much of the German Army in France.

As a result of the landing at Inchon in September 1950, deep in its rear the North Korean Army broke its siege of Pusan and rushed north to avoid being cut off from its base of supplies in China. Likewise, the American withdrawal from the Yalu River, coming after a surprise attack by a large Chinese Army, in its confusion took on the trappings of a collapse.

Ironically, it is in the French Indochina War that we clearly see examples of tactics being tailored to the capabilities of the troops. The Viet Minh had no hope of defeating the French by battle in the open field. The French staff was well capable of manoeuvring large bodies of disciplined troops with armoured support and tactical air power in open battle. The Viet Minh staff and troops were capable of siege operations and ambushes, which do not require manoeuvring large formations in the open field. Those capabilities were put to use at Dien Bien Phu and in the destruction of GM 100. After nearly eight years of low-grade conflict, those significant tactical successes by the Viet Minh caused morale on the French home front to collapse.
In South Vietnam, a surprise offensive by the North Vietnamese Army in the spring of 1972 caused the resistance of a disorganized Army of South Vietnam to collapse. The situation was restored by the use of American air power, which destroyed the NVA formations and gained time for the ARVN to organize and recover. However, in April 1975, American air power was not available, and another offensive by the NVA for which the ARVN was also ill-prepared caused a general collapse of resistance in the north and centre of South Vietnam.

The wars between Egypt and Israel in 1956, 1967 and 1973—which lasted nine days, six days and twenty-one days respectively—all turned on bringing about the collapse of the Egyptian Army by attacks deep in the rear of Egypt’s fighting formations. Superior Israeli training, motivation and discipline made those tactics possible.

In the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, the coalition forces greatly surpassed the Iraqi forces in technical superiority and fighting skill, from the individual soldier to the corps formation. Iraqi forces consisted of large numbers of neglected conscripts and the Republican Guard, a hard core of about five divisions. Resistance by the conscripts collapsed immediately in both wars. The large numbers of prisoners captured so quickly almost choked the offensive in 1991. Those Republican Guard divisions that encountered coalition forces were destroyed by the superior technology and skill of their enemy.
Guerrilla and terrorist tactics are adapted to avoid the trading of blow for blow with disciplined military formations by guerrilla and terrorist formations. Those formations that are attacked by guerrillas tend to be small and isolated. The fighting skill, training, and discipline of guerrillas and terrorists and their groupings vary widely and tend in the aggregate to be far below that of disciplined, regular soldiers. By employing tactics and methods adapted to the strength of the guerrilla or terrorist, success of a kind in battle is possible.

The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011 demonstrated how tactics needed to be adapted to the capabilities and temperament of the insurgents for success of any kind to be possible. Resistance to the coalition forces took the form of attacks by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombers, and snipers. The ultimate aim of those attacks was to bring about a collapse of morale on the home fronts of the coalition countries, particularly that of the United States. Fallujah in 2004, Ramadi and the surge of 2007–2008 in Iraq, and Op
MEDUSA in 2006 in Afghanistan demonstrated what happens when insurgents fight blow for blow against disciplined formations in open battle. The unskilled forces suffer disproportionate casualties, the fanatical insurgents are killed, and the survivors become demoralized.

Most recently, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist organization, advanced from its base in Syria into northern Iraq, and saw the collapse before it of a western-trained and equipped Iraqi Army without resistance. Detailed study of these events may prove that western-style military organizations and means of securing discipline are ill-suited to the temperament of tribal-based societies. It is known that massive corruption among the officer cadre involving the pay of soldiers gave the fighting men of Iraq no cause to follow their erstwhile leaders into hot battle. That a general collapse occurred by a western-style military formation equipped with tanks in the face of a mere advance by undisciplined troops mounted on pickup trucks points to a massive failure of morale.

CONCLUSIONS

Ardant du Picq conducted a systematic analysis of a number of important battles that occurred prior to the invention of firearms in order to determine the real character of combat of those days. He was especially interested in battles in which large discrepancies were reported in the casualties of opposing sides. From those studies, he concluded that, when large discrepancies occurred, the formations of the losing side collapsed and dissolved as a result of panic and terror in the soldiers. The contagion of panic usually started in the rear of the formation, where the combat could be seen but not engaged in. The panic often arose from unexpected and unpleasant surprises in the battle, such as the sudden appearance of enemy forces on the flanks or rear of the formation. That tendency explained why the ancients placed their more experienced troops in the rear and their least steady troops in the centre of the front line.

The human animal is capable of handling only so much fear before he loses his capacity for rational thought. Morale is expressed in the willingness to fight. But a willingness to fight among men must be combined in formations and employed in tactics that are both sensible for the combat and are suited to the characteristics of the combatants. Discipline is necessary for a stable morale to be developed. Surveillance in battle is essential for the maintenance of discipline in battle. The familiarity of the men with each other through mutual association in their formation and in their training is necessary for surveillance in battle to be effective.

With the development of modern firearms, surveillance in battle is rendered more difficult. The ability of modern weapons to kill from afar forces the formations to disperse widely. Consequently, more effort needs to be put into training and into having soldiers socialize with each other for surveillance to be perceived, even if it is not actually occurring in battle.

The moral effect of well-organized formations in modern battle remains powerful. Therefore the sensible course in modern battle is for the large, well-organized formations to be covered and preceded by a thick line of skirmishers whose duty it is to break up, sow confusion, and disorganize the enemy’s large formations. Sniping is one way of doing that. Artillery and air
power are other means of disorganizing an enemy’s attacking formations and defensive preparations. When the large formations come into contact, the moral effect of superior organization is frequently enough to cause a collapse of resistance in the less well-organized formation. If resistance does not collapse immediately, the power of the superior organization destroys the disorganized formation until resistance ceases. Organized reserves capable of renewing the combat are further means of bringing about the collapse of resistance by the enemy.

The best disposition for material effect in attack or defence is that which permits the easiest and most deadly use of arms. This disposition is the scattered, thin line. Every soldier is able then to relieve the growing tension by striking a blow. The whole of the science of combat lies then in the happy, proper combination of the open order, scattered to secure destructive effect, and a good disposition of troops in formation as supports and reserve, so as to finish by moral effect the action of the advanced troops.

Small formations, no matter how well disciplined and experienced, cannot afford to become involved in mêlées with large ones. With a breakdown in organization and mutual support, the disparity in numbers begins to tell.

Collapse of the enemy’s morale in battle is the desired effect. The cause of this lies in superior material effect, perhaps brought about by tactics, in the discipline sufficient to employ tactics and manoeuvre in battle by one’s own formations, by the threat of what is possible, and in one’s own superior morale.

ENDNOTES

2. This was du Picq’s estimate.
3. As T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) himself determined independently.
6. Think of the four men and the lion.
LIVES LIVED
Major-General Dan Gordon Loomis MC, OMM, CD (1929–2013)

Major-General (ret’d) Dan Gordon Loomis, MC, OMM, CD, passed away in an Ottawa hospital on 05 December 2013. He was 84 years of age. A decorated officer of The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) and later the commanding officer of its 1st Battalion (1 RCR), he was also often remembered as an intellectual whose writings made a substantial impact on the evolution of army concepts, doctrine and training.

Loomis went on to serve as a platoon commander in “C” Company, 1 RCR, in Korea from April 1952 to March 1953. On the night of 27 September 1952, as a young lieutenant, he led a patrol of “C” Company men against Chinese positions on Hill 227, a powerful enemy bastion. During the patrol, contact was made with the enemy. In the short but savage engagement that ensued, grenades and small arms fire were exchanged at short range. Lieutenant Loomis and three of his men were wounded. Dan Loomis received severe shrapnel wounds to his legs and hips (debilitating injuries from which he suffered for the rest of his life). Nevertheless, under the leadership of Lieutenant Loomis the “C” Company patrol carried the fight to the enemy, eliminating a Chinese machine-gun while killing its crew. For his gallantry and leadership in this action, Loomis was awarded the Military Cross (MC). He was one of only 33 Canadian officers to receive this decoration for gallantry during the Korean War.

Following his return to Canada from Korea, Loomis attended Queen’s University in Kingston, graduating in 1954 with a Bachelor of Science (BSc) in Chemical Engineering. During 1954–1955 he returned to Regimental service with 1 RCR, first at Wolseley Barracks in London, Ontario, then at Fort York in Soest, West Germany. Remaining in Germany, Lieutenant Loomis was subsequently employed as a staff officer at 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group Headquarters during
1955–1956. Promoted to Captain in 1956, he was selected for and attended the Royal Military College of Science in England. Loomis graduated from this course at the top of his class, adding yet another science degree to his growing list of accomplishments. Not surprisingly, given his background in science, Captain Loomis next served as a Technical Staff Officer at the Joint Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Warfare School at Camp Borden, Ontario, during 1958–1959. He then attended the Canadian Army Staff College in Kingston, graduating in 1961. Promoted to the rank of major, Dan Loomis returned to RCR and commanded a rifle company in the 1st Battalion from 1961 to 1962, first at Camp Ipperwash, Ontario, then at Fort York in Soest, West Germany. From 1962 to 1964 Major Loomis was an operations staff officer at British 1st Corps Headquarters (British Army of the Rhine). Returning to Canada in 1964, he was assigned as a staff officer at the newly created Mobile Command (Army) Headquarters in St-Hubert, Quebec. He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and attended Queen’s University from 1967 to 1969, graduating with a master’s degree.

Returning to field service after graduation, Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Loomis was appointed to the command of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, from 15 January 1969 to 21 February 1971. He served concurrently as Home Station Commander for the regiment. During his tenure of command, 1 RCR mounted two significant operations. The first was Operation SNOWGOOSE 13, a battalion deployment to Cyprus on UN peacekeeping duties from March to October of 1970. Returning from Cyprus, 1 RCR was flung almost immediately into the FLQ Crisis (also referred to as the October Crisis), participating in Operation GINGER, an assistance to civil authority operation to secure key infrastructure and very important persons (VIPs) from attack and harm in Ottawa and the surrounding area. In addition to commanding 1 RCR at this time, Lieutenant-Colonel Loomis also acted as Chief of Staff of the Western Quebec Sector during the FLQ Crisis. Dan Loomis eventually wrote an account of the Canadian army’s role in this event, “Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ,” which appeared in 1984.

Following the period during which he commanded 1 RCR, Dan Loomis was employed at NDHQ in a staff capacity from September 1971 to November 1972. Immediately following this he served as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Canadian Contingent, which provided international military observers and monitors in Saigon during the climactic phase of the Vietnam conflict in 1972–1973. Loomis then served as a Special Policy Advisor at NDHQ from 1973 to 1974. Eventually attaining the rank of major-general, he subsequently held a myriad of important posts, including Chief of Staff Mobile Command HQ; Commander CAST Combat Group and CFB Petawawa; and NDHQ Chief of Programme. Following his retirement, Major-General Loomis served as a senior-level management consultant and advisor to, among others, the Treasury Board, the Department of External Affairs, and various private-sector entities. Major-General D.G. Loomis was most certainly one of the most important Regimental leaders within the RCR, and a true military intellectual and professional who greatly influenced the evolution of the Canadian Army during the Cold War era.

Major-General Loomis’s contribution to the intellectual thought of the Army extended over decades and addressed a wide variety of topics pertinent to the Army of the day. From the effects
of unconventional warfare and nuclear weapons on the character of conflict to the impact of unification on the Army and Canadian Armed Forces, Major-General Loomis wrote extensively and demonstrated unique perspectives on these varied subjects. Many of his major works were never formally published, but fortunately copies of many of these works are held by the Army’s Fort Frontenac Library (FFL) in Kingston, Ontario.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY – MAJOR-GENERAL D.G. LOOMIS MC, OMM, CD**

**PUBLISHED ARTICLES**


**MAJOR WORKS IDENTIFIED BY GENERAL LOOMIS AS HAVING BEEN WRITTEN**

*We Will Bury You* (1962). This is a detailed analysis of low-intensity non-conventional conflict in Malaya, Indo China and Cuba (10 copies circulated). No copy found to date.
**On Conflict** (1969). This is a conceptual study of the evolution of Canadian defence policy within the context of controlling conflict during the remainder of this century, with special emphasis on low-intensity non-conventional conflict (600 copies circulated). Copy found in FFL, see call number below.

**Speculations on Nuclear Forces** (1972). This is a study of the possibilities of extending the concepts of quantum electrodynamics to account for nuclear forces. For the past seven years, I have engaged in correspondence and discussion with the physics staff of several universities and government departments/agencies on this subject, and it now appears that this work is not soundly based (30 copies circulated). No copy found to date.

**Not Much Glory** (1984). This is an account of the Canadian Forces’ adaption to the FLQ Crisis of 1970 and other low-intensity conflicts during the 1960s and 1970s (150 copies circulated). This work was published by Deneau Publishers. Copies of earlier manuscripts of the work are also held by FFL.

**OTHER HOLDINGS IN THE FORT FRONTENAC LIBRARY**


*The Concept of High Intensity Operations: Lecture to OPS Branch Officers.* 28 August 1975. (FFL Special Collections 355.F5.L863)

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LEADERSHIP IN ARMY INTELLIGENCE: PRESERVING OUR MOST CRITICAL CAPABILITY

Captain Brad E. Benns

“Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity. If the leader is filled with high ambition and if he pursues his aims with audacity and strength of will, he will reach them in spite of all obstacles.”

—Carl von Clausewitz

The leadership of Army Intelligence has overcome many obstacles in the past decade and has led the function through the critical lessons of Afghanistan and other operations conducted throughout the world since 2001. The intelligence function in the army has been in the limelight with Land Intelligence Modernization (LIM), concerning the institutionalization of critical intelligence organizations and capabilities. But there remains an equally critical requirement: to develop its junior officers’ leadership in order to meet the challenges of this new environment. As intelligence leaders and professionals, we must commit ourselves to a greater focus on teaching, developing and demonstrating strong leadership amid the army collective. Encouraging bold and aggressive operational attitudes in young leaders, allowing them opportunities to perfect the art of command in an exercise or operational environment, and redirecting individual and collective training efforts will solidify the importance of leadership in Army Intelligence at all levels. Leadership is the cornerstone of any military organization and is achieved through a
combination of talent and training. It therefore requires the appropriate investment of time and effort in order to reap the immeasurable benefits for the trade in the future. Army Intelligence leadership has been outstanding in achieving the milestones necessary to move the function forward post-Afghanistan. However, we must ensure that our junior leadership is equally ready to inherit the task of taking on the challenges of these changes in whatever future threat environments arise.

**ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTION**

Part of the problem in Army Intelligence, and the army overall, is the predominant perception that intelligence personnel are the archetypal academics, rather than the archetypal soldiers. Typically, Army Intelligence officers are not portrayed as hard-chargers in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), despite the incredible number of capable intelligence leaders the forces possess. The current leadership in Army Intelligence, and that of the recent past, has been extremely successful in breaking down barriers, challenging systems, and taking the Branch to a position of increased relevance and competence across the army. Army Intelligence has had the benefit of strong serving members, with various leadership styles and years of experience inside and outside of the trade. Given the increased intelligence footprint within the land force, it is necessary to ensure that those charged with moving intelligence forward are portrayed in the appropriate light and given the relevant tools and opportunities to prove themselves as military leaders.

To a large extent the problem of perception can be solved by changing the attitudes of our members and those whom they serve. Intelligence officers are often referred to as managers rather than leaders, and this characterization invariably dilutes their potential and their abilities. Leadership and management are very different things, and the more that members are confined by these roles, the less drive, dynamic problem solving, and overall effort you will see in their performance. Studies have shown that differences in leadership potential can be clearly seen between those who maintain a ground-level management approach to situations, solely reacting to events, and those who view problems or situations at a higher level, seeking and devising preventative strategies or a long-term plan as a true leader should. These are the types of personnel we must continue to produce. Military organizations require leaders, not managers, and leadership can be realized and developed regardless of the particular assignment. An environment that champions management sets the stage for complacency and severely undermines every potential leader by limiting new and imaginative ways of achieving their tasks and/or motivating their personnel. Leaders must still of course be competent managers of resources and personnel, but they must consider leading the intelligence mission and their soldiers as a primary objective. Army Intelligence must ensure that those serving in any leadership capacity, including analytical roles, have the ability and opportunity to demonstrate their prowess.

Competent leadership in garrison or in the field is not solely the realm of a combat arms officer. To be an outstanding leader and exert command and control over an organization and its
mission simply requires clarity of purpose and the opportunity or the encouragement to step into a command role. Developing junior intelligence personnel’s ability to push through command challenges should be a primary focus in order to prepare them for the rigours and stresses of the trade.

Army Intelligence should not accept the perception that intelligence personnel are solely specialists or analysts behind closed doors. Our members hold senior leadership positions in the Joint Staff and Land Staff, are commanding officers of line units, and serve as Special Forces personnel, international representatives in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, and critical mentors in all environments. Every individual serving under the intelligence star should have the opportunity and support for exhibiting leadership in whatever capacity their employment allows them. Intelligence personnel are field savvy, physically fit, motivated leaders looking for challenges and solutions that will contribute to the completion of the Commander’s mission.

So how are these perceptions and attitudes overcome? The existing intelligence leadership first must recognize the realities of our pool of talent in Army Intelligence, then push our peers and subordinates into roles that complement those realities. By promoting leadership roles in all areas of intelligence, academics, physical fitness, and other competitive ventures, the army can help our future leadership eventually fill the roles of our predecessors and continue to bring the function into the future.

In the Five Eyes community, leadership and command in intelligence is questioned far less, and serving members are not hampered by the way intelligence personnel are perceived. In Canada, the culture of looking at intelligence personnel as analysts and managers versus leaders is ingrained, and we write our doctrine and intelligence guidance based on those perceived roles. Canadian doctrine on Intelligence in Land Operations describes the G2 or Intelligence Officer roles as simply “responsible for the functioning of the combat intelligence system.” This does not represent strong leadership; once again, it perpetuates the perception of management. It is only exacerbated by Intelligence in Land Operations Volume 2, which focuses on the organizational framework for deployed intelligence personnel. It also demonstrates that the words “leadership” and “intelligence” are not commonly used in Canadian documents. The words “govern,” “advise,” “manage” and “provide” are all used to describe the functions of intelligence professionals from the J2 downward. This speaks to the nature of the problem which drives the perceptions within the Army. Leading this function should be the first critical task in any officer’s Performance Development Review (PDR). Obviously, there is an overall expectation that officers will demonstrate leadership, but every member has had a different career path, different opportunities, and different mentors. It is the chain of command’s responsibility to ensure that each of them individually knows what is required and is pushed to excel in all forms of leadership.
Conversely, our allies’ publications on intelligence doctrine and guidance demonstrate a very different approach. The U.S. and U.K. push leadership to the forefront of their members’ intelligence responsibilities. The USMC Intelligence Operations doctrine describes an Intelligence Officer’s duties as both “leading” and “directing” intelligence operations.\(^5\) This is clearly a different and more aggressive approach that creates a necessary mindset in its members. The U.S. Army’s Concept for Functional Intelligence 2016–2028 states that Intelligence will “Develop Soldiers and leaders. Future intelligence leaders will be required to support offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously against both conventional and unconventional enemies. The future requires Soldiers and Leaders with flexible mindsets who can work through ambiguity…”\(^6\) Here, there is emphasis on both soldiers, who are skilled in field operations and weapons, and leaders, who lead their soldiers and the intelligence function toward a successful mission. We have never employed this use of leadership in Canadian doctrine, and it clearly identifies a bolder, more aggressive role for intelligence personnel.
Similarly, the U.K. Military Intelligence Battalion manual describes the role of operational Intelligence Officers as follows: “Lead on the provision of insight and understanding on all aspects of the physical environment, human terrain and adversary…and…Drive the intelligence cycle.” It is the underlying theme of these similar approaches that we must develop in our own cadre of intelligence professionals. If we do not move forward as leaders, we will inevitably fall behind and be forced to follow. Setting the tone for that leadership in the cornerstone Canadian Army intelligence documents and guidance is a necessary step in order to achieve this goal.

**TASKS AND OPPORTUNITIES**

This article is not a criticism of junior intelligence leaders in any form, but rather a celebration and recognition of the incredible pool of operationally savvy and talented members in the new Army Intelligence environment. Army Intelligence has been fortunate to reorganize itself not only to help the function, but to truly help develop its leaders in producing new leadership
positions and opportunities across the country. Through the proposed creation of critical organizations such as the Canadian Army Intelligence Regiment (CAIR), the All Source Intelligence Centres (ASIC) at each Brigade, Land Force Intelligence Centre (LFIC) in Ottawa and Joint All Source Intelligence Centre (JASIC) in Kingston, Army Intelligence is giving the Branch an opportunity to bring its army leadership from behind closed doors and allow its officers the appropriate, and too often forgotten, art of command. Although this article does not discuss the issues in line and staff functions that the Intelligence Branch has faced, it is clear that outstanding leadership transcends these delineations and will shine regardless of the organization one serves. Just as it is not necessary to be a combat arms officer to show leadership, not everyone needs to be the commanding officer of an ASIC to excel. Leadership is demonstrated at all levels, and officers should be recognized every step of the way.

Bold leadership in this context does not mean that members have to physically lead the charge over the trench lines. The author is not advocating that intelligence personnel run company live-fire exercises or enter Cambrian Patrol competitions. However, at higher levels, intelligence officers should be an integral part of every operational planning group, be present at every board table with operations staff, and be aggressively represented in every possible scenario for the
completion of the Commander’s mission. Intelligence and Operations are inseparable, and situational requirements should therefore present ample opportunities for members to become involved and excel in leadership roles. At a much lower level, fostering our junior leaders can be as basic as commanding physical activities, leading unit competitions, creating internal challenges designed to exercise personnel, or simply just showing community or volunteer leadership. In order for members to be comparable on some level to their peers in the Army, they must have the appropriate skills and opportunities to develop the fundamental elements of leadership.

COURSES AND TRAINING
Institutional training is very difficult to change in any context, but it is extremely important in order to redevelop a greater leadership focus within Army Intelligence. Although most intelligence courses are focused solely on functional content, there are obvious opportunities to demonstrate leadership, to encourage personnel to seek non-traditional solutions, and to act boldly in the face of whatever problem is presented. Because the intelligence trade courses conducted at the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI) are in a joint environment, they cannot focus on specific army leadership requirements. However, an increased focus on leadership within the joint courses regularly offered, or more specifically in the elemental phases (army) of those courses, can significantly enrich training, and students should be
taught a baseline of leadership within the framework of the intelligence function. Regardless of the colour of your uniform within the school, leadership is a teachable and necessary skill to be employed in the various environments.

For example, students on the Basic Intelligence Officer Course (BIOC) will see that there are no performance objectives (POs) on leadership. As it is considered a course for learning the function of intelligence, it assumes that once candidates complete qualifications which do promote leadership, such as the Common Army Phase (CAP), there is no further need to focus on this skill. However, as intelligence leaders, how are members encouraged to use the leadership skills learned on previous training in an environment as described above—one focused on the management of intelligence versus providing leadership to it? Other trades do not stop considering leadership performance as a critical criterion for success once the rank of lieutenant is attained. Both the combat arms and other support trades such as Signals consider this aspect of training an integral part of their courseware. This is an important consideration, as it clearly shows the delta that intelligence professionals face against other trades who do not have the benefit of prior service or leadership experience. Intelligence officers are no longer ex-combat arms personnel with an already hardened knowledge of army units, structures and tactics. They do not necessarily possess the same skill set that the majority of intelligence personnel did coming into the trade throughout the 1990s. Some of these students come directly from the Royal Military College (RMC) or civilian universities, with little leadership experience or knowledge of the real army. The Branch can therefore not expect them to perform to the same degree without giving them the proper instruction and opportunities to develop. As a result, the members reach their respective postings unprepared, and the function, their subordinates, and the members themselves suffer failures due to a lack of fundamental leadership abilities.

The Senior Intelligence Operations Officer Course (SIOOC), designed for senior Captains and Majors in the Branch, is no different in this sense. It does in fact list “Lead Intelligence units” as one of its POs, but in practice the course has little scope to allow for this to actually happen, given the nature of the classroom environment and the parameters set by staff and Standards. Although it states that leadership is a priority, the course is wholly focused on the administrative and managerial elements of intelligence, analyzing structures and producing reports. This is just one more example where leadership is assumed to exist but is not necessarily backed up with performance. As members are promoted to major, the rank assumes a command presence and competence that may simply not exist. This situation creates a significant problem if members do not inherently possess the leadership skills to support their position, or if they have not had the opportunities and experiences to learn them.

So what is the solution to this institutional leadership problem? Although it cannot rest solely with CFSMI to completely reorganize its structure to accommodate the shortfall for Army Intelligence leadership, subtle changes in core or elemental (army) content will be one way to assist in ensuring that all members of the Branch realize the continued importance of leadership in the intelligence function. Understanding the challenges inherent in redesigning training within a school environment, the Branch is already on the right path in the drafting of the
Military Employment Structure Implementation Plan (MESIP), which examines a critical need to re-evaluate how the army approaches its employment of intelligence personnel and its courses. This effort, and the results of the recent Job-Based Study (JBS) review, which re-orients intelligence officer training courses overall to complement the specific duties and responsibilities of each rank in each environment, identified some of the potential shortcomings in leadership and capabilities overall. There are other potential options to consider which might address the issue as well, including leadership performance on initial intelligence training, formalizing the leadership requirement in senior intelligence courses already identified, and/or possibly creating and conducting an additional intelligence leader course aimed at truly learning the key positions within the ASICs or other leadership roles. In 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2 CMBG) Petawawa, the Commanding Officer of 12 ASIC initiated an outstanding program of rotating its newest officers into key positions in order to ensure that they understood and could function in both intelligence and leadership roles. These junior officers, under the mentorship of a senior Captain, conducted and led intelligence tasks, various soldier skills, and physical training events through exercises and scenarios as a way of formalizing their understanding of command in intelligence organizations. Including training of this nature from the beginning of an officer’s career will have enormous benefits in developing their leadership and their abilities to continue to push Army Intelligence forward. It is not necessary to rewrite all of the existing courseware to include these principles. General leadership concepts and pushing members into command roles in both the classroom and exercise components will contribute to students’ development and allow them the opportunity to excel.

CONCLUSION
The army cultural norms that force intelligence leadership to remain behind closed doors are a complex issue resulting from a combination of neglect of the function and the overall necessity for personnel survival in the pre-Afghanistan period. In the recent past, however, Army Intelligence personnel have demonstrated outstanding leadership with an abundance of operational experience while filling key enabler positions throughout the army. This success has allowed the critical concepts derived from the lessons of Afghanistan to come to fruition. Now, Army Intelligence must take control of the critical task of developing its future leaders. By breaking down the army’s perceptions of Intelligence officers as academics, establishing fundamental training and exercises to give members the opportunities to excel, and institutionalizing leadership within a school setting, intelligence leadership will continue to achieve the necessary milestones in the future threat environment. As the intelligence function moves forward to achieve its next critical developments, shaping the army cultural bias, proving the value of our skilled leaders, and creating the nuances of our intelligence operational framework will be key to the institutionalization of leadership. The future of Army Intelligence will rest with those who push forward and accept the roles that are being developed for them. This new intelligence environment must ensure that the art of leadership is practised, that opportunities to excel are provided, and that this most critical of all capabilities is never forgotten.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Captain Brad E. Benns was commissioned in the Canadian Armed Forces in January 2004 as a reserve Infantry Officer with the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment. Transferring to the Intelligence Branch in March 2008, he was accepted into the Regular Force in June 2010 and posted to 21 Electronic Warfare Regiment (21 EW) as the Regimental Intelligence Officer. He completed an operational tour as a member of OP ATHENA, RC(S) Afghanistan as the J2 Fusion Chief, TF Paladin South and is currently employed as the Officer Commanding Training Support with the Canadian Army Intelligence Regiment (CAIR) Headquarters in Kingston. Captain Benns holds a BA Hons degree in History from Trent University and a Postgraduate Diploma in Museum Studies from Sir Sanford Fleming College.

ENDNOTES

5. United States Marine Corps, *MCWP 2-1 Intelligence Operations* (Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division, September 2003), 1.
9. USMC, *MCWP 2-1 Intelligence Operations*, 1-5.
12. Department of National Defence, *Qualification Standard (QS) for Occupation MOSID 00213 Senior Intelligence Operations Officer* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2 February 2009), 1-1.
They have become tactically efficient but strategically inept, risk-adverse micromanagers who have forgotten, in the desire to protect the rank and themselves, that they are stewards of the institution and defenders of the country. Ricks argues that this ineptitude has arisen for two distinct and systemic reasons, which form the themes of his book.

First, he writes, “American generals were managed very differently in World War Two than they were in subsequent wars.” Ricks argues that General George C. Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff during World War II, was the epitome of the “old army,” the “gold standard” by which all who came after are judged. Intelligent, demanding, apolitical, prepared to “speak truth to power” and completely ruthless in relieving subordinates who did not measure up to his exacting standards, Marshall fired sixteen division commanders and five corps commanders during the war and approximately six hundred senior commanders before.1 Today, generals, if they are relieved, are relieved by government officials and usually for moral lapses rather than military incompetence. Quoting from a senior officer, Ricks writes, “[…] as matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses his part of the war.” The American Army senior leadership has, according to the author, abandoned its self-policing role. Commencing with MacArthur in Korea, the U.S. Army has abdicated its traditional role of relieving its own and turned that responsibility over to the government.

The second theme that runs through The Generals is the decline of the Army’s ability to produce leaders capable of developing comprehensive war strategies supple enough to react to the inevitable friction brought on in warfare, either from events on the battlefield or from political pressure. Ricks argues that, in the post-Vietnam Army, tactics were prized over strategy. Wars were not tied to political ends, so, as Ricks writes, the “shock and awe” of the second Iraqi war gave way to the failure of Eclipse II.2 The Army emphasis on brawn over strength left senior officers with little understanding of what their role was after victory was achieved and, as Ricks writes, “[…] believing that it was not their job to consider the question.”
Some may dismiss this book as the rant of an uninformed and hostile journalist. They would be mistaken if they did. Ricks relies on internal Army reports and investigations, interviews with senior American officers, both retired and active, and secondary sources dealing with military command and civil–military relations when he draws his provocative conclusions. *The Generals* is divided into chapters detailing the successes and failures of Army generals from Eisenhower and Patton in Europe, to MacArthur and Dean in Korea, to Westmoreland and Abrams in Vietnam, to Powell, Schwarzkopf, Casey, Sanchez and Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author concludes with his analysis of how General Marshall would fix the Army if he returned.

In short, he writes, Marshall would say that generals are “disposable.” For the long term benefit of the service and for the advancement of more competent subordinates, the “institutionalization of mediocrity” among senior commanders must be eradicated, as bad leaders drive out good ones. A new breed of senior commander—adaptable, flexible in their approach, energetic, determined, cooperative and trustworthy—must be created, encouraged, and mentored.

*The Generals* is a fascinating read, both for the history buff and for those interested in the internal workings of the US Army. Many may not agree with Ricks’ central thesis of “tough love”—that the relief of American generals was the key to military success in the past and its current decline bodes ill for the US Army in the future. Whichever side of the fence one comes down on regarding this issue, *The Generals* will certainly provoke debate among both the leaders and the led.

**ENDNOTES**

1. The firing of senior officers is not uncommon within the Canadian Army in wartime. Several Canadians were “sacked” during Canada’s wars. In the Boer War (1899–1902), several Canadian officers were returned home for incompetence or other reasons; chief among those officers was Sam Hughes (later, MG Sir Sam Hughes, Minister of the Militia and Defence (1911–1916). In the First World War, several battalion and division commanders were removed from command for a variety of professional reasons. The Second World War saw the forced retirement or return of senior Canadian officers to Canada on an unprecedented scale. Lieutenant-General Montgomery (as he then was) fired a number of Canadian division and brigade commanders, including Major-Generals Price and Pearkes and Brigadiers Ganong and Potts. The Dieppe debacle saw the replacement of Maj General J.H. (“Ham”) Roberts, GOC 2nd Division. The firing of commanders found wanting by their superiors continued with the campaign in North West Europe, during which a divisional commander, two brigadiers and several battalion commanders were let go.

Summer 2014 will mark the centenary of the beginning of the First World War, or the Great War as it was known at the time. Given the resurgence of interest in things military, and particularly military history, among the Canadian population, the anniversary will no doubt see a great increase in the number of people who wish to research relatives’ war records from 1914 to 1918. Books that can help them do so will be in great demand—and, in the case of this particular volume by Susan Evans Shaw, which is described on the back cover as the first of its kind, deservedly so. (Not that there aren’t other First World War battlefield guides; in fact, there are many.)

Susan Evans Shaw’s interest in this subject was stirred by the fact that her grandfather, Captain James Lloyd Evans of the 5th Infantry Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), was killed in action on 1 September 1918 during an attack on the Hindenburg Line. Her book is intended for new generations of Canadians, whom she hopes will now be able to trace the footsteps of their predecessors who fought in the Great War. The book, which is a guide to Canadian First World War operations in Western Europe, is divided into two parts. The first spans the relatively static trench warfare period from the beginning of the conflict until August 1918, the start of the so-called “Hundred Days” that make up the second part of the book. The author’s text, in which she recounts the course of various battles and describes cemeteries and monuments, is beautifully accompanied by Jean Crankshaw’s colour photos.

All of the major battles in which Canadians fought are covered here. Anyone whose relatives withstood the first poison gas attacks at Ypres in 1915, went over the top with the Newfoundland Regiment in July 1916, stormed Vimy Ridge in April 1917, or charged with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade at Moreuil Wood in March 1918 will find useful details of what took place there and how the battlefields are commemorated, as well as descriptions of the soldiers’ final resting places. Sadly, there are many cemeteries. It appears that Ms Shaw has visited all of the ones that contain Canadian graves, and readers looking for the graves of Canadian Victoria Cross winners or that of John McCrae (author of “In Flanders Fields”), or the former resting place of the Unknown Soldier, who is now interred at the National War Memorial in Ottawa, will find details of how to locate them. She does not shy away from the more controversial aspects of the war—indeed, she provides details on the gravesites of some Canadian soldiers who were “shot at dawn” for various offences. A full chapter of the book is devoted to those men, 25 of them in all.
The book also provides much useful information for military tourists or units that might be contemplating a visit to the World War I battlefields, including how to plan a visit to Vimy Ridge, the best maps to use (the book contains many very good ones, though the small size of the volume makes some of them hard to read), and a most helpful chapter on how to research a Canadian soldier who served in World War I. The notes and bibliography are particularly useful for those wishing to pursue Canadian Great War history further. While the focus of the book is on the traditional combat arms, there are also chapters on lesser-known Canadian units such as the Railway Troops, the Tunnelling Companies, the Forestry Corps and the embryonic Air Services. I couldn’t find much fault with this book at all, apart from the fact that there is only a passing mention of the Turkish battlefields where the Newfoundlanders fought during the Gallipoli campaign. But that is a small quibble with an otherwise fine volume, which is very timely and highly recommended. It’s also well designed and can fit easily in a jacket pocket.

ENDNOTES

1. From a general, albeit Allied, perspective, the Great War battlefield guides produced in the United Kingdom by Major and Mrs Holt (who also offer tours), are highly recommended, as are the Battleground Europe series published by Leo Cooper/Pen and Sword Books. Closer to home, there is the “Then and Now” format of In the Footsteps of the Canadian Corps: Canada’s First World War, 1914–1918 by Angus Brown and Richard Gimblett (Ottawa: Magic Light Publishing, 2006). Lastly, Canadian Military History magazine (published by Wilfrid Laurier University) produces Canadian battlefield guides in partnership with the Canadian War Museum.
The British plan to defeat their adversary included a significant amphibious operation to land two full brigades ashore. The first to go in, the 3rd Commando Brigade, was commanded by Brigadier Julian Thompson. The 5th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Sir Anthony Wilson, followed them in a few days later.

While the 3rd Commando Brigade, having already fought a vicious battle at Goose Green on 28–29 May, moved slowly eastwards towards Port Stanley along the northern flank, Brigadier Wilson’s brigade met little resistance to their front and rapidly pushed forward along the southern flank. In an effort to quickly seize terrain from the enemy, Brigadier Wilson greatly overstretched his already troubled formation, causing significant planning, tactical and logistical problems for the whole British land force. That, in addition to several other recorded blunders and oversights during the final stages of the land war, subsequently resulted in very harsh criticism of Wilson’s overall command during the campaign. Officially, he was completely snubbed by both the British government and the military after the war, being the only senior British commander to not receive a single honour for his role in operations. Brigadier Wilson subsequently resigned from all military service shortly after in December 1982, and later immigrated to the United States to live in relative obscurity.

Martin Mahle’s *The Lonesome Commander* is an amateur historian’s attempt to shed new light on a controversial subject that few seem willing to revise in detail. There is little question that Brigadier Wilson has been largely removed from the popular Falklands War narrative. Interestingly, he is not included in the list of British commanders on the Falklands War Wikipedia page (Brigadier Julian Thompson is) nor is he referred to directly in any way on any other pages examining the operations of 5th Infantry Brigade. His own Wikipedia page is decidedly brief in explaining the brigadier’s previously illustrious military career. Wilson had been awarded the...
Military Cross for gallantry in Northern Ireland and was subsequently made a member of the Order of the British Empire. Yet even when acknowledged by historians, he is largely presented as a military failure. Even Britain’s official history of the war states that “there were questions about Brigadier Tony Wilson’s competence,” leaving one with the impression that, rather than drag the brigadier’s reputation completely through the mud, the official historian simply preferred not to discuss it.

Mahle, a decorated former West German Army veteran turned bank economist, has been an avid student of the Falklands War for most of his life. The controversy over Brigadier Wilson’s command obviously gnawed at him for some time, and this study represents his own effort to address various aspects of that debate. Thus, The Lonesome Commander is not a detailed biography of

Brigadier Sir Mathew John Anthony Wilson, OBE, MC, 6th Baronet of Eshton Hall, but is rather an essay examining, more specifically, his command during the war that undoubtedly ended his military career. Originally published in the German language, Mahle’s English translation understandably suffers from several grammar and style errors, but the book remains very readable in English and offers a good, simple introduction to the subject for those who might be unfamiliar with the controversy. Divided into several small chapters, Mahle first introduces his anti-hero and then walks the reader through the historical record of what happened. He then offers his own analysis and as well as a counterfactual historical alternative to explore whether or not Wilson might have performed differently under other circumstances. While the conclusions drawn from this exercise are not very rigorous by academic historical standards, Mahle still makes a decent effort to examine what, if anything, Wilson might have done differently.

To Mahle’s credit, he made repeated attempts to contact his main subject via phone and e-mail to gain further insight on the brigadier’s thinking (at the time of Mahle’s research in 2012, Brigadier Wilson was living in Florida and Vermont, authoring travel guides). Ultimately, the effort
failed after a brief connection, but interestingly the author has included the contents of those letters in his book, including a final communication from Wilson’s attorney ordering Mahle to cease any further attempts to contact the brigadier. Despite that rebuke, the author remains sympathetic to Brigadier Wilson’s plight throughout the book and leaves the reader with the impression that there is indeed more to the story than what has been told thus far.

Mahle’s *The Lonesome Commander* is a good book, but not a great book, on the subject of Wilson’s troubled wartime command. There is a decent bibliography of sources but no footnotes or endnotes, and the author appears to have assembled his analysis mainly from other secondary sources. The book only includes two very small maps of the area of operations, relying instead on a decently constructed chronology to provide the context in which the major events took place. Lastly, the book has no index, which is simply unfortunate. Still, despite those oversights, *The Lonesome Commander* offers an interesting perspective on Brigadier Anthony Wilson, and it would make a suitable addition to the library of any dedicated student of this conflict.
Ronald Skirth was a native of Cheshire, England, and was 16 at the time that the war broke out in 1914. Like many others who wanted to do their bit, he joined up and was assigned to the Royal Garrison Artillery and, as a member of 239 Siege Battery, arrived in France in April 1917. He saw service in many of the cataclysmic battles on the Western Front that year and was ultimately transferred to Italy. Originally trained as a clerk, he later became a member of what today we would call an observation post (OP) party, responsible to deploy forward with the infantry and cavalry and to bring down fire on enemy targets.

His life-altering moment came on 8 June 1917, when he encountered the corpse of a dead German soldier. The soldier was clutching a photo of his girlfriend, who somewhat resembled Skirth’s own sweetheart, Ella, whom he had met earlier and with whom he corresponded during the war. After encountering the dead German in those circumstances, Skirth realized that his adolescence was over. Later in Italy, he had a similar
epiphany in a church, where he admitted that he had “reached the end of the road to Disillusion.” Bombardier Skirth then made his personal vow not to take another life and embarked upon his campaign of active pacifism. That included sending false firing information (or what, in my day, we called “target grid corrections”) so as to remain true to the pledge he had made to himself. Amazingly, his acts were never discovered by his superiors. Indeed, as recounted earlier, Skirth was decorated for his efforts. At the end of the war, he returned home (removing his rank badges) to make himself less conspicuous. There was no large welcome for Skirth and his comrades on their return home. He subsequently trained as a teacher and married his darling Ella, and they had a daughter together. When the Second World War broke out in 1939, though still a pacifist at heart, he did his bit to help the victims of war. He died in 1977.

Ronald Skirth only recorded his wartime experiences in 1971. His initial aim was to have a story that his family could read and to use writing as an exercise to ease his arthritis. During wartime, his letters would have been censored. His daughter gave the account to the Imperial War Museum, where the mother of the book’s editor, Duncan Barrett, brought it to his attention.

Skirth certainly had a difficult war, losing many comrades and being exposed to poor leadership from his superiors. As a gunner, I found Skirth’s description of relations between the ranks highly instructive. In his view, such relations were good in the infantry, where the officers led their men out of the trenches. However, in Skirth’s word, “In the artillery, it was not so. The officers rarely had any direct contact with the lower orders.” Skirth, however, also had an interesting war, meeting the writer Ernest Hemingway as well as the King of Italy. The book contains illustrations, including some drawings by Skirth himself (using the doubtless now lost art of the artillery “panorama”) that depict the view from his OP at various times. The book closes with a very open and honest postscript in which the author explains his views on pacifism and war, the latter in his opinion being an evil thing that someone enters of their own free will. Many years later, Ronald Skirth received a war disability pension, for which he admits he was grateful, and which enabled him to forgive, but not, as he says, forget.

As I write this review, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are experiencing the tragedy of a series of member suicides. That has increased awareness of, and placed additional focus on, the
condition known as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A case could be made that young Ronald Skirth was a PTSD sufferer as well, and that he chose to respond to it in the ways he described in this book. While the times are different, the issue of how our servicemen and servicewomen respond to war and conflict is as relevant today as it was a century ago. This is one of the most honest war memoirs I have ever read and is highly recommended.

Colonel Williams is Director, Global Plans, at the Strategic Joint Staff

ENDNOTES


2. Ibid. p. 233.
THE WAR THAT ENDED PEACE:
The Road to 1914

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
Margaret MacMillan, “The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914,”
Toronto: Allen Lane, Penguin Canada books Inc. 2013, hardcover,

Reviewed by Major Thomas K. Fitzgerald

The centenary of the First World War is sure to bring a small library of new books examining all aspects of this worldwide conflict, which caused an estimated nine million military and civilian dead and an additional fifteen million wounded, destroyed four empires, and heralded communist regimes in Russia and fascist regimes in Italy and Germany. Recent examinations of the causes of the war have attempted to point the finger of responsibility at, variously, Germany,¹ Imperial Russia,² and Great Britain,³ while Christopher Clark⁴ argues that Europe as a whole “sleepwalked” towards war.

Noted Canadian historian and writer Margaret MacMillan, in her book The War That Ended Peace, convincingly demonstrates that war came not as a result of chance but as a matter of choice as the options for peace were gradually and irretrievably restricted through the deliberate or reckless actions of many of the protagonists of the period.

The traditional historiography is that the war was the culmination of simmering colonial imperialism and traditional Anglo-German antagonisms, expressed through the naval build-up in the early years of the century and sparked into flame by the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. In her examination of the war, MacMillan draws on a variety of secondary sources to bring together the divergent cultural, political, diplomatic and social themes of pre-war Europe. She argues that, to many people of the time, war was not only desired but sought after. She poses the insightful question not of why the war started but of why the peace lasted as long as it did.

The declaration of war by the Austro-Hungarian Empire on Serbia on 25 July 1914 was, for MacMillan, the confluence of a number of individual and systemic factors that were mismanaged by unstable, weak or hawkish individuals. Nascent nationalism in the Balkans resulting in a succession of crises and two wars and near wars in Morocco and central Africa brought a sense of political and social complacency that wars could be avoided. It also resulted in a concomitant feeling that the peace that followed those conflicts and crises was secured at too great a price to national honour and prestige. Resentment, particularly among the nations’ militaries, followed. To many Europeans, war was not something to avoid. The destruction wrought by war would have a cleansing and redeeming character that would eliminate many of the decadent, effete and materialistic features of modern society. The Triple Entente and Triple Alliance, originally
designed as defensive coalitions, were now viewed as measures to secure the diplomatic and military isolation of their opposite members. Russia and Austria-Hungary, members of those respective alliances, moreover, used their coalitions as a means to secure their individual national interests with little, if any, prior consultation with their partners, who followed along with their wayward partner for fear of damaging their credibility inside and outside the alliance. Growing technology and the “cult of the offensive” had led countries to devise inflexible and hair-trigger mobilization plans that, once set in motion, could not be reversed by last-minute diplomatic action. It was this grouping of seemingly divergent factors that created expectations in the minds of many and made global war a plausible option when Franz Ferdinand was murdered.

MacMillan argues that wars are not inevitable but are the result of deliberation, indifference or recklessness on the part of the major players. *The War That Ended Peace* is infused with contemporary examples where similar conduct among nations is evident. It is manifest, as Macmillan writes, that the stresses and pressures of “that vanished world,” the rise of militant religions, social protest movements, and rising and declining states still exist and continue to provide the stuff from which new wars can start. It is imperative, she writes, that “we think carefully about how wars can happen and about how we can maintain the peace.”

**ENDNOTES**

UNLIKELY DIPLOMATS:
The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951–64

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD

While the Cold War is generally defined as encompassing the entire period of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union lasting from 1945 to 1991, the era of uncertainty that followed immediately after the Second World War until the resolution of the Cuban and Berlin Crises in 1961–1962 has increasingly come to be viewed by scholars as the true Cold War era. It was during those first two decades after the end of the world war that the victors openly confronted each other and threatened on more than one occasion to drag the world into a nuclear Armageddon.

It was also a time when politicians and strategists questioned the necessity of maintaining armies when devastating atom bombs could be more easily delivered by plane and missile.

In 1949, America, Britain, Canada and other western allies concluded a negotiation that resulted in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Designed to promote collective security and the western values of democracy and capitalism, the treaty soon required its member nations to contribute ground forces for the collective defence of still-occupied western Germany and, more broadly, the western side of central Europe. In 1951, Canada officially announced its own contribution to NATO with the deployment of an air division to France and 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade to West Germany. Historian Isabel Campbell’s most recent book, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951–64, provides the reader with a detailed political and social examination of the earlier brigade deployments, shedding new light on an often overlooked subject in Canadian Cold War military history.

Organized into six chapters, with generous endnotes and an extensive bibliography, Campbell examines a wide range of topics, from the politics of Canadian–German relations to the strategy of deterrence in brigade planning. In addition, she covers the troop experience in West Germany extensively and offers the reader a very detailed survey of the evolution of the Canadian Army during the early Cold War years. As much as this book is still an operational military history of sorts, its focus on the political context that led to the Canadian deployment to Germany, as well as on how soldiers and their families lived and fared after they arrived there, are the real strengths of the analysis. Campbell does a fantastic job at getting the reader to empathize with the challenges soldiers on deployment faced, and modern day practitioners will certainly feel a degree of familiarity when reading those sections of the book.
Published as part of the Studies in Canadian Military History Series from the University of British Columbia Press, the book holds to the high standard one has come to expect from volumes produced in this collection. If this reviewer has one complaint about the book, it is the lack of supporting material to further the analysis in the text. A map or two of Canadian basing and areas of operation in West Germany between 1951 and 1964 would have assisted readers unfamiliar with the geography. As well, the only tables in the book are associated with economic data. A table explaining the composition and order of battle of the brigades, as well as which ones rotated into Germany and when, would have been of great value. Finally, the book’s only photos are those on the front cover, which is a shame, given the rich photographic archives that exist for this period of the Army’s history.

That complaint aside, Campbell has nevertheless produced an interesting, informed, and very readable analysis of the Canadian brigade’s experience in West Germany during its formative years. This is a solid contribution to the scholarship on the subject and should encourage many to explore Canada’s Cold War-era army in greater depth. Isabel Campbell’s Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951–64 is highly recommended for both scholars of Canada’s military history as well as practitioners at the brigade level and beyond.

Two Ferrets in Soest, West Germany, with the Canadian Army in 1962

Source: Canadian Army Journal, 1963 Vol XVII

That complaint aside, Campbell has nevertheless produced an interesting, informed, and very readable analysis of the Canadian brigade’s experience in West Germany during its formative years. This is a solid contribution to the scholarship on the subject and should encourage many to explore Canada’s Cold War-era army in greater depth. Isabel Campbell’s Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951–64 is highly recommended for both scholars of Canada’s military history as well as practitioners at the brigade level and beyond.
In the summer of 1862, the tension that had been building between whites and the Dakota peoples in Minnesota boiled over into open conflict. Dakota warriors launched attacks on white communities along the Minnesota River valley. The conflict, referred to as the Dakota Uprising or the Minnesota Massacre, would have a devastating effect on both the aboriginal and white communities. In spite of its preoccupation with fighting the civil war against the Confederate States, the United States government organized a military campaign to restore order, but not before hundreds of whites had fallen victim to the violence.

By September of 1862 the uprising had been suppressed, and the subsequent trials of First Nations participants led to the execution of 38 Sioux, the largest single mass execution in American history. But that would not mark the end of white retribution. In the summers of 1863 and 1864, the United States Army would launch punitive expeditions against the Sioux tribes in Minnesota and the Dakota Territory.

Paul N. Beck’s book, *Columns of Vengeance: Soldiers, Sioux, and the Punitive Expeditions, 1863–1864*, is an excellent account of the US Army’s punitive expeditions against the Sioux. Beck begins with two chapters outlining the build-up to, and conduct of, the Sioux uprising in 1862 and then follows up with a chapter on the political, military and personal motivations behind the punitive expeditions launched in 1863–1864. The main effort of Beck’s work, however, is a series of chapters on the major engagements that took place throughout the two campaigns.

What distinguishes Beck’s book is his considerable utilization of first-hand accounts from participants in the conflict, with a particular focus on junior officers and soldiers rather than senior commanders. Beck gives a good account of the soldiers’ views on the nature of the war, conditions in the field and a range of emotions and concerns that will resonate through time with

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**COLUMNS OF VENGEANCE:**
Soldiers, Sioux, and the Punitive Expeditions, 1863–1864

**BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:**

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Rankin

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today’s military personnel. The force was made up primarily of volunteers who had expected to find themselves fighting rebel Confederates in the south. Views on the war among the soldiers who participated were diverse: some saw it as a distraction from the real task at hand; others, as a necessary exaction of revenge for the Sioux uprising of 1862. For readers who prefer to have a geographical sense of the action on the ground, one deficiency of the book is a lack of battle maps to accompany Beck’s descriptions of the campaign’s key engagements. This is mitigated by the superb job Beck does in describing the key engagements throughout the two campaigns, including the tactical approaches adopted by each side.

In his concluding chapter, Beck highlights some of the lessons learned by the US Army and the Sioux during the two campaigns, including the Army’s evolution away from the use of heavier infantry and artillery columns to move mobile cavalry forces and the Sioux adaptation to the Army’s superior firepower. In addition, it highlights how the Army’s failure to understand the Sioux’s complex political structure turned potential allies into adversaries through the conduct of indiscriminate operations.

Overall, Beck’s Columns of Vengeance: Soldiers, Sioux, and the Punitive Expeditions, 1863–1864 is a valuable contribution to the history of conflict between the United States Army and the indigenous populations during America’s expansion west. It is well worth a read.
An element of warfare that rarely receives the degree of attention warranted is fighting in built-up areas. Historians tracing the unfolding of a campaign will talk about fighting in Caen, Krakov or Warsaw but not delve into the details. Louis DiMarco’s book aims to address this oversight through an analysis of city fighting over the last century.

His stated intention for this book is threefold: provide the reader with an overall understanding of the urban battlespace, analyze doctrinal insights—based on case studies—into factors affecting the execution of urban operations, and trace the evolution of urban warfare in the 20th and early 21st centuries. He undertakes this effort through a series of case studies of urban conflicts commencing with World War II and running through to Iraq.

DiMarco’s work is interesting and useful in that it expends a great deal of effort providing a strategic and operational level (“big hand/small map”) overview of the conflict and the events leading up to it. The challenge with this is that the degree of analysis of the evolution of urban warfare is somewhat limited. I would have anticipated a greater attention and focus on the actual development and execution of urban doctrine. Additionally, DiMarco’s premise (identified in Chapter 1) that “warfare’s historically traditional locale” is the urban battlespace is, in my opinion, not accurate. One does not have to look very hard to find innumerable historical examples of field combat, siege warfare and, least of all, fighting in urban settings that underscore the multi-faceted nature of war.

Nevertheless, the book does contain some very valuable analysis. DiMarco identifies a number of consistent themes associated with success in urban combat. Intelligence, isolating the environment from reinforcement, specialized weapon systems and joint operating teams, as well as working to separate the combatants (both conventional and asymmetric) from their civilian population support base, all retain resonance. Additionally, the failure of many nations to remember and learn the lessons from the past (and the resulting failure to apply them) proved to be both costly and time-consuming.

DiMarco has produced a worthy product but it attempts to address too many issues that are secondary to, and have little bearing on, his stated primary focus. A good example of this is his
discussion of the use of Republic of South Korean forces in the retaking of Seoul during the Korean War. The author's outline of their involvement, while interesting, adds nothing to the discussion of how urban warfare was undertaken and developed.

I enjoyed his work as a general analysis of the battlefields that he reviews, but the book left me somewhat underwhelmed. I had anticipated, given his introduction, that much more emphasis would be placed on the hows and whys of urban conflict itself. Also, I think that a number of his premises, while not completely incorrect, are somewhat skewed. The book is worth reading, but with a critical eye. 🌟
In the fall of 1944, US XIX Corps was pushing to capture its first major city inside of Germany: Aachen. Determined to defend the fatherland, the German LXXXI Armeekorps made a stand behind well-prepared lines of defence, including the Siegfried Line. Lacking sufficient panzer units, the Germans relied increasingly on their assault guns to compensate, both to support divisional units and to act as a reserve to counterattack American penetrations.

That was a trend that had started earlier in the war when tank production could no longer keep up with the demand at the front. Among those assault guns was the venerable StuG III. For its part, the US Army, anticipating a hard fight against the bunkers and reinforced fortification of the German line, chose to use its heavy-gunned M10 tank destroyer to assist the infantry in reducing German defensive positions. Thus the StuG III assault gun as would-be tank destroyer and the M10 tank destroyer as would-be assault gun met in battle in a seemingly strange role reversal.

M10 Tank Destroyer vs StuG III Assault Gun: Germany 1944 is another book (#53) in the Osprey Duel series. The series compares various fighting systems from design and development through to combat, using a holistic analysis of the human, tactical and technical factors that contributed to their success in battle. This particular book looks at the American M10 tank destroyer and the German Sturmgeschütz (StuG) III assault gun and is written by Steven Zaloga, who is well known to those with an interest in armour fighting vehicles. In this book, Zaloga writes with his usual analytical and insightful style to create a detailed comparison between these two fighting systems. As with other books in the Duel series, Zaloga’s writing is complemented by a highly visual layout that includes the deliberate use of an array of comparative technical data, drawings and photographs as well as Richard Chasemore’s excellent full-color digital illustrations of the vehicles and their employment in battle. Taking as its major theme the necessity for fighting systems to tactically adapt when their technical and design specifications do not meet the reality of combat conditions, M10 Tank Destroyer vs StuG III Assault Gun: Germany 1944 explores these two lesser-known platforms within the American and German arsenals.

During the 1930s, the German Army was split between those such as General Manstein, who valued the dedicated and timely direct fire support that platforms such as the StuG could provide the infantry, and others such as General Guderian, who viewed the resources dedicated to
assault guns and those who supported them as the “grave diggers of the panzer force.” The StuG’s success during the invasion of France in 1940 ensured its survival, albeit with the recognition that a requirement for it to defeat enemy tanks in support of the infantry meant that certain improvements in firepower and protection were needed. That was further highlighted in its engagement with the more capable Soviet tanks it encountered on the Eastern Front, and it was increasingly used in an anti-armour capacity.

The US Army drew a different set of lessons from German operations in France. The effectiveness of the blitzkrieg indicated a need to protect infantry divisions from rampaging panzer formations. The response was to create an offensive-minded anti-tank capability that would rush forward to meet any advancing panzer penetration. It emphasized speed, firepower and aggression and was reflected in the tank destroyer motto “Seek, Strike, Destroy.” The M10 would form a significant element of that force. Once deployed, particularly where the panzer threat was reduced, commanders were unwilling to leave the M10 in reserve, waiting for a panzer breakthrough, given its valuable direct and indirect fire capabilities. Indeed, by the time it first faced German forces in Tunisia in 1943, the mass panzer threat was already in decline and the US would seldom find itself on the operational defence against the Germans.

*M10 Tank Destroyer vs StuG III Assault Gun* is an interesting and concise tale of the combat evolution of these two systems. As with many of the books in the Osprey collection, it will have a broad appeal to modellers, wargamers and military history enthusiasts.
OPERATION TYPHOON: Hitler’s March on Moscow, October 1941

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
ISBN: 978-1-107-03512-6
Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham

Four themes resonate throughout Stahel’s work on the German thrust towards Moscow in October 1941: 1) the challenges and importance of logistics; 2) the failure of the German High Command to accept the capability limitations of its forces; 3) the extreme willingness of the Soviet soldiers to sacrifice themselves; and 4) the equal determination and inner strength of the German soldiers to continue to drive forward despite dwindling supplies and atrocious weather conditions. Each of those veins of discussion permeate the narrative and serve to reinforce the desperation of the two antagonists.

Stahel’s work focuses primarily on the Germans and on the successes and difficulties they were encountering. In my experience, a vast majority of works on the Second World War do not give enough attention to the issue of logistics and home-front morale. Stahel, while focusing on the strategic perspective (with some minor forays into the operational one), identifies almost exclusively with the elephant in the German room: logistics. The narrative discusses in detail why it was that a command structure so adept at waging war chose to ignore this vital aspect. It is a fascinating glimpse into the human psyche and continues to be as relevant today as it was in October 1941.
Stahel does not dismiss the masterful way that the Germans undertook the operational execution of war; indeed, the very fact that they were as successful as they were against the Russians in their drive for Moscow is a testament to that. However, Stahel does do a noteworthy job of shining a light upon the Achilles heel of their war effort: the strategic planning and execution of operations. This book is unique in that it is not about the success that the Germans experienced in October 1941 but rather, more accurately, is about why they could not have won despite their successes. It is clear from the text, backed up by solid research that the Germans were not defeated by the Russians but by themselves and their inability to recognize what was within the realm of the possible. That they could defeat the Russian military was not in doubt; that they could stay ahead of a collapsing logistics system, overheated German public opinion, the worsening weather and, above all, their own inability to acknowledge the realities of their situation, definitely was.

Cambridge has published a wonderful book, of the highest quality, and it is a very welcome addition to any historian’s library. An extremely extensive bibliography rounds out a work of exemplary worth. Logistics receives the most talk and the least attention in any operation, yet it is as much the key to victory or defeat as the finest combat unit and, as Stahel has so eloquently proven, it is ignored at one’s absolute peril. 🍁
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